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A 



OF 



PHILOSOPHY. 



EMBRACING 



LOGIC, METAPHYSICS AND ETHICS. 



DESIGNED AS A TEXT-BOOK FOR THE USE OF SCHOOLS.. 



> 



by - /: ?^~?~: 

Rev. A. Louage, C. S. OS ^ - '<- ^ 

PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME. 



BALTIMOEE: 

KELLY, PIET & COMPANY. 

1873. 






THE LIBRARY 
OF CONGRESS 
WASHINGTOW 



Entered, according to an Act of Congress, in the year 1873, by 

KELLY, PIET & COMPANY, 

In the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



PREFACE 



T is the unanimous opinion of those best qualified 
to judge, that a knowledge of the first principles 
of Philosophy is necessary to complete any course 
of classical or scientific studies. Experience as well 
as reason teaches that those who complete their edu- 
cation with a course of sound Philosophy, thus 
acquire an accurate method for the continuation of 
their studies, for the instruction of others, or for the 
pursuit of any calling to which they may devote 
their talents. 

The man who learns what truth is, learns also to 
love it ; and will not be easily led astray by the sys- 
tems of error which are everywhere paraded before 
him, labelled with the false appellation of Philos- 
ophy : he despises the contradictions of pseudo- 
philosophers, he abhors the repulsive doctrines of 
the wicked, and avoids with care the corruption of 
morals which always accompanies them. Every- 
where and always he perceives the presence of the 
Divinity, and is accordingly filled with awe and 
reverence : he sees also, with consolation, the excel- 
lence of his own soul and its future destiny, and not 
only preserves it from the contamination of vice, but 
also adorns it with every virtue ;• thus conscientiously 
discharging all the duties of his station in life, he 
must ascend higher and higher in the scale of being, 



4 PREFACE. 

When we thus point out the abundant and inesti- 
mable fruits of Philosophy, it is evident that we do 
not speak of that so-called Philosophy which ignores 
the light of Divine revelation, but of that true 
Christian Philosophy which is guided as far as pos- 
sible by reason, but which freely admits the light of 
faith where that of reason fails : for, as we shall see, 
reason alone is not capable of completely solving 
some of the most serious problems which concern the 
salvation of man. 

The young man who, while at college, has either 
wholly neglected to study the rules of judging and 
knowing, or who has not engraven them deeply on 
his mind, wanders without a guide through dark 
and devious ways, and is " carried about by every 
wind of doctrine. ' ' He reads indiscriminately every 
book, good or bad, that chance throws in his way, 
and peruses them with little attention or reflection. 
Hence he fills his mind with imperfect notions of 
things, without any order ; everywhere he sees con- 
tradictory systems, and in the midst of this general 
darkness he remains uncertain of the truth, and 
even becomes doubtful of the very existence of cer- 
titude. Soon the truth of religion appears to him 
as not sufficiently proved ; and, owing to the preju- 
dices to which he has yielded, he begins to deny that 
there is any excellence in virtue or any turpitude in 
vice. Passions rise in his heart, which, not being 
restrained, but rather flattered and excited by many 
causes, soon lead to deplorable results ; for they 
shake his reason, which is already weak and deprived 
of its natural support, they destroy the vigor of his 



PREFACE. O 

physical system, they deprave his nature, and finally 
carry the unfortunate youth to utter destruction. 

That this is not an overdrawn picture is plain to 
any one who chooses to look around him with an 
unprejudiced eye; and it shows conclusively the 
importance of a knowledge of the primary principles 
of Philosophy. On this knowledge, in truth, de- 
pends the progress which we shall make in science, 
the solidity of our mind ; our love of truth and 
detestation of falsehood, our sagacity in choosing 
what is best, the integrity of our morals, the peace 
of families, the well-being of society, in a word, our 
happiness both in public and in private life. 

The teacher, therefore, who is incompetent, neg- 
ligent or dishonest, is the cause of an irreparable 
loss to those under his care ; while he who is learned, 
diligent and consistent in his instruction, sows in 
the minds of those committed to his charge the seeds 
of truth and virtue which will bring forth an abun- 
dant harvest of the richest fruits of a good education. 
To attain so desirable an end, the pupil should be 
guided, not by obscure and uncertain precepts, but 
by those which are established upon the clearest 
principles of reason : even as a child as yet unac- 
quainted with the way is guided, not by the hand 
of an ignorant or a dangerous man, but by that of 
his father. 

We do not approve of the method of teaching 
Philosophy by lecture ; for long lectures, however 
well developed, are not always understood by the 
student and are very easily forgotten : we are rather 
in favor of placing in the hands of the pupil a 



b PREFACE. 

small but comprehensive text-book, which, he can 
readily commit to memory, and easily retain. Such 
a text-book should be concise without being obscure, 
so that the attention of the student may be sufficiently 
attracted and exercised ; but, more than all, a book 
written for this object should be exact. 

An elementary book of this kind is not often 
found ; indeed it may be doubted whether one pos- 
sessing all the qualities mentioned above exists in 
any modern tongue. Some excellent compendiums 
written in the Latin language have been published 
since 1825 ; but they cannot serve our purpose, 
which requires a manual of Philosophy adapted par- 
ticularly to the wants of those who are not acquainted 
with the classics. To unlock the treasures of Phi- 
losophy for them, we concluded that it would be well 
to prepare a text-book having as far as possible the 
requisites mentioned above. 

During the preparation of our manual we have 
diligently consulted the best works on the subject ; 
and we now submit the result of our labors in the 
form of an elementary text-book on Philosophy, 
which we trust will meet the requirements of those 
for whom it is intended : and may God grant that, 
owing to the good intentions of the author, this book 
may be the means of advancing the best interests of 
the youths for whom it was written. 

S. K D. B. 



INTRODUCTORY. 



BEFOBE entering the sanctuary of Philosophy, 
a few words are necessary by way of introduc- 
tion. We shall arrange these preliminary remarks 
under four heads. Under the first we shall give the 
Definitions of several woeds of common occurrence : 
under the second we shall examine the Definitions 
of Philosophy: under the third we shall give the 
Divisions of Philosophy : and under the fourth we 
shall say something of Argument. 

I. 

Definitions of Words. 

A being or thing is that which exists or may exist : 
it is therefore twofold, real or possible. 

Existence is the real union of the parts or attri- 
butes which constitute a being. 

Possibility is the agreement of the attributes which 
constitute a being, in such a way that its existence 
does not involve any contradiction. 

The attributes are the qualities of a being : they 
are essential or constitutive when the thing cannot 
exist without them, and accidental when the thing 
can exist without them. 

The essence of a being; consists of the collection of 



O INTRODUCTORY. 

its essential or necessary attributes. The essence of 
a thing is also called its nature ; although the word 
nature is more extensive than essence, since the 
nature of a being sometimes includes its accidental 
as well as its essential attributes. Nature is also 
used to signify the whole collection of corporeal 
beings. 

A genus is a collection of beings having one or 
more attributes common to each. A genus must be 
sufficiently general to be divided into subordinate 
classes, called species. 

A species, therefore, is a collection of beings be- 
longing to one and the same genus, but having par- 
ticular and constitutive properties by which they are 
distinguished from any other collection of beings of 
the same genus. 

For example, being, the most general genus, is 
divided into two species, corporeal and incorporeal 
beings. These two species are each divided into 
other species, and consequently they are genera 
with reference to the subsequent divisions. Corpo- 
real bodies form two species, things with life and 
things without life. Things with life, considered 
-with reference to a further division, form a genus 
which is divided into two species, animals and vege- 
tables. 

The genus may be either remote or proximate. It 
is remote when there is at least one division inter- 
vening between the species and the genus referred 
to. For instance, when I say, Man is a rational 
being, the genus, being, is remote ; but it is proxi- 
iinate when I say, Man is a rational animal. 



INTRODUCTORY. 9 

Each species must have an essential attribute which 
makes it distinct from every other species of the 
same genus : this attribute is called the difference. 
When this difference consists of an attribute which 
separates every being of the species from every being 
of another species, it is called the specific difference. 
We have an example of this difference in the follow- 
ing definition, Man is a rational animal, where the 
word rational indicates the specific difference, dis- 
tinguishing man from any other species of the genus 
animal. 

Individuals are those beings to which, considered 
separately, the same genus and the same difference 
pertain. 

In Ontology we shall give the definitions of Sub- 
stance, Modification, Subject and Object, also of Order 
and Relation. 

Science is a series of notions deduced from princi- 
ples firmly established, disposed in a methodical 
order and referring to one and the same object. 

Science is either subjective or objective; subjective 
when we consider it as existing in our own minds, 
and objective when we consider it as existing in the 
object contemplated : it is again either speculative or 
practical. 

Practical science is the source of art . 

Art is the application of science to external things, 
according to determined rules. We will here ob- 
serve that the same species of knowledge may be at. 
the same time a science and an art. Arithmetic and 
Geometry, considered in themselves, are sciences ; 
but applied to external things they are arts. Logic, 
1* 



10 INTRODUCTORY. 

considered in itself, is a science ; but applied to trie 
investigation of truth and its manifestation, accord- 
ing to determined rules, as in the method of Aris- 
totle, it is the Art of Eeasoning, or the Art of 
Thinking. 

Knowledge, in general, is the representation 
taking place in the mind, of something, in some 
manner ; it differs very little from idea, as we shall 
see. It is intuitive when the object appears so 
clearly to our intellect that we perceive it without 
reasoning, and discursive when we need some de- 
monstration to perceive the object. 

Knowledge has for its objects either natural or 
supernatural things. 

Faith, in general, is the assent of the mind to 
some truth, on the testimony of another person. 
When this assent is founded upon the authority of 
G-od, it is Divine Faith ; it is Human Faith when 
established upon the testimony of men. 

II. 

Definitions of Philosophy. 

It often becomes necessary to give definitions, in 
order to avoid obscurity or uncertainty. A defini- 
tion is an explanation of a word or of a tiling. The 
definition of a word is said to be etymological when 
its origin is given, and significative when its mean- 
ing is explained. 

The definition of a thing is that which shows the 
nature of the thing. It may be merely descriptive, 
and then the definition is called imperfect; or it 



INTRODUCTORY. 11 

may be accurate and perfect, and this only deserves 
the name of definition. Description is suitable to 
oratory, but definition belongs especially to Philos- 
ophy : it gives precisely what is necessary in order 
that the thing may be understood and distinguished 
from every other thing, by enumerating its essential 
qualities. 

Three conditions are requisite to a perfect defini- 
tion : 1st, It must be clear, that is, free from any 
obscure or ambiguous expression ; 2nd, It must be 
orief, that is, free from all unnecessary words ; and 
3d, It must give the 'proximate genus and the specific 
difference. When these three conditions are found, 
the definition applies to the thing defined, and to 
nothing else, so that the thing and its definition are 
reciprocals. 

Philosophy has been defined as "the science of 
things knowable by the light of reason," or "the 
science of reason." 

But these definitions, while they distinguish Phi- 
losophy from theology, do not separate it from the 
physical and mathematical sciences ; and in our day 
these sciences have been so far extended that they 
have ceased to belong to Philosophy, as it is now 
taught in the schools. The following definition of 
Philosophy might consequently be accepted : ' ' The 
science of supersensible things knowable by the light 
of reason." This definition has the three requisite 
marks : it is clear, short, and contains the proximate 
genus, "science," and the specific difference, "super- 
sensible," which word distinguishes Philosophy 
from the physical sciences, and "knowable by the 



12 INTRODUCTORY. 

light of reason," which words distinguish Philos- 
ophy from theology. 

III. 

Divisions of Philosophy. 

Division, in general, is the distribution of a whole 
into its parts. A whole is that which is formed of 
parts really or logically distinct. The whole is said 
to be metaphysical, jjhysical or logical, according as 
its parts belong to one or other of these orders. 

The division, to be accurate, must have these 
three conditions : 1st, It must be adequate, that is, 
it must include as many members as there are in 
the whole which is to be divided ; 2nd, It must be 
distinct, that is, one part must not be included in an- 
other ; 3d, The parts must be proximate, otherwise 
there would be confusion, the following division, for 
instance, would be wrong : Living beings are divided 
into three classes, men, beasts and plants. A prox- 
imate division would be : Living beings are divided 
into two classes, animals and vegetables, and so 
continue, always giving first the proximate, or 
nearest, division, and the subdivisions in like order. 

Philosophy, as we have learned, is the science of 
supersensible things. In order to proceed method- 
ically in the acquisition of this science, we must 
first give the rules for the investigation of truth, 
and then investigate the things which form the object 
of this science, beginning with the most important, 
namely, God and the soul. The nature of God and 
the soul being known, we may examine the relations 
existing between God and the soul, between the soul 



INTRODUCTORY. 13 

and the body, and finally the relations of men to 
each other considered as social beings. We have 
then three parts which form the Divisions of Phi- 
losophy: namely, Logic, Metaphysics, and Ethics. 

IV. 

Argument. 

The different points to be treated under this head 
will be given in Logic. We will here say only a 
few words in regard to equivocal propositions, which 
we may sometimes' have to deal with. 

1st. We must distinguish and point out clearly 
the equivocal expressions. 

2nd. If these expressions are not clear of them- 
selves, we must define and explain them. 

3d. We must concede the proposition in the sense 
in which it is true, and deny it in the sense in which 
it is false ; and in both cases give our reasons for 
doing so, if necessary. 



A COURSE OF PHILOSOPHY. 

PART I.— LOGIC. 



LOGIC. 



Definition — Division. 

FOR the acquisition of science the human mind 
must first be provided with rules, and so be 
enabled to avoid error and establish truth on the 
solid foundation of reason. 

The word philosophy, as we have seen, is as uni- 
versal as the word science itself, and logic is the key 
of this science. Logic is consequently the first part 
of Philosophy, the part which treats of the first 
efforts of the human mind to discover truth, and 
afterwards gives rules by which this truth may be 
demonstrated. We may therefore define Logic to 
be, "The science which directs the operations of our 
mind in the investigation and demonstration of 
truth/' 

When this science is put in practice it becomes 
"The Art of Reasoning," which words may be ac- 
cepted as a definition of logic, considered as an art. 
In the foregoing definitions we find the three re- 
quisite conditions of a good definition : 1st, clearness, 
2nd, conciseness, and 3d, reciprocity, that is, the 
proximate genus and the specific difference are 
given. 



18 LOGIC. 

The natural order observed by the mind in the 
investigation of truth may be described as follows : 
We first represent objects*to ourselves, we next judge 
of them, we then compare our judgments and draw 
conclusions, and, finally, we arrange these conclu- 
sions in a certain order. Hence we have in the 
science of logic four different .parts or divisions ; the 
first treating of our Ideas of objects, the second of 
our Judgments concerning those ideas, the third of 
our Eeasoning concerning the judgments, and the 
fourth of the Method in which we dispose of the con- 
clusions of our reasoning. 

As soon as we have considered these four divisions 
of the science we shall apply it to a the investigation 
of the existence of truth, or Certitude ; and, logically 
speaking, this question comes first. Is there any- 
thing certain, is there any certitude? and, if so, how 
can Ave prove its existence ? Although this question, 
in reality, forms the introduction to the study of 
Philosophy, since without an affirmative answer to 
it we cannot make one step in the science, yet some 
authors treat it as a part of logic ; and we adopt this 
plan as more convenient, and shall therefore treat of 
certitude as the fifth part of logic. 



FIRST DISSERTATION. 

ON IDEAS. 
An idea may be considered as existing either in 
the mind or out of it : consequently this first disser- 
tation may be divided into two chapters. 



LOGIC. 19 

CHAPTEK FIKST. 

Of Ideas Considered as Existing in the Mind. 

" An idea is the mere representation in the mind 
of some object." We cannot, therefore, have an 
idea of nothing ; for nothing has no property or attri- 
bute by which it might be represented in the mind. 
The definition- of an idea being given, we have now 
to examine, 1st, the division of ideas, 2nd, their 
properties, and 3d, the operations of our mind in 
regard to them. 

§1. The Division oe Ideas. 

r 

In regard to their origin, some authors divide 
ideas into three classes : First, innate ideas, or those 
born 'with us ; second, adventitious ideas, or those 
coming to us from various causes in the course of 
time ; and third, factitious ideas, or those formed by 
ourselves. 

In regard to their object, we have, first, the idea 
of substance, when we consider the substance of a 
thing as abstracted from its modifications ; second, 
the idea of modification, when we consider the mod- 
ifications of a thing as abstracted from its substance 
(these two ideas are called abstract ideas) ; and, 
third, the idea of modified substance, which is called 
a concrete idea. 

Concrete ideas may be produced by sensation or 
by the imagination. They are produced by sensa- 
tion when they represent objects which strike our 
senses and which, therefore, really exist : they are 
produced by the imagination when they represent 



20 LOGIC. 

objects which, may exist, hut which do not strike our 
senses. 

All these ideas are called ideas of sensible things 
when their objects are sensible things ; and they are 
called ideas of intellectual things when the objects 
which they represent cannot affect the senses : the 
ideas of moral things belong to this second class. 

An idea is simple when the object represented can- 
not be divided, as, "an affirmation ;" complex when 
the object is qualified, as, " a good man ;" compound 
when the object may be divided into several parts, 
as, "a horse," " a tree ;" collective, when the object 
is a unity formed of several objects belonging to the 
same species, as, "an army;" universal when the 
object represents all the beings of the same species, 
as, " man in general;" particular when the object 
represents only a part of the beings belonging to the 
same species, as, "several men;" singular when the 
object refers to one individual of a collection, as, 
"Peter," "John;" and adequate when the object 
appears with all its attributes : God only has ade- 
quate ideas, we have but inadequate ones. 

§11. Properties of Ideas. 

Ideas are, first, either true or false. They are 
true when they conform with their objects, false 
when they do not. But since this conformity is 
always with the objects as represented in our minds, 
and not as they may be in reality, we may, with 
this explanation, admit the opinion of those who 
pretend that there are no false ideas. Ideas are, in 
the second place, either clear or obscure, and these 



LOGIC. 21 

words need no explanation. Thirdly, they are 
either distinct or confused. An idea is distinct when 
it can be readily separated from any other idea, as 
the idea of "a certain house" or of "a certain per- 
son;" and it is confused when the object cannot be 
distinctly determined. If I say, " Many persons are 
standing at a distance from me, and I cannot see 
whether they are armed or not, ' ' I have a confused 
idea. . 

' The comprehension of an idea signifies the sum of 
the attributes which constitute the nature of the 
object. The comprehension of the idea of man in- 
cludes everything necessary to constitute a man, as 
man, thus distinguishing him from everything else, 
as a tree or a stone. 

The extension of an idea signifies the whole collec- 
tion of the individuals which the same idea embraces. 
The extension of the idea of man includes all those 
beings that have the human nature, that is, all men. 

§ III. Opeeations of the Mind in Begaed to Ideas. 

The principal operations of the mind in reference 
to ideas are attention, abstraction and comparison. 

Attention is that operation of the mind by which 
we lay our ideas, as it were, before the eyes of the 
mind, in order to examine them with care and 
master them. Attention and reflection constitute 
the foundation of science and the source of learn- 
ing. 

Abstraction is that operation of the mind by which 
we consider one or more qualities of an object, the 
other qualities being laid aside. Abstraction is not 



22 LOGIC. 

only possible and even easy of attainment, out it is 
also necessary. 

Having examined several qualities and found that 
they belong to a certain object, if we unite these 
qualities in order to form this object again, we per- 
form an operation which is called synthesis : on the 
contrary, if an object is given us to study, and we 
divide it into its parts, examining successively each 
part, we perform an operation which is called analy- 
sis. We may, therefore, see that analysis is a de- 
composition, while synthesis is a recomposition. 

When, in order to form a species, we collect several 
individuals having Common properties, we perform 
an operation which is called generalization. 

When we consider two or more ideas, in order to 
find their consistency or their inconsistency, we per- 
form an operation which is called comparison. This 
operation is, of course, the most important ; without 
it we could not improve in any branch of science or 
art. 

CHAPTER SECOND. 

Of Ideas Considered as Existing Out or the Mind. 

There are three ways by which we may express 
what we represent to our mind, namely, gestures, 
speech and writing ; and these three are designated 
by the general appellation of signs. 

For the development of this chapter see the re- 
marks on the "Origin of Language," in experi- 
mental Psychology. 



LOGIC. 23 

SECOND DISSERTATION. 

ON JUDGMENT. 

When the mind after having compared two ideas 
declares their consistency or their inconsistency, it 
makes a judgment. Consequently c ' Judgment is 
that operation of the mind hy which it pronounces 
on the consistency or the inconsistency of two ideas, 
or declaring that a certain quality exists or does not 
exist in a certain object. We may readily under- 
stand that our errors proceed from mistaken judg- 
ments only, for we cannot err in perceiving or in 
feeling. 

Here again we may consider judgment as existing 
either in the mind or out of it, and consequently 
this dissertation is also divided into two chapters. 

CHAPTEK FIKST.~ 

Of Judgment Considered as Existing in the Mind. 

Judgment is a positive act of the mind, and not a 
mere sensation, as Condillac said, or a perception, 
according to the opinion of Mallebranche. It is an 
act, since we judge and pronounce, and we can do 
neither without acting ; it is, besides, a simple act, 
since it consists of an affirmation or a negation, and, 
consequently, cannot be divided. 

Judgment is very probably produced both by the 
intellect and by the will. 

A judgment is either necessary or free. A neces- 
sary judgment is one formed when the mind is so 
strongly impelled to judge that it cannot refrain 
from judging. ' ' I exist, " is a necessary judgment. 



24 LOGIC. 

A free judgment is one which the mind is not forced 
to pronounce. 

A judgment is, in the second place, either true or 
false, depending on the fact as to whether the things 
are, or are not, as the mind declares them to he. 

Thirdly, a judgment is certain when it is estab- 
lished on an infallible foundation, as, "Our Lord 
died," "Bodies exist/' 

Fourthly, a judgment is evident when it rests upon 
a clear and distinct perception of the consistency or 
the inconsistency of two ideas, as, "Two and two 
equal four." 

Lastly, a probable judgment is one established on 
trustworthy, but not infallible, reasons, as, " It is 
probable that a sick man will recover when several 
good physicians are of opinion that such will be the 
"case." 

CHAPTEE SECOND. 

Of Judgment Considered as Existing out of the Mind. 

"When we express our judgment we form what is 
called a proposition. To constitute a proposition 
three terms are necessary, a subject, a verb, and an 
attribute, one or even two of which may be under- 
stood. 

In every proposition the attribute always expresses 
a notion more extensive than the subject. Aristotle 
gives ten classifications of attributes, which he calls 
cle categoriis ; Kant gives but four. Nothing is 
more obscure and less useful than such classifica- 
tions. 

A proposition is universal when the subject is taken 



LOGIC. 25 

in all its extension, as, " Every substance is divisi- 
ble/' "No spirit is mortal." 

A proposition is particular when the subject is 
not taken in its full extension, as, "Some men are 
learned." Even such expressions as "All young 
men are fickle" are but particular propositions. 

A proposition is singular when the subject is but 
one individual, as, " Cassar was a great general." 

A proposition is affirmative when the attribute is 
declared to be consistent with the subject, negative 
when declared inconsistent. 

The following axioms in reference to affirmative 
and negative propositions are given in this connec- 
tion ; we shall need them farther on : 

1st Axiom. The attribute of an affirmative propo- 
sition is taken in its entire comprehension, but not 
in its entire extension ; consequently, the attribute 
of an affirmative proposition is a particular term. 
For example, if I say "All angels are spirits," the 
attribute ' ' spirits ' ' is taken in its entire compre- 
hension, but not in its entire extension ; for other 
beings than angels may be spirits. 

2d Axiom. The attribute of a negative proposition 
is not taken in its entire comprehension, but is taken 
in its entire extension ; consequently, the attribute 
of a negative proposition is a universal term. For 
example, if I say, "A man is not a stone," the at- 
tribute ' ' stone ' ' is not taken in its entire compre- 
hension, since both "man" and "stone" have the 
comprehension of material substance ; but it is taken 
in its whole extension, for no stone whatever is a man. 

A proposition is grammatical when we consider 
2 



26 LOGIC. 

only the terms as abstracted from the sense, and 
logical when we consider the proposition as having 
a determined sense. 

The sense of a logical proposition may be proper or 
foreign: it is proper, or natural, when we give to the 
words their ordinary meaning ; and it is foreign when 
we give to the terms a signification which is not 
their own. 

The sense may also be either divided or composite ; 
or, to use the Latin expressions, the proposition may 
be taken either in sensu diviso or in sensu composite. 
For instance, if I say, "The blind may see," the 
proposition is true in sensu diviso, but false in sensu 
composito. In the first sense the proposition means, 
"The blind, if restored to sight, may see ;" in the 
second it means, "The blind, though remaining 
blind, may see." In the course of this work we 
shall have more to say of this distinction. 

A proposition is true when it declares its subject 
to be as it is in reality, as, " God is powerful ;" and 
false when it declares its subject to be as it is not in 
reality, as, " God is cruel." 

Sometimes a proposition has two senses, and then 
it is called equivocal. To obtain the true sense of a 
proposition it is often necessary to stake the propo- 
sition in a different manner, to change the order in 
which the terms have been first presented ; some- 
times also when two propositions are given and 
compared it becomes necessary to judge of the con- 
trary or the contradictory of one of them: it is 
therefore necessary for us to learn something of the 
conversion and the opposition of propositions. 



LOGIC. 27 

§1. Conversion of Propositions. 

The conversion of a proposition is the changing of 
it into another proposition of the same -meaning. 

This conversion is simple when the whole attribute 
is substituted for the subject, and the subject for the 
attribute ; and it is accidental when a part only of 
the attribute takes the place of the subject. 

The following rules must be observed in the con- 
version of propositions : 

Kule I. The quality and the quantity of the prop- 
osition must be retained in the conversion. 

Rule II. A universal negative proposition and a 
particular affirmative proposition may both be conr- 
verted by simple conversion : for, in the first, both 
terms are universal (2d Axiom), and in the second, 
both are particular (1st Axiom); consequently, the 
quality and the quantity are kept in the conversion. 
Examples of simple conversion : 

No man is a stone ; no stone is a man, 

Some men are good persons ; some good persons 
are men. 

Rule III. A universal affirmative proposition 
cannot be converted by simple conversion, for its 
attribute is a particular term (1st Axiom) ; except 
in necessary and reciprocal statements, that is, when 
they are identical in regard to the sense, as is the 
case in definitions. For example, " All priests are 
men" is not equivalent to "All men are priests" 
but to "Some men are priests." But "All circles 
are round" is equivalent to its reciprocal, "All 
round figures are circles." 

Rule IV. A particular negative proposition cannot 



28 LOGIC. 

be converted either simply or accidentally ; for such 
a conversion would violate the first rule, by chang- 
ing the quality or the quantity of one of the terms. 

§11. Opposition of Propositions. 

When I say "Peter is a learned man," and " Pe- 
ter is not a learned man," I have two propositions 
which are opposite. 

Opposition is, therefore, the negation in one prop- 
osition, and the affirmation in another, of the same 
attribute, concerning the same subject and with the 
same reference. Consequently, in these two propo- 
sitions, " Peter is good" and "Paul is not good," 
there is no opposition ; nor is there .any opposition in 
the following, "Peter is learned in philosophy" 
and "Peter is not learned in theology." To con- 
clude, two propositions are in opposition when one of 
them denies what the other affirms. It follows that 
two negative propositions cannot be in opposition. 

Two propositions are said to be contrary when in 
one of them more is said than is necessary to refute 
the other. Example : "All men are just. No man 
is just." 

Two propositions are called contradictory when in 
one is said precisely what is necessary to refute the 
other ; as, " All men are just. A certain man is not 
just." 

Evidently, two contradictory propositions cannot 
both be either true or false ; for, if so, the same 
thing wQiild be and not be at the same time ; that 
is, the same attribute would be consistent and not 
consistent with the subject, which is absurd. 



logic. 29 

As a corollary, since two contradictory proposi- 
tions cannot be true and false at the same time, it 
follows that when one is true the other is false, and 
vice versa. 

Two contrary propositions cannot both be true at 
the same time, but both may be false : for, as two 
contradictory propositions cannot both be true at 
the same time, since in one of them is said precisely 
what is sufficient for the refutation of the other ; so, 
a fortiori, two contrary propositions cannot both be 
true at the same time, since in one of those proposi- 
tions more is said than is needed for the refutation 
of the other : also, since, in one of the two contrary 
propositions more is said than is necessary to refute 
the other, there may be a middle term which is the 
true one ; and consequently the two contrary propo- 
sitions may both be false. 

Examples: " All men are just. No man is just," 
— both false. The middle term, "some men," is 
the true subject ; and "some men are just " is the 
true proposition. 



THIRD DISSERTATION. 

ON EE ASOJSTING . 

When after comparing several judgments we draw 
a conclusion from them we are said to reason. Rea- 
soning is, therefore, an act of the mind deducing a 
judgment from other judgments ; and when expressed 
in words it forms an Argument. Argument then is 
to reasoning what the proposition is to judgment, 
namely, its formal expression in words. 



30 LOGIC. 

Seasoning is said to be immediate when no com- 
parison is needed, and mediate when a comparison 
is necessary. 

Reasoning affects only formal truth ; hence, if we 
assume a false principle we shall, by good reasoning, 
deduce a false conclusion. 

There are many sorts of argument, of which the 
syllogism is the most common. 

We shall divide this dissertation into five chap- 
ters. In the first we shall treat of the syllogism 
and its rules ; in the second, of the different kinds 
of syllogisms ; in the third, of the forms of argument 
other than the syllogism ; in the fourth, of sophisms ; 
and in the fifth, of the sources of sophisms. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

Of the Syllogism and its Rules. 

The syllogism is an argument consisting of three 
propositions so arranged that from the first two, 
called the premises, the third necessarily follows as 
a conclusion. 

In every syllogism there are three terms, the 
major, or greater, the minor, or less, and the middle. 

The major term is the attribute of the conclusion, 
of which the minor is the subject : as we have already 
learned, the attribute is always a greater term than 
the subject. The middle term, which is the term 
of comparison, is not found in the conclusion. 

The first proposition of the syllogism is called the 
major proposition, because it contains the major 
term ; the second is called the minor, because it con- 



LOGIC. 31 

tains the minor term ; and the third, which, as we 
have just seen, contains both the major and the 
minor term, is called the conclusion. 

The major and the minor are together called the 
premises, or the antecedent; and the conclusion is 
also called the consequent. 

Example : 

Middle Term. Major Term. "*| 

Major. All bad men are miserable ; Premises, or 

Minor Term. Middle Term. ( Antecedents. 

Minor. All tyrants are bad men ; J 

Conclusion. All tyrants are miserable. Conse- 
quent. 

The minor premise may precede the major. 

Eules of the Syllogism : 

1st. The syllogism must have but three terms. 

2d. No term must be greater in the conclusion 
than it is in the premises. 

3d. The middle term must be at least once a gen- 
eral term. 

4th. No conclusion can be deduced from two pre- 
mises which are either negative or particular. 

5th. Two affirmative propositions cannot produce 
a negative conclusion. 

6th. The conclusion follows the weaker premise. 
That is, when one of the premises is a negative prop- 
osition the conclusion will be negative, and when 
one of the premises is a particular proposition the 
conclusion will be particular. 

Examples of faulty syllogisms : 

Against Rule 1st. 

Every man is a spirit; 



32 LOGIC. 

Every substance is divisible. — -Four terms, no con- 
clusion. 

Against Rule 2d. 

Every animal is a living being ; 

Every animal is a substance ; 

Every substance is a living being. 

Every substance, in the conclusion, is a general 
term, and it is a particular one in the minor. 

Against Rule 3d. 

Every man is an animal ; 

Every brute is an animal; 

Every man is a brute. 

The middle term is taken twice in a particular 
sense and with a different reference, which consti- 
tutes two different terms, consequently, there are 
four terms in the premises. 

Against Rule 4th. 

No man is a stone ; 

Man is not marble. — No conclusion. 

Against Rule 6th. 

The Italians are soft ; 

The Italians are men ; 

Hence (some) men are soft. 

This syllogism is good, but the following would 
be wrong : 

No man is a stone. 

Marble is stone. 

Marble is man. 

Syllogisms may be divided into four classes accord- 
ing to the position of the middle term. 



LOGIC. 33 

In the first class — The middle term is the subject 
of the major and the attribute of the minor. 

In the second class — -The middle term is the attri- 
bute of both premises. 

In the third class — The middle term is the subject 
of both premises. 

In the fourth class — The middle term is the at- 
tribute of the major and the subject of the minor. 

In the first two classes we may have four cases, or 
forms of syllogism ; in the third class we may have 
six forms ; and in the fourth, five forms. Each of 
these cases, or forms, is designated by a word con- 
taining three vowels. The first two vowels indicate 
the quantity of the premises, and the third indicates 
the quantity of the consequent. 

There are, as we have seen, four kinds of proposi- 
tions, which are indicated as follows : 

1st. Universal affirmative — by the vowel a. 

2d. Particular affirmative — by the vowel i. 

3d. Universal negative — by the vowel e. 

4th. Particular negative — by the vowel o. 

We will illustrate the use of these vowels by two 
examples : 

Middle 

First. All virtuous men are happy 



Middle. I f ^Uq 

All good men are virtuous ; 



One form 

of the 
first class. 



All good men are happy. 
Second. 

Middle. ^ C)r\Q 

No vicious conduct is praiseworthy; ? 

' term 

Middle. ^ of the 

All truly heroic conduct is praiseworthy ; ( '-, 

J '■ | second 

No truly heroic conduct is vicious. J class. 

2* 



d4 LOGIC. 

In the first example, "both of the premises and the 
conclusion are universal affirmative propositions, 
and, "by the notation given above, must each be indi- 
cated by the vowel a. Hence the word used to desig- 
nate this example must contain the vowel a three 
times. Barbara is the word used for this purpose. 

In the second example, the major premise is uni- 
versal negative, and therefore indicated by e; the 
minor is universal affirmative, and hence indicated 
by a; while the conclusion, universal negative, is 
designed by e: the word celarent, therefore, desig- 
nates the form represented by this example. 

It will now be enough, without further explana- 
tion, to give the words used to designate each form 
in the four classes of svllo2;isms : 



1st Class. 


2d Class. 


3d Class. 


4th Class. 


Barbara, 


Celarent, 


Darapti, 


Bramantip, 


Cesare, 


Camestres, 


Disamis, 


Camenes, 


Darii, 


Festino, 


Datisi, 


Dimaris, 


Ferio. 


Fakoro. 


Felapton, 


Fesapo, 






Dokamo, 


Fresison. 






Feriso. 





CHAPTER SECOND. 

Of the Different Sorts of Syllogisms. 

The syllogism may be simple, complex, or com- 
pound. The simple syllogism is that of which we 
have treated in the preceding chapter. A complex 
syllogism is one whose conclusion contains complex 
terms ; it may always be reduced to a simple syllo- 
gism. 



LOGIC. 35 

Example : 

f Divine law obliges us to honor the pas- 
p i J tors of the Church ; 

1 '" | Benedict is a pastor of the Church ; 

[_ Hence, divine law obliges us to honor him. 
This syllogism is equivalent to the following : 
f Our pastors ought to be honored ; 
Simple. A Benedict is our pastor ; 

[Hence, he ought to be honored. 
The syllogism is compound when the major is a 
conditional, disjunctive, or negative conjunctive 
proposition. 

I. The major is conditional when it consists of 
two parts, the one called the antecedent and the 
other the consequent, united by if. In this case, 
when we concede the antecedent in the minor we 
must affirm the consequent in the conclusion, and 
when we deny the consequent in the minor we must 
also deny the antecedent in the conclusion — verum 
prius, ergo et poster ius ; falsum consequens, ergo et 
antecedens — that is, the first being true, the second 
is true ; and the second being false, the first is also 
false. 

Example : 

If Peter is wise he will stay away from gambling 
houses ; 

1st. But Peter is wise ; hence, he will stay away, 
&c. 

2d. But Peter will not stay away, &c; hence, 
Peter is not, &c. 

II. The major is disjunctive when it consists of 
two or more parts incompatible with one. another, 
and united by either — or. In this case, when one 



LOGIC 



part is affirmed in the minor the other is denied in 
the conclusion. The parts forming the major must 
be contradictory propositions. 
Example : 

We must either restrain our passions or yield to 
them ; 

But we must restrain them (since reason and re- 
ligion teach us to do so) : 

Hence, we must not yield to them. 
Since the two propositions forming the major 
ought to he contradictories, there should he no mid- 
dle term between them. 
Example : 

We must either obey governments commanding 
evil to be done, or we must revolt against them : 

But we must not obey governments commanding 
evil. &c: 

Hence, we must revolt against them. 
Here, the major term, which should consist of two 
contradictories, is made up of two contraries, both 
of which, as we have seen, may be false : hence the 
error in this example. The truth is contained in a 
middle proposition. "We must suffer persecution.'"' 
III. The major is negative conjunctive when it 
consists of two contrary propositions. In this case, 
when we affirm in the minor we must deny in the 
conclusion, for both propositions cannot be true ; 
but if we deny in the minor we cannot absolutely 
affirm in the conclusion, for two contrary proposi- 
tions may both be false. The rule is. therefore, s 
follows : One part ought to be affirmed in the minor 
and the other denied in the conclusion. 



LOGIC. 61 

Example : 

No one can serve God and mammon ; 
The avaricious man serves mammon ; 
Hence, lie does not serve God. 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

Of the Forms of Argument other than the 
Syllogism. 

1st. The EntJiymeme. — This is an abbreviated 
syllogism, in which one of the premises is omitted. 

Example : 

God is good ; 

Henee he should be loved. 

The major, " We should love those who are good," 
is omitted. 

2d. The Epichireme.- — This is a syllogism whose 
major and minor are accompanied with proofs. The 
substance of Cicero's beautiful " Oration tor Milo" 
is given in the following Epichireme : 

It is lawful to kill those who lie in wait to kill us 
(this is proved by the natural law and by the laws 
of nations — many examples) ; 

But Clodius lay in wait to kill Milo (this is proved 
fey the number of armed men who accompanied 
Clodius, his absence from Rome .at the time of the 
attack, &c); 

Hence, it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius. 

An Epichireme may be reduced to a single syllo- 
gism. 

3d. The Sorites.- — This is an accumulation of prop- 
ositions, so connected that, the attribute of each is 



38 LOGIC. 

made the subject of that which follows, and the sub- 
ject of the first becomes the attribute of the last. 

The propositions must be well " chained/'" so that 
there may be no middle term between the attribute 
of one proposition and the subject of the following ; 
and no equivocal proposition should be employed. 

Example : 

Avaricious men desire manv things, 

Those who desire many things are in need of 
many things, 

Those who are in need of many things are dissat- 
isfied with their condition, 

Those who are dissatisfied with their condition 
are not happy ; 

Hence, avaricious men are not happy. 

4th. The Dilemma.- — This is an argument in 
which we conclude of the whole major, which is 
generally a disjunctive proposition, what we have 
concluded of each j>art. It is called a horned argu- 
ment, because it strikes on both sides. 

Example : 

When the wicked die, either they are utterly 
destroyed or their souls are immortal : 

If they are utterly destroyed there is no hope of 
eternal happiness for them ; 

If their souls are immortal there is also no hope 
of eternal happiness for them, since God is just ; 

Hence, there is no hope of happiness for the wicked 
after death. 

To have the dilemma good no middle term must 
be possible in the major, and the conclusion must be 
true after each part. 



LOGIC. * 39 

5th. Induction or Enumeration.- — This is an argu- 
ment in which the major is an enumeration of partic- 
ulars, from which a universal conclusion is deduced. 
That the argument may be absolutely conclusive, 
the enumeration must be complete. 

6th. The Example. — This is a common form of 
argument in which a single conclusion is drawn 
from a single proposition. This may be done in 
three ways : by' similitude, or comparison {a pari), 
by opposition, or contrast (e contrario), and by su- 
periority (a fortiori) . 

Examples : 

1st. apari. God forgave David when he repented ; 
a pari, He will forgive me. . 

2d. e contrario. Intemperance is hurtful to health ; 
e contrario, Temperance is favorable to health. • 

3d. a fortiori. John's conversation for even one 
hour is tedious ; a fortiori, it would be tedious for a 
whole day. 

CHAPTER FOURTH. 

Of Sophisms. 

The word sophism comes from the G-reek sophizo, 
which signifies to teach ivisdom; and the Greek noun 
sophismos means wise invention. From this etymol- 
ogy it is easy to understand that the word sophism 
had not in the beginning the meaning which it has 
at present. Men of subtle intellects, falsely called 
philosophers, have abused their powers of reasoning 
so far as to construct a theory for reasoning falsely, 
a theory by which fallacies are logically established 



40 LOGIC. 

as if they were truths. This is what is now called 
sophistry. A sophism, then, is a false reasoning, 
with the intention of deceiving. "When the sophism 
results from ignorance in the reasoner, it is called a 
paralogism. 

Aristotle divides sophisms into three classes : 1st. 
formal sophisms ; 2d. material sophisms, or sophisms 
extra dictionem ; and 3d. verbal sophisms, in dictione, 
that is, sophisms existing in the words used. 

Formal sophisms are syllogisms badly constructed. 
Of these we have already spoken. 

Material sophisms are the following : 

(a) Ignoraiitia elenchi, which may be translated, 
"ignorance of the subject." This occurs when we 
prove what is not in question, or what is not denied 
by our opponents ; also when we suppose them to be 
actuated by principles which they disavow, or when 
we draw from their words or actions inferences which 
they would not admit. This sophism is of common 
occurrence ; it comes from precipitation, prejudice, 
and feelings of pride or hatred towards our oppo- 
nents, but still more from equivocation in terms not 
well defined. In order to avoid this last source of 
error, we must know both the precise sense and the 
exact extent of the expressions used by our oppo- 
nents. 

(b) Petitio principii, or "begging the question." 
* This species of false reasoning takes place when we 

suppose as proved that which is to be proved. There 
is no substantial difference between this sophism and 
that called the vicious circle (circulus vitiosus), or 
arguing in a circle, which consists in proving two 



LOGIC. 41 

propositions by one another, neither of them being 
otherwise proved. 

Examples : 

The earth is immovable, because the sun moves 
around it. 

Evidence is infallible, because God is infinitely 
true ; and God is infinitely true, because it is evi- 
dent, &c. 

(c) Non causa pro causa, or "Not the cause for 
the cause." This sophism occurs whenever we give 
as the cause of some effect that which is not its cause. 
This happens frequently, especially in the case of 
"Post hoc, ergo propter hoc," — after this, therefore 
on account of this. 

(d) Imperfect enumeration . No explanation needs 
to be given of this kind of false argument. 

(e) Fallacy of objection. This sophism results 
when we consider as a cause, or as an essential, that 
which is only an accident. 

The following are examples of the fallacy of ob- 
jection : 

(1) Philosophy rendered many men impious ; 
then philosophy is a bad thing. 

(2) False miracles have been believed; then no 
faith ought to be given to miracles, &c. 

Verbal sophisms, or sophisms in dictione, are the 
following : 

(a) Fallacy of division and composition. Passing 
from a distributive to a collective sense in the use of 
words. 

Example : 

Two and one are . even and odd ; 



42 LOGIC. 

But two and one are three ; 

Therefore three is even and odd. 

One and two are even and odd when divided (in 
sensu diviso), but not when united (in sensu compos- 
ite)). This distinction is the only one to he given in 
such cases. We may see that in the above sophism 
there are four terms : two and one are taken in sensu 
diviso, or distributively, in the major ; and in sensu 
composite, or collectively, in the minor. Hence the 
syllogism involves an error against the 1st rule. 

2d. Passing from a collective to a distributive 
sense ; or attributing to several parts of a collection 
what is true only of the collection itself. 

Example : 

The Apostles were twelve ; 

Peter and James were Apostles ; 

Therefore Peter and James were twelve. 

Here again we have four terms in the premises. 
The Apostles are taken together (in sensu composite) 
in the major ; and separately (in sensu diviso) in the 
minor, — and no conclusion can be drawn. 

(b) Fallacy of accident. This consists in assert- 
ing something of a subject in a general sense, in one 
of the premises ; while in the other premise we con- 
nect with that subject some accidental peculiarity. 

Example : 

You now have the same feet that you always had ; 

But you once had small feet ; 

Therefore you now have small feet. 

Putting this sophism in the form of a regular syl- 
logism, we shall perceive that there are four terms 
in the premises. 



L G I c . 43 

Your present feet are those of your childhood ; 

The feet of your childhood were small feet ; 

Therefore your present feet are small feet. 

In the major, the u feet of childhood" means the 
essence of those feet, while in the minor it means 
their form or shape. Hence the middle term being 
taken in two different senses we have four terms in 
the premises and can draw no conclusion. 

Besides these two kinds of verbal sophisms, we 
have (c) that of Equivocation, (d) that of Amphib- 
ology, and (e) that of Figure. 

Example of a sophism of figure : 

No creature laughs but man ; 

But a meadow laughs ; 

Hence a meadow is a man. 

We may observe that ' ' meadow ' ' is first taken in 
a figurative sense and then in a literal. 

Doctor Ubaghs, speaking of these last three so- 
phisms (c, d, and e), says that they do not deserve to 
be mentioned, since they could embarrass no one but a 
child or a person of very dull mind. 

CHAPTEK FIFTH. 

Of the Sources of Sophisms. 

The sources of sophisms are : 

1st. Precipitation. We are liable to commit a 
sophism whenever we pronounce a judgment on any- 
thing which we have not well considered or which 
is not sufficiently well known. 

2d. Prejudice. In this case we form a judgment 
•in accordance with our wishes and without previous 
examination. 



44 LOGIC. 

3d. Our passions. There are impressions vio- 
lently agitating our mind and forcing it in different 
directions. 

4th. Our senses. The senses have been given to 
lis by G-od that" we may judge of external bodies, not 
as they are in themselves, but as they appear to us. 

5th. Our imagination. The imagination is that 
faculty of the mind which pictures to itself material 
objects that do not affect the senses. 

Although the human mind is very imperfect, still 
it would never be deceived if we always acted pru- 
dently in the investigation of truth, abstaining from 
judging until the truth shows itself manifestly to 
the mind. We should then be ignorant of many 
things, and know others imperfectly ; but we should 
not err. 



FOURTH DISSERTATION. 

ON METHOD . 

We have now explained the notions of Ideas, the 
nature of Judgment and of Reasoning, and we have 
given rules for judging and reasoning correctly. It 
remains for us to examine in what order we should 
arrange these mental operations for the investigation 
and manifestation of truth. This arrangement and 
order is called Method, or ' ' The way we must go in 
order to reach the end we have in view." 

Definition. — Method is that operation of the mind 
by which we dispose our thoughts in that order 
which is most suitable for detecting the truth which 



LOGIC. 45 

we do not know and showing it as soon as we know 
it. 

Evidently the necessity of method shows the weak- 
ness of our mind ; but without it progress cannot be 
made, nor can pleasure be found, in the reading of 
books or the teaching of masters. 

Method being the application of the science of 
logic, is consequently an art ; and this art is ac- 
quired rather by practice and experience than by 
precept, and it depends more on the rectitude and 
attention of our mind than on rules. 

Division. — Some authors divide method into two 
kinds, the analytic and the synthetic. This division 
cannot be accepted ; for, according to it, the analytic 
method, which is the same as the method of induc- 
tion, would proceed always by analysis ; but this 
would too much restrict the method of induction, in 
which we have to proceed as much by synthesis as 
by analysis, as experience shows. We must then 
take a more accurate division. 

There are two divisions of method, or two methods ; 
the method of invention, which comprises observa- 
tion and induction ; and the method of demonstra- 
tion, or dialectics. 

1st Division, the Method of Invention. 

The difference between observation and induction 
may be stated thus : When our attention is directed 
towards a phenomenon or a fact, in order only to 
know it, we make an observation ; but when that 
attention is directed to the same fact or phenomenon, 
in order to discover some law, or to deduce some 



46 LOGIC. 

conclusion from principles, we make, in the first 
case, an induction, and in the second, a deduction. 

Observation is consequently a serious attention of 
the mind, in order to know some fact, which fact 
may be either exterior or interior. 

In order to observe well, four operations are ne- 
cessary : First, attention ; and this attention must 
be intense, persevering, and free from prejudice ; 
second, distinct perception of the fact, that is, we 
must determine well the circumstances of its exist- 
ence, and its essential elements ; third, analysis, 
which should be complete, the examination being 
minute and exhaustive ; and fourth, synthesis, which 
should also be complete, the recapitulation being 
made in proper order. These rules ougbt to be fol- 
lowed not only in observing but also in making ex- 
periments. 

Induction, which always supposes previous observ- 
ation, is an oj>eration of the mind inducing us to 
affirm of things not observed that which we have 
observed in similar things. 

Four conditions are necessary in order that the 
induction may be good : " First, abstraction ; second, 
comparison: third, generalization (This, as we have 
seen, signifies the discovery of a quality common to 
several similar objects ; and this common quality 
serves as a distinguishing mark for the class in 
which all the similar objects are contained. Classi- 
fication is the formation of these classes, and we may 
see that generalization affords the materials for classi- 
fication.); and fourth, induction, properly so called, • 
which is the extension of the common quality di.s- 



LOGIC. 47 

covered by generalization to other objects of a similar 
kind. 

Note. — This method leads lis to a certain knowl- 
edge of the truth. There are other modes of inves- 
tigation which lead us, no£ to a sure, but to a more 
or less probable knowledge of the truth ; these are : 
analogy, hypothesis and the calculation of proba- 
bilities. 

Analogy is an operation of the mind attributing 
to one object some quality observed in another. 

Example : A certain medicine has proved to be 
good for a certain sick person ; analogy would lead 
us to believe that it would be good for another person 
sick in like manner. 

Analogy must be grounded on obvious resem- 
blance, and the resemblance must have necessary 
connection with the conclusion which we draw. 
Hence the science called cranioscopy, and others of 
that kind, are false. 

Hypothesis is the supposition of a cause, in order 
to explain several effects of which the cause is con- 
cealed. An hypothesis is also called & postulate. 

Example : The hypothesis of the existence of a 
neutral electric fluid in all bodies, in order to ex- 
plain electric phenomena. 

Hypotheses are very useful, but subject to many 
serious inconveniences. In order to proceed wisely 
when we form an hypothesis, we must first examine 
well the case which we wish to explain by hypothe- 
sis, and notice all its circumstances ; for the degree 
of probability of an hypothesis depends on the num.- 



48 LOGIC. 

ber of circumstances which it explains : and, in the 
second place, we should chose out of those circum- 
stances that which is most important, and try to 
explain it by the hypothesis ; hut although our hy- 
pothesis may explain this most important circum- 
stance, yet if it he in contradiction to any other 
circumstance it must he rejected. 

The calculation of probabilities, so far as it has 
reference to philosophy, will he spoken of in several 
other places, especially in Ethics. 

2d Division, the Method of Demonstration, or 
Dialectics. 

To demonstrate is to prove ; and a demonstration 
is an argument in which the truth of a proposition 
is deduced from one or more propositions which are 
known to be true. The proposition from which the 
conclusion is drawn is called the principle of the 
demonstration ; and as this principle may be either 
sure or probable, the deduction will be accordingly 
either certain or only probable. 

The parts of a demonstration are as follows : 

1st. The question, or proposition to be demon- 
strated. When the question is concerning a truth 
to be demonstrated, it is called a theorem, a thesis, 
or simply a proposition ; and when it is concerning 
a truth to be discovered, it is called ^.problem. The 
question must be defined, divided into its parts, 
precise, and well arranged. 

Example : The question is, is the human soul 
immortal ? Immortality must be defined ; and the 
question must be divided into its two parts concern- 
ing internal immortalitv and external immortality. 



LOGIC. 49 

The first part of the question may be passed over, 
as evident ; and then the real question comes, which 
is, whether the soul, after the death of the body, 
will pass to another life, a life without end. We 
next arrange this question into its two parts, (a) 
_ whether the soul, on leaving the body, will pass to 
another life, and (b) whether that life is eternal. 

2d. The principle of the demonstration. This 
principle, or these principles, must be certain and 
connected with the question. They may be axioms, 
or facts of experience, or simply postulates. These 
two first parts, the question and the principle, are 
called the matter of the demonstration. 

3d. The form of the demonstration, or the con- 
nection of the conclusion with the principle. This 
connection must first be accurate, that is, nothing 
should be used in the argument which does not be- 
long to the question ; and second, it must be clear. 

The demonstration may be : 

1st. Analytical, ascending, going from the ques- 
tion to some general principle ; or synthetical, de- 
scending, starting from some general principle and 
coming to the question. 

2d. Direct, or indirect. 

3d. A 'priori, the effects being proved by the 
cause ; or a posteriori, the cause being proved by the 
effects. 

4th. Absolute, resulting from a true principle ; or 
relative, grounded on a principle admitted as true 
by our opponent, whether really true or not. This 
last demonstration does not prove that the conclu- 
sion is absolutely true, but only that it cannot be 



50 LOGIC. 

denied by those who admit the principle on which 
it is based : it is therefore called the argumentum ad 
hominem. 



FIFTH DISSERTATION. 

ON CEETITUDB. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 
Preliminary Notions — Definitions. 

Certitude is the firm adhesion of the mind to the 
truth made known to it. Certitude is at the same 
time a state and an act of the mind. As a state it 
may be defined to be, a disposition by which the 
mind tends to adhere firmly to the known truth. 

Truth is, " that which is." Truth is either ne- 
cessary or contingent. Necessary truth is that which 
cannot but be, and which cannot but be as it is. 
Such is the truth of the existence of God. 

A contingent truth is one which, although it may 
exist, yet might not have existed, or might have 
existed in a different manner. 

Truth cannot be known by the intellect unless it 
is cognoscible. That by which truth is cognoscible, 
or rendered capable of being perceived by the intel- 
lect, is called evidence. Evidence has an objective 
sense, as the term has been used by all good philos- 
ophers ; although some have pretended that evidence 
being a perception has only a subjective sense. 

Certitude is subjective when considered as existing 
in the mind ; and it is objective when considered as 



LOGIC. 51 

existing in the object, in which case it is the same 
as truth itself, inasmuch as it is surely known, or 
inasmuch as it is the object of our certitude. 

Evidently subjective certitude cannot exist with- 
out the objective, but objective certitude may exist 
without the subjective. 

Evidence is also subjective as well as objective. 
Objective evidence is that which is perceived by the 
mind ; it is objective evidence that is defined above. 
Objective evidence is the visibility of truth, and sub- 
jective evidence is the vision of truth. 

Certitude is implicit, that is direct, common or 
spontaneous, when the mind adheres to the truth 
from what is only an implicit knowledge of the mo- 
tion or cause which determines that adhesion. Cer- 
titude is explicit, philosophical or scientific, when 
the mind adheres to the truth from an explicit 
knowledge of the motion or cause which determines 
that adhesion. Both implicit and explicit certitude 
are true. 

Certitude is immediate when the evidence of the 
truth is intuitive, and mediate when the evidence is 
discursive, or the result of a course of reasoning. 

Evidence is itself immediate or intuitive when a 
truth manifests itself to the mind without the aid of 
another truth, as in the axiom. The whole is 
greater than any of its parts ; and it is mediate or 
discursive when truth is made manifest by the aid 
of reasoning. 

Note. — Mediate evidence is formed from that 
which is immediate, and requires more labor from 
our minds for its perception. 



52 LOGIC. 

It is not possible by noting the manner in which 
the perception takes place in our mind to fix the 
line between intuitive and discursive evidence ; we 
must, for this purpose, accept the definitions and 
take them as rules for making the distinction be- 
tween the two kinds of evidence. 

A primary truth is one which is intuitively evi- 
dent ; and a secondary truth is one which is discur- 
sively evident. 

Metaphysical certitude is that which is based upon 
the essence of things, and which can on no hy- 
pothesis be different from what it is. 

Physical certitude is that which is based upon the 
laws of nature, and which cannot be other than it is 
except by a miracle. 

Moral certitude is that which is based upon the 
laws of our moral constitution, and which cannot be 
otherwise without affecting the condition of human- 
ity. 

In regard to the subject, certitude is one and the 
same for all, though it admits of several degrees' in 
the clearness of our perception of the truth and in 
the intensity of our adhesion to it. 

CHAPTEE SECOND. 
Of the Criterion of Certitude. 

A criterion is a sign by which something may be 
distinguished from everything else ; consequently, 
the criterion of certitude is the sign by which certi- 
tude is perfectly distinguished from error. Evident- 
ly such a sign must exist, but in order to proceed 



LOUIC. 5d 

methodically let us first examine what is the crite- 
rion of truth. 

I. Proposition. Objective evidence is the criterign 
of truth. To prove this proposition we proceed as 
follows : 

That which is so evidently the characteristic of 
truth that it cannot be attributed to falsehood, is the 
criterion of truth. 

Such a characteristic is objective evidence, — that 
is, the property by which truth is cognoscible to our 
minds, and consequently by which truth -is distin- 
guished from what is not truth ; for if evidence could 
be attributed to falsehood as well as to truth it 
would not be that by which what is true is distin- 
guished from what is not true. 

Hence, evidence, taken objectively, is the criterion 
of truth. 

In order to meet objections that may be brought 
against this proposition, let us observe that there is 
a difference between judging and perceiving. We 
judge sometimes that such a thing is so and so, and 
perceive afterwards that we have made a mistake. 
In the first case we judge erroneously of something, 
which afterwards, on account of evidence, wejperceive 
exactly as it is. 

II. The criterion of certitude differs from the 
criterion of truth. The criterion of truth is the 
character proper to truth, and consequently some- 
thing essentially objective ; but the criterion of cer- 
titude is the character proper to our knowledge, and 
consequently something both objective and subjec- 
tive. It is, after all, the criterion of truth applied 



54 LOGIC. 

to our mind, the criterion of truth being the cause 
of our certitude. 

In order to determine in what the criterion of 
certitude consists, let us first see what are the con- 
ditions or marks which ought to he found in such a 
criterion. 

This criterion ought to he : 1st, necessarily con- 
nected with truth; 2d, known by itself; and 3d, 
universal, that is, it ought to he the last reason of 
certitude. 

Proposition. A clear perception is the only crite- 
rion of certitude. Argument : 

That is a criterion of certitude which has the 
requisite qualities for establishing such a criterion ; 

But a clear perception has such qualities ; 

Hence, a clear perception is the criterion of cer- 
titude. 

Proof of the minor. 1st. Such a clear perception 
has a necessary connection with truth ; what we 
clearly perceive is evident, and it cannot be evident, 
as we have said, unless it be true. 2d. It is some- 
thing known by itself, since it is a perception ; for 
nothing is more known to us than what we see. 3d. 
It is the last reason of certitude ; for the last reason 
which we can give for our certitude is this : " I see," 
' 1 1 percei ve clearly . ' ' 

We have said that this clear perception is the only 
motive of certitude ; for the other motives of certi- 
tude, of which we shall speak hereafter, are all 
grounded on this criterion. The last reason which 
we bring forward is always, "I see clearly/' 



LOGIC. 55 

CHAPTEE THIRD. 

Of the Existence of Certitude. 

Some philosophers have altogether denied the 
existence of certitude, while others have estahlished 
erroneous systems concerning its attributes. The 
following are the schools which we shall refute by 
the exposition of the true philosophical doctrine 
concerning the existence and the motives of certitude : 

1st. Universal or subjective scepticism, also called 
Pyrrhonism. This denies, or at least doubts, the 
existence of subjective certitude ; and since one who 
doubts his own existence may doubt anything this 
subjective scepticism is called universal scepticism. 

This was the system of the sophist Pyrrho and 
his disciples, and also of the " new sceptics,'' a sect 
that renewed the errors of Pyrrho at the beginning 
of the Christian era. Among modern philosophers 
Montaigne, Bayle and Hume have indirectly adhered 
to the same system. 

2nd. Objective scepticism, or Kantism. This is 
the doctrine of those who accept subjective, but reject 
objective certitude. It is the system of the modern 
German school, represented by Kant, Hermes and 
Fichte. Some French philosophers, of the school of 
Jouffroy, have accepted the doctrine of Kant with 
modifications. 

3d. Idealism and Empiricism. The idealists are 
those philosophers who, extolling too much the cer- 
titude of pure reason, destroy in part the certitude 
of experience. Berkeley and Mallebranche are the 
chief representatives of this system. Descartes ad- 



5G LOGIC. 

liered more or less to the system of Mallebranche, 
and he was also of opinion that the perception of 
the senses, of itself, could not produce certitude. 

The empiricists reject the certitude of pure reason, 
and teach that sensation is the only cause of certi- 
tude ; they are also called materialists and sensists. 
Of this class were Condillac and Helvetius, and in 
our time Augustus Comte, Littre, &c. 

4th. Historical scepticism. This is the system of 
all those who attack historical certitude. It is of 
two kinds, general, when it rejects all historical 
certitude, and particular when it refuses to admit 
some particular historical fact. We find this sys- 
tem, in regard to its principles, in Bayle, and in 
the writings of Craig, a Scotch mathematician, and 
also of Laplace and Lacroix. 

A branch of this system has been called the theory 
of Mythism, which is mythism applied to history 
and religion. Philosophers, or rather infidel writers, 
try to explain in a mythical way the best authenti- 
cated facts of history. This system appears in the 
dangerous writings of Vico, Michelet, Dupuis, Vol- 
ney, Strauss, Hegel, and, lately, Kenan. 

5th. Bationalisin. This is the doctrine of those 
who do not admit any revealed truth, and try to 
explain in a natural manner the miracles and mys- 
teries of revealed religion. We shall see hereafter 
that revelation is possible, that it is an infallible 
motive of judging, that the doctrine revealed by 
God may be perceived by human reason, &c. 

The system of rationalism is widespread. It has 
been taught in France by Cousin, Jouffroy and 
Damiron. 



LOGIC . 57 

6th. Fideism. This is the doctrine of several 
philosophers who think that genuine certitude can- 
not be obtained except by faith, either human or 
divine. As we may see, it is directly opposed to 
rationalism. 

To this system belongs (a) the doctrine of Huet, 
who taught that reason, of itself, cannot give true 
certitude, but must be assisted by divine faith, and 
also (b) the doctrine of Lamennais, the author of the 
famous book "Essai sur 1' Indifference," who was 
of opinion that what he calls "individual reason" 
cannot give us true certitude, but that what he calls 
"general reason" is necessary for this purpose. 
Lamennais' s system is founded on a vicious circle; 
for the reasons which determined him to reject indi- 
vidual reason must also determine him to reject 
general reason, which, after all, is composed of indi- 
vidual reasons. The whole system rests upon ob- 
scure and inaccurate definitions and explanations. 
It created much excitement in the beginning on 
account of its novelty and obscurity, and also on 
account of the talent of its author. 

6th. Traditionalism, or the system of those who 
think that tradition, that is, revelation made to 
man and handed down by the testimony of men, is 
necessary to us in order that we should have certain 
knowledge of truths of the natural order. Dr. Bon- 
netty was the author of this system, which was con- 
demned in the provincial council of Rheims, France, 
in 1853, the condemnation being apj)roved by Pope 
Pius IX., who, at the same time, condemned the 
following errors : 



58 LOGIC. 

(a) They err who teach that human reason is, by 
its nature, inimical to divine revelation, or opposed 
to it. 

(b) They err who teach that the force of human 
reason, in the present condition of our fallen nature, 
has been almost destroyed, or rendered powerless. 

(c) They err who teach that no interior power 
has been left man by which he may acquire truth, 
or that all truths and notions come to us from exte- 
rior source, by speech and revelation. 

(d) They err who affirm that man cannot with 
his reasoning powers perceive and demonstrate cer- 
tain truths of the metaphysical and moral order. 

(e) They err who teach that man cannot naturally 
admit any metaphysical or moral truth, unless he 
has first believed by an act of supernatural faith, 
through divine revelation. 

(f) They err who do not admit a distinction be- 
tween the natural divine law and the positive divine 
law. 

Having named and described the systems accord- 
ing to which certitude is either disfigured or its 
existence totally denied, it now remains that we 
should affirm and demonstrate it. For this purpose 
the following propositions are stated and demon- 
strated : 

First Proposition. — Certitude Exists. 

It is certain that certitude exists if there are any 
truths which the mind accepts without any fear of 
erring ; for then it perceives these truths clearly, 
and this clear perception is the criterion of certitude. 



LOGIC. 59 

But there are such truths; for when we say "Two 
and two are equal to four," the mind accepts the 
fact without any fear of erring. Hence certitude 
exists. 

Second Proposition. 

The existence of certitude is a fact which cannot 
he rigidly demonstrated, hut which nevertheless 
becomes clearly manifest on mere statement or rep- 
resentation to the mind. 

Certitude is a fact which cannot he demonstrated, 
if it he necessary for its demonstration that we should 
take as a principle that which is to he demonstrated. 
But such is the case in regard to the existence of 
certitude ; for to demonstrate it we should first have 
to take as granted certain premises, — which assump- 
tion would of itself suppose the existence of certitude ; 
hut this would he the petitio principii, or begging 
the question. It is enough then to show or state 
the existence of certitude ; for this is so clear of itself 
that no one can seriously doubt it when thus pre- 
sented to the mind. 

Third Proposition. 

No one can doubt the existence of certitude with- 
out falling into a contradiction. 

He who supposes in the premises what he wishes 
to deny in the conclusion, contradicts himself. But 
such is the case with one denying the existence of 
certitude ; for his conclusion would be the affirma- 
tion of his belief in the. non-existence of certitude, 
and as an affirmation is the expression of a certitude 
it follows that he contradicts himself. 



60 LOGIC. 

Sceptics bring many objections against tbis tbesis. 
They say tbat we may find arguments both for and 
against every proposition, and that therefore we 
must doubt; and, again, that the human mind is 
fallible and knows nothing fully, and that for this 
reason also we should doubt. It is true that we 
must sometimes doubt, but not always ; and hence 
certitude does exist. When they add that perhaps 
life is a dream, we need not stop to answer them. 

This thesis refutes both subjective and objective 
scepticism. 

CHAPTEK FOUETH. 

Of the Motives of Certitude. 

A motive, in general, is that which disposes the 
mind to adhere firmly to some truth. . We have seen 
that evidence clearly perceived is the general motive 
of certitude ; but this evidence affects the mind 
diversely in regard to its adhesion to the truth, 
according to the different orders of truth. Hence, 
there are different motives, which we shall examine 
successively : 

First Motive. — The Certitude of Pure Reasox. 

Pure reason, or simply reason, is the faculty by 
which our mind perceives wbat is absolutely neces- 
sary. We have already seen what is meant by a 
necessary truth, and have shown that the evidence 
which pertains to necessary truth is the evidence of 
contradiction, that is., an evidence which does not 
allow us to suppose that the truth is other than it 
is without contradicting ourselves, or saying implic- 



LOGIC, 61 

itly that the same, thing may be and not be at the 
same time. 

Eeason has for its principle all necessary truths, 
that is all truths which are intuitively evident. 
These truths are the sources from which all other 
truths are derived, and it is on this account that 
they are called the principles of pure reason. These 
principles have been also called axioms ; and, 
although some writers have made a distinction be- 
tween axioms and principles, we shall consider the 
two words as synonimous. 

We may define an axiom, or principle of pure 
reason, to be a necessary and self-evident truth, from 
which other truths proceed. 

These principles are : 1st. The principle of iden- 
tity or essence; namely, "What is, is." This is 
the same as the principle of contradiction ; namely, 
" The same thing cannot be and not be at the same 
time," a principle implicitly contained in every 
necessary truth. 2nd. The principle of equality and 
inequality; namely, "Two things which are each 
equal to a third are equal to each other," and " Two 
things, of which one is equal to a third, while the 
other is not equal to this third, are unequal to each 
other." 3d. The principle of substance ; namely, 
"The mode supposes the substance." 4th. The 
principle of casuality ; namely, "That which has a 
beginning has a cause." 

These axioms being given, we prove the following 

Proposition. — Pure reason gives certitude of neces- 
sary truths. 

(a) This proposition is clear according to the 



62 LOGIC. 

very definition of reason. Season is a perception ; 
but if the mind could never adhere to truth, reason 
would at the same time he a perception and not a 
perception. It would he a perception according to 
the hypothesis, and it would not be a perception 
because we should always doubt ; that is, the same 
thing would, at the same time, both be and not be, 
which involves a contradiction. Hence, when reason 
perceives clearly it gives true certitude. 

(b) This proposition cannot be seriously opposed, 
if it be false argument to suppose as true what we 
attack as false. But such is the case with any ar- 
gument contrived against the legitimacy of reason, 
since he who would argue against reason would sup- 
pose that reasoning is a lawful mode for the attain- 
ment of certitude. 

Second Motive. — Consciousness. 

Consciousness is the interior feeling by which our 
mind is aware of its present condition or state. 

Proposition. — Consciousness produces a true certi- 
tude in regard to our interior feelings and affections. 

Consciousness gives a true certitude, if there is a 
necessary connection between it and the truth of the 
judgments formed by it. But such is the case, since 
the object and the subject are the same individual ; 
consequently, consciousness cannot be deceived, 
although it may deceive. Hence consciousness 
gives true certitude ; and the judgments formed by 
it concerning .the appearances of things which have 
affected it are essentially true, since they express the 
present state of the soul. 



LOGIC. G3 

Here again, we cannot demonstrate the truth, but 
simply show it ; for any truth which we could bring 
forward as a principle of demonstration would rest 
on reason and on consciousness, which latter is 
aware of the evidence produced in our' mind. These 
two motives, reason and consciousness, are, as we 
see, chained together. 

Our own existence is, in regard to ourselves, the 
first truth known of itself, or self-evident. 

Third Motive. — The Evidence of the Senses. 

The evidence of the senses is that invincible pro- 
pensity which induces us to refer our sensations to 
the bodies which, according to our convictions, have 
been the causes of them ; and by which, therefore, 
we judge of the existence of the bodies themselves. 

Our senses lead us into many errors and illusions, 
and consequently some philosophers have refused 
to acknowledge that our senses may give us true 
certitude. Hence the origin of objective scepticism, 
of idealism and of traditionalism. Against those 
philosophers we establish the following 

Proposition.- — By the evidence of the senses we can 
judge infallibly of the existence of bodies in general. 

That* is infallibly true which we are irresistibly 
forced by nature to believe as true. But we are 
irresistibly forced by nature to believe in the truth 
of the existence of bodies in general, which we per- 
ceive by our senses. Hence, by the evidence of the 
senses we can judge infallibly of the existence of 
bodies in general. 

We prove the minor as follows : A propensity 



64 LOGIC. 

■which is universal, constant, and irresistible may 
be considered to be the effect of truth, or the voice 
of nature, and consequently to exclude every doubt. 
But that propensity by which we are led to judge of 
the existence of bodies in general is universal, con- 
stant and irresistible. It is universal, since we find 
it in all men ; constant, for all men have it during 
their whole life ; and irresistible, since we cannot 
overcome it whatever efforts we make. It is then 
the voice of nature, the expression of truth. 

Indirect demonstration. — If there "were no bodies, 
there would be no difference between the phantoms of 
our imagination and real bodies ; but we know that 
this difference does exist, and hence bodies must exist. 

The evidence of the senses, according to the more 
probable opinion, gives immediate certitude ; and, 
consequently, in regard to the strength of the con- 
viction produced in our mind, the certitude given 
by the evidence of the senses is equal to that given 
by reason or by consciousness, from which it differs 
only in regard to the object, which is metaphysical 
in one case and physical in the other. 

The propensity by which we are led to believe in 
the existence of bodies in general, will also enable 
us to judge in favor of the existence of bodies and 
external events, in particular ; for the same argu- 
ment may be brought forward in this second part of 
the thesis as in the first. But in this case four con- 
ditions are required in order that the evidence of the 
senses may be an infallible motive of certitude : 

1st. The organs of sense must be sound and in 
their, normal condition. 



LOGIC. G5 

2nd. The bodies themselves must he within the 
limits of the perception of our senses. 

3d. Nothing must intervene between the organs 
of sense and the bodies, so as to interfere with the 
ordinary laws of their action. 

4th. Each of the senses must be exerted upon an 
object upon which it can properly act. 

These conditions being observed, the evidence of 
the senses gives a true certitude in judging of the 
relative properties of bodies in particular, but not of 
their essence ; that is, we may judge of them as they 
appear to us, but not as they are, in themselves. 

Fourth Motive. — The Consent of Mankind in 
Things of the Moral Order. 

By the consent of mankind, we do not mean una- 
nimity, or metaphysical universality, but that gene- 
ral consent which is called moral, being the consent 
of the greater and sounder part of mankind. 

This consent is the result of common sense, and 
common sense is nothing else than that general 
knowledge of first notions or principles which is 
found in all men. 

In order that such a consent may be a criterion of 
certitude, it must be constant, uniform, reasonable,. 
and not indifferent in regard to its object. 

Proposition. — The consent of mankind, ivith the 
conditions prescribed above, is an infallible motive of 
judging, in regard to several moral truths. 

1st. Either such a consent ought to be admitted 
as a criterion of certitude, or some private opinion 
should be preferred to it ; but such a preference 



66 LOGIC. 

would be absurd, and therefore the general consent 
must be admitted. 

2nd. A man who would defend an opinion contrary 
to common sense ought to defend it with irresistible 
arguments ; but he could not find such arguments, 
(a) in his reason, for his reason must be in harmony 
with universal reason ; nor (b) in the consent of 
mankind, for he rejects this motive of certitude : he 
would, then, be obliged to admit this consent or be 
in contradiction with himself. 

3d. Direct argument. — It would be absurd to ad- 
mit that the majority of men, and most sound part 
of humanity, would deceive, or could be deceived ; 
but if one should deny the proposition under consid- 
eration this absurdity would result. Consequently 
the general consent must be accepted as an expression 
of the truth. 

4th. This consent has been accepted in all ages 
and at all times as an infallible motive of judging. 
To show this, it will be sufficient to quote the fol- 
lowing, from Cicero : ' ' What is established upon 
the laws of nature must be true, if anything is true ; 
but a general consent of mankind, which is constant, 
uniform, and refers to something of great import- 
ance, as the existence of a Supreme Being, the ne- 
cessity of worshiping the Deity, &c, is the voice of 
nature. 

To solve any objections to this proposition,, we 
have only to refer to the four conditions already 
indicated. 



. LOGIC. 67 

Fifth Motive. — The Testimony of Men. 

As we have already said, we can judge by our 
senses only of those facts which we have witnessed : 
for other facts we must rely on the testimony of men. 
But, by its nature, such testimony is not necessarily 
infallible ; and we have to examine under what con- 
ditions it may be considered an infallible motive of 
certitude. We shall first give some general notions 
concerning the facts, the witnesses, and the conditions 
which the testimony must have in order to be an 
infallible motive of certitude. 

(A) The facts may be first, contemporaneous or 
past ; second, public or private ; third, of great or of 
little importance ; fourth, favorable to the views of 
the people, or opposed to them ; fifth, clear or ob- 
scure ; and sixth, natural or supernatural. 

(B) The witnesses may be, first, eye-witnesses or 
historical witnesses ; and second, contemporaneous 
with the events or posterior to them. 

(C) The testimony, in order to be an infallible 
motive of certitude, must have the following condi- 
tions : First, the fact must be possible ; second,, it 
must be important ; third, there must be several 
witnesses who were not deceived, who would not 
deceive, and who could not deceive, even if they 
wished ; and fourth, these witnesses must speak 
clearly and be clearly understood. 

Bayle and his followers have attacked the legiti- 
macy of the testimony of men as an infallible motive 
of certitude, and have gone so far as to deny the 
possibility of establishing with certainty the truth 



68 LOGIC. 

of any historical fact. This system has been called 
Historical Pyrrhonism ; and it must he rejected, for 
the following reasons : First, it is as much repug- 
nant to the nature and moral disposition of men as 
is Universal Scepticism ; second, it is opposed to 
reason, which naturally admits that several wit- 
nesses cannot be deceived in regard to the substance 
of an important fact, and that they would not and 
could not deceive : this second part is grounded (a) 
on the love of truth which is natural to man and (b) 
on the principle of veracity or the inclination which 
all men have to speak this truth : the impossibility 
of deceiving may come from the fact itself, and this 
takes place when many relate a fact which is hurtful 
or useless to them, or one concerning which their 
previous interests are divided ; or the impossibility 
may come from the nature of the testimony, as when 
many persons relate the event in the same way, even 
in the smallest details ; or, again, it may come from 
the character of the witnesses, and is very clear 
when they are all honest. 

Pyrrhonism must, in the third place, be rejected 
because its acceptance would result in the subversion 
of religion, of society and of private rights. The 
truth of religion is established by facts ; while society 
rests upon a system of customs, laws and forms of 
government, which, in regard to their origin, are 
based on tradition, or the testimony of men ; and 
private rights, so far as their origin is concerned, 
depend upon titles and documents handed down 
from generation to generation by the testimony of 
men. Bayle's doctrine must therefore be rejected. 



LOGIC. 69 

From what has "been said, it is indirectly proved 
that the testimony of men is sufficient authority for 
the existence of facts of which we have not been eye- 
witnesses, including historical facts. 

We have now to proceed to the direct proof of the 
proposition that the testimony of men is an infallible 
motive of certitude in regard to facts. As the facts 
may be either natural or supernatural, it is evident 
that the question at issue is a double one ; we shall 
therefore examine it in two sections. 

§ I. Authority of the testimony of men concerning 
natural facts. 

1st. Proposition.— The testimony of men is an in- 
fallible motive of judging of contemporaneous facts. 

We may judge that a fact is true when the wit- 
nesses have not been deceived, and when they would 
not and could not deceive. But such is the case 
with facts which are contemporaneous and of great 
importance. This minor has been fully developed 
in the preceding remarks ; therefore the testimony 
of men is an infallible motive, &c. 

Note. — When we speak of facts we mean the sub- 
stance of them, for we may be deceived in regard to 
secondary circumstances. 

It is not necessary that the number of the wit- 
nesses should be great, provided, 1st, that they are 
honest, 2nd, that their account is uniform, 3d, that 
they persevere in giving the same testimony at all 
times, and 4th, that it is evident they are not influ- 
enced by motives of interest or pleasure, or that their 
interests are divided, or that the fact is opposed to 



70 LOGIC. 

their interests, or tliat the fact is of such notoriety 
that any fraud might be detected by other contem- 
porary witnesses, v 

TTe may accept the evidence of even one eye-wit- 
ness when he is entirely trustworthy and when the 
fact which he relates is in necessary connection with 
other known facts, and especially when the witness 
is of great wisdom and virtue, and still more if he 
attests by miracles the truth of his testimony. 

The objections to this first proposition, given 
under different forms, are expressed in the following 
major: "If the testimony of one man gives only 
probability, the testimony of several men will give 
only several probabilities, but no certainty.''' We 
deny the major ; the amount of probabilities is not 
to the point : the question is not concerning the value 
of testimonies taken separately, but concerning the 
value of testimonies taken together. Consequently 
the objection is a sophism, which we have called 
ignorant ia elenclu, or a mistaking of the question at 
issue. 

2d. Proposition.— The testimony of men is some- 
times an infallible motive of judging of past events. 

Argument : The testimony of men is an infallible 
motive of judging of past facts, provided there be 
several means by which truth comes to us. But 
such is the case, the means being : tradition, history 
and monuments. 

The force of the argument from tradition comes, 
first, from the moral impossibility that many men 
have been deceived, or that they have deceived ; this 
has been sufficiently developed already : and, second, 



LOGIC. 71 

from the argument of prescription, according to 
which the actual existence of a tradition or a uni- 
versal custom, the reason for which cannot be given 
unless the fact on which it is based he accepted, 
makes it necessary to accept the fact ; for such a tra- 
dition could not originate in error or falsehood, it 
not being possible in regard to facts of a serious na- 
ture and having a serious consequence, that an error 
should have either suddenly appeared or slowly 
grown through centuries without some protestation 
against the falsehood. "We are therefore justified in 
assenting to the truth of a fact which is attested by 
tradition : the argument is considered good even in 
respect to moral obligations. 

History must be authentic, true and entire. The 
authenticity of a book may be established by Oral 
and written tradition, and also by an examination 
of the book itself. A book is authentic when its 
style is the same as the style of other books known 
to be by the same author, and when the contents of 
the book are in harmony with the known views, 
doctrines and opinions of the author. An historical 
work is true when the facts related, whether con- 
temporaneous or past, are of great importance, are 
public in their nature, and are not contradicted by 
any historian of the same period. A history is 
known to be entire, when a comparison with the 
original manuscripts, or the first printed editions, 
shows no omission or alteration of statements in 
regard to important circumstances. When such a 
comparison cannot be made, we may judge by the 
unity of style and plan, and the satisfactory connec- 
tion of events, that the work is entire. 



72 LOGIC. 

In regard to monuments, it is necessary that they 
should have a necessary connection with the events 
commemorated, whether erected at the same time or 
afterwards. 

It is objected that a certitude cannot be perfect 
which is diminishing gradually by the lapse of time 
and the loss of titles, which rests upon the testi- 
mony of witnesses less trustworthy than eye-wit- 
nesses, which becomes less clear as the date of the 
facts becomes more remote, and which, finally, has 
often been the source of deception. We answer, 
that a certitude once established is always a certi- 
tude ; and though it may not afterwards affect our 
sensibilities so deeply, nevertheless its intrinsic na- 
ture is not thereby changed^ and we always have 
sufficient means to detect a falsification when this 
takes place. 

§11. Authority of the testimony of men concern- 
ing supernatural facts. 

A supernatural fact differs from a natural fact 
only with reference to the cause and the manner of 
its production. In regard to the effect, or the fact 
itself, it is a natural one. With this explanation, 
we proceed to demonstrate the following 

Proposition.- — The testimony of men is an infallible 
motive of judging of supernatural facts . 

The truth of supernatural facts may be established 
by the testimony of men, provided this 'testimony 
has the same force for proving such facts, that it 
has for proving natural facts. But such is the case ; 
for, as we said in the introduction to this proposi- 
tion, and this assertion is denied by no one, a super- 



LOGIC. T3 

natural fact, in regard to its effect and exterior 
motive, is only a natural fact, and consequently can 
be established by similar proof, so that we might 
here repeat the argument already given in regard 
to natural facts. The testimony of men is true, 
when many witnesses relate the same fact, whether 
this be a miracle or a mere natural fact, provided it 
be evident that these witnesses have not been de- 
ceived and have not deceived. Hence the testimony 
of men is an infallible motive, &c. 

The objections to this proposition rest upon the 
following assertion : A miracle is impossible. In 
this assertion there is an implied contradiction ; for 
to pretend that all the witnesses to the miracles of 
our Lord were deceived or did deceive, is to assert a 
miracle in the moral order greater than the facts 
which are denied. 

From what has been said, we may understand 
what is meant by authority: It is the motive by 
which we judge of those things which we do not 
know ourselves. Authority is human when it is 
the source of human faith or belief, and divine when 
our adhesion to it constitutes divine or supernatural 
faith. 

Sixth Motive. — Memory. 

Memory is that faculty by which we recall to mind 
feelings that are past. 

Proposition. — Memory is an infallible motive of 
judging of a past state of the mind of which we have 
a clear recollection. 

4 



74 LOGIC. 

This proposition cannot be proved : it can only be 
explained. 

I. There is certitude where there is a clear per- 
ception of a truth .; but by memory, when our recol- 
lection is distinct, we have such a perception. Hence 
we have certitude. 

II. Judgments based upon a universal, constant 
and irresistible propensity are infallible.* This is 
admitted by every one ; and were it not true we 
might doubt of everything, even of God himself. 
But by memory we form Judgments which are based 
upon an irresistible, constant and universal pro- 
pensity ; these judgments are therefore infallible. 
Hence memory is an infallible motive_, &c. 

Memory, like consciousness,, produces an imme- 
diate certitude, and consequently cannot be demon- 
strated, since the demonstration should rest on 
memory itself. It is, in fact, by memory that we call 
to mind the very first principles, the bases, of every 
demonstration. 

Seventh Motive. — Induction or Analogy. 

We reason by induction when we pass from phe- 
nomena observed and known to phenomena which 
are neither known nor observed. The following 
definition of induction may therefore be given : In- 
duction is the operation by which, from several par- 
ticular phenomena, the mind concludes the existence 
of a general law of nature. 

The principle of induction rests upon the laws of 
nature. These laws may be summed up in these 
three axioms : 1st. There exists a constant and gen- 



LOGIC. Vo- 

meral order in the things which have been created, 
that is, in nature ; 2nd. Every natural cause follows 
a certain order in the production of its effects ; 3d. 
The same natural cause, placed in the same circum- 
stances, produces the same effect. 

We may now proceed to establish the following 
proposition concerning the principle of induction. 

Proposition. — A persuasion of the constancy and 
generality of the laws of nature is an infallible motive 
of certitude. x 

What is born with us must be in harmony with 
the truth, and consequently an infallible motive of 
certitude ; for if a persuasion natural to our mind 
could be false, the very constitution of the mind 
itself would be false, which would be the destruction 
of all certitude. But a persuasion of the constancy 
and generality of the laws of nature is innate ; for it 
is universal, irresistible, and anterior to reason itself, 
as we see in the case of children, who instinctively 
avoid what is hurtful ; such a persuasion is therefore 
an infallible motive of certitude. 

We have seen, from the exposition of the princi- 
ples of induction, that there are in nature general 
laws ; but is it possible to have a true certitude in 
regard to the existence of the laws of nature in par- 
ticular ? In order to solve this question we proceed 
to establish this 

Proposition. — Induction sometimes gives time certi- 
tude concerning the laws of nature in particular. 

We have true certitude when we clearly perceive 
some truth, and when we may affirm it without any 
fear of erring. But by induction we know surely, 



76 LOGIC. 

and consequently perceive clearly, the existence of 
some laws of nature in particular ; for instance, that 
fire will burn wood, melt lead, &c; and we affirm 
the existence of these laws without any fear of erring. 
Certitude, then, sometimes gives us true certitude, 
<rc. 

Notes.- — Induction gives certitude concerning the 
existence of a law of nature in particular, when there 
is some identity of circumstances in the phenomena 
which are observed, and this identity may be dis- 
covered by an attentive observation. 

The certitude of facts known by induction is some- 
times merely conditional and sometimes absolute. 

The laws of nature, considered individually, are 
contingent, and Grod can suspend them when this 
suspension is not in opposition to his attributes, but 
not when such suspension would be in contradiction 
to any of these attributes. For instance, He could 
not cause a multitude of persons to agree among 
themselves to tell an untruth which would be inju- 
rious to their own interests. Prom this explanation, 
we may know when the certitude given by induction 
is conditional, and when it is absolute. 

The laws of nature are two-fold, physical and 
psychological : the former governing corporal bodies, 
and the latter regulating spiritual substances. Moral 
laws are included in the psychological laws. By 
induction, we may learn the existence of. psycholog- 
ical as well as of physical laws. 

Appendix . - — Probability . 

Although, in itself, certitude is complete and 



LOGIC. 77 

indivisible, yet it sometimes happens that a propo- 
sition true in itself, appears to us to approach the 
truth more or less nearly, according as we have more 
or less reason for believing it to be true. Those 
reasons which leave our minds in a state of uncer- 
tainty are called probabilities. When the probabil- 
ities in favor of a proposition are equal to those 
against it, we -have what is called doubt; and when 
those in favor are more numerous than those against 
we have verisimilitude. Probability , then, is the 
motive which inclines us, in a greater or less degree, 
to believe as true that which is not completely de- 
monstrated. As it is often very difficult to deter- 
mine the degree of probability in favor of or against 
a given proposition, we must be cautious and not 
judge beyond what we perceive. 

We admit historical facts which are only probable, 
whenever we have to doubt on account of the diffi- 
culty of criticising the sources of the history. In 
our daily actions, also, we often have to conduct our- 
selves according to information which is only proba- 
ble. The further elucidation of this question belongs 
to theology. 

In many questions relating to future events the 
issue depends upon a certain number of unknown 
possibilities : the probability of one of these possi- 
bilities may therefore be determined mathematically, 
and upon the result obtained, certain calculations 
may be based. In this manner contracts of insur- 
ance are drawn up, certain games of chance are 
predicted, &c. But evidently logic has nothing 
further to do with this subject. Here, then, closes 
the First Part of this work. 



PART II. 
METAPHYSICS. 



METAPHYSICS. 



METAPHYSICS literally means above nature, 
and ' l nature ' ' here signifies the material 
world. The following definition of metaphysics is 
generally accepted : The science of supersensible and 
merely speculative things, as known to us by reason. 
By the words "merely speculative ' ' metaphysics is 
distinguished from the other parts of philosophy. 

Metaphysics is divided into two parts, general and 
special. General metaphysics has been called ontol- 
ogy, or the science of being ; and special metaphysics 
has been called pneumatology , or the science of spir- 
itual substances. 

Pneumatology is divided into two parts, the first 
treating of God and His attributes, and the second 
of the human soul, its faculties and qualities. The 
first is called theodicy, or the science of God, and 
the second psychology , or a dissertation on the soul. 

This order in the division of pneumatology is man- 
ifestly the proper one, for the knowledge of God and 
of his attributes is necessary in order to treat of 
various questions concerning the human soul. The 
destination of the soul for another life, for instance, 

cannot be proved until we have demonstrated the 
4* 



82 METAPHYSICS. 

existence of God and his providence with his infinite 
wisdom and justice, ready after this life to render to 
every one according to his deserts. 



FIRST DISSERTATION. 

ON ONTOLOGY. 

The word ontology conies from two Greek words, 
?i6yos and &v, which together signify "discourse on 
being." Ontology may therefore be defined to be 
that part of philosophy which treats of being in gen- 
eral, and of the general species and relations of being. 
In this dissertation we consider being as abstracted 
from existence ; and as we may have a positive idea 
of being thus abstractly considered, the title of this 
dissertation, "Ontology," or being in general, is 
correct. 

We shall divide the subject of ontology into five 
chapters., treating in the first of the notion, essence 
and possibility of a being in general, in the second 
of its causes and its effects, in the third of its species, 
in the fourth of its properties, and in the fifth of 
space and duration. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

Of the Notion, Essence and Possibility of a Being 
in General. 

A being is that which exists or may exist. The 
notion of being is the first of all notions. We can- 
not think of anything unless there be some being ; 



METAPHYSICS. 83 

hence the notion of being is logically prior to our 
thought, the notion of being is necessarily involved 
in thought. 

The essence of a being is that without which a 
being can neither be nor be conceived to be. For 
instance, we cannot conceive the idea of a man with- 
out the notions or attributes of intelligence and ani- 
mality. 

The agreement among the essential attributes of 
a being forms the possibility of its existence. Con- 
sequently if certain attributes involve a Contradic- 
tion they cannot constitute a being — that being is 
not possible. There is such a contradiction in a 
round square, consequently a round square is an 
impossibility. 

The possibility, as we understand it here, abstract- 
ing it from the idea of existence, is what the philos- 
ophers call metaphysical or intrinsic possibility. 

This accord among the essential attributes, which 
constitutes the possibility is immutable, and conse- 
quently necessary. It is immutable, for if it could 
be changed there would be, at the same time, accord 
and discord among the essential attributes of a being ; 
that is, the same thing would at the same time both 
he and not be, which involves a contradiction and 
which is therefore absurd. That accord is then ne- 
cessary since it is immutable: hence that accord, 
which is the essence or possibility of a being in gen- 
eral, does not depend on the free will of God ; but 
since it is immutable and necessary, like God, it has 
its seat or foundation in God Himself, in the divine 
intellect, in the very essence of God. Descartes 



84 METAPHYSICS. 

therefore was mistaken when he said the contrary. 

Possibility of itself is not a sufficient reason for 
existence ; that is, from the fact that a being is pos- 
sible we cannot conclude that it exists. Existence 
is more than mere possibility ; and if mere possibil- 
ity were a sufficient reason for existence the effect 
would be greater than the cause, what is plus would 
be contained in what is minus ; but this would involve 
a contradiction. 

It follows, that since mere possibility is not a suf- 
ficient reason for existence, some existence must 
have existed before any possibility : hence, from this 
notion we deduce the idea of an eternal, necessary 
and infinite being. 

The essential attributes of a being, or its essence, 
either metaphysical or physical, constitutes the 
nature of that being. The word nature, however, 
has a greater extension than the word essence ; it 
comprehends not only the attributes which are essen- 
tial, but also what flows from them. Hence, those 
attributes are essential without which a being can 
neither be nor be conceived to be ; and those attri- 
butes are natural which are formed in a being by 
the force of its essence. For instance, the roots, the 
trunk and the branches are the essential parts of a 
tree ; but its bulk, height, &c, are its natural parts. 

Two axioms are drawn from the considerations 
made in this chapter, with regard to essence : 

1st. What is, is ; or, negatively, the same thing 
cannot be and not be at the same time. This is gen- 
erally called the principle of contradiction. 

2nd. Whatever is involved in a being must be 



METAPHYSICS. 85 

affirmed of its essence; and what3ver is excluded 
from a being must be denied of its essence. 

CHAPTER SECOND. 
Of the Causes and the Effects of Beings. 

Let us first establish the difference which exists 
between principle and cause. Principle is that which 
contains the reason for the existence of something. 
Our mind, for instance, is the principle of our 
thoughts ; that is, our thoughts could not come from 
a substance different in its nature from our mind : 
in other words, the substance from which thought 
flows is spiritual and active. 

When the principle contains the whole reason for 
the possibility or the existence of a being it is called 
adequate, if the principle does not contain the whole 
reason it is called inadequate. The adequate prin- 
ciple is also called the sufficient reason. 

Cause is that which produces something, or which 
concurs in the production of something. Hence 
there are two kinds of causes. The first is called 
the efficient cause ; and this only, properly speaking, 
is a real cause, for only this produces an effect. The 
other concurs in the production of the effect, and is 
only improperly called a cause. 

This last, or incomplete, Cause may be material, 
formal, instrumental, final, or exemplary, according 
as we consider the material, the form, the instru- 
ment, the end, or the mo4el which has been used by 
the agent. 

The efficient cause is either necessary or free. 



86 METAPHYSICS. 

The cause is necessary .when it necessarily produces 
its effects, and it is free when it may either produce 
them or not produce them. The human mind, in 
regard to its free determinations, is a free cause. 

The efficient cause may also be either a first cause 
or a secondary cause. It is a first cause when it 
does not depend upon another cause in order to act, 
and a secondary cause when it does depend on another 
cause in order to act. 

The efficient cause is also either physical or mora 
physical, when it produces an effect which belongs 
to the physical order ; and moral, when the effect is 
a moral one. The man who orders another to com- 
mit a murder is the moral cause of the death which 
he has ordered. The physical cause is also called 
the direct cause, and the moral cause the indirect 
cause. 

The efficient cause is moreover either general or 
particular, which words are readily understood ; and 
also either actual or virtual ; actucd, if we consider 
the effect produced, and virtual, if we consider the 
power of producing it as residing in the cause. 

The efficient cause is, finally, a cause per se, when 
it produces the effect which it aims at ; and a cause 
per accidens, when the effect produced is not the one 
intended, but an accidental one. 

Note. — 'There is a difference between the cause 
and the condition. The condition is the difficulty 
to be conquered in order to obtain the effect. It is 
consequently the way of producing the effect. 

An intelligent cause does not act without aiming 



METAPHYSICS. 87 

at some end : the end, then, is that which involves 
the reason why an action is undertaken ; it has been 
improperly called the final cause. 

The end may he either primary or secondary, prox- 
imate or remote, intermediate or final. The end is 
intermediate when it is connected with two others, 
one preceding and the other following ; and it is 
final when the agent, after having obtained it, is at 
rest, that is, has accomplished his purpose. 

The means (media) are everything instrumental 
■ in the production of an effect. These means must 
be in proportion to the cause that uses them, and to 
the end which is aimed at. Some of them are neces- 
sary, and others only useful. 

Order, in general, is the regular arrangement of 
causes, means and ends. When Ave consider that 
arrangement in reference to the essence of things, 
we have the metaphysical order ; when we consider 
it in reference to the existence of bodies, we have 
the physical order ; and when we consider the same 
arrangement in reference to the free actions of God, 
of the angels, or of the souls of men, we have the 
moral order. 

The moral order is called religious when it refers 
to the worship of Grod, social when it regulates the 
intercourse of men with one another, and political 
when its object embraces the correlative duties of the 
State and its citizens. 

The metaphysical order is the foundation of the 
other two. In the whole universality of things there 
exists a perfect subordination of causes, means and 



88 METAPHYSICS. 

effects, so that all possible and existing beings are 
perfectly chained together. 

This three-fold order being the object of science, 
it follows that science is metaphysical, physical and 
moral : and as everything which is known, or which 
may be known, by reason only, forms the object of 
philosophy, and everything which is made manifest 
to us by divine revelation constitutes the object of 
theology, it appears further that the order of science 
is double, natural and supernatural. 

From what has been explained in this chapter we 
may deduce the following axioms : 

I. He who wills the end wills the means. 

II. The means must be in proportion to the end. 

III. There is no effect without a cause. 

IV. The cause is prior to the effect. 

V. The perfections of the effect cannot be greater 
than those of the cause. 

If a perfection in the effect could exceed the per- 
fection in the cause, that perfection would be without 
a cause, which is absurd. 

The cause may contain its effect in a three-fold 
manner : 

1st. Formally, — as a heap of gold contains for- 
mally, or according to their nature and forms, several 
particles of the same metal. 

2d. Virtually, — as the architect has in his mind 
the plan of the building which he is to erect. 

3d. Eminently, — as when the cause contains all 
the perfections of the effect, in a most eminent 
manner and one quite unknown to us. God has in 



METAPHYSICS. 89 

himself, in a most eminent manner, all the perfec- 
tions of his creatures. 

The following corollaries result from the axioms 
given above : 

I. No being can be its own cause ; for, if so, it 
would, at the same time, be prior and posterior to 
itself. 

II. Two beings cannot be mutually their own 
cause. 

CHAPTEE THIKD. 

Op the Different Species of Being. 

1st. A being exists either in itself or in another 
being : in the first case we have what is called sub- 
stance, in the second modification. 

2nd. A being is either finite or infinite. 

3d. A being is either material or spiritual. 

Hence the division of this chapter into three 
articles. 

Article First. — Substance and Modification. 

A substance is a being existing in itself : this does 
not mean that such a being is independent of a cause, 
but only that it is independent of another substance 
as an object in which it should lie in order to exist ; 
thus, a stone is a substance_, for it does not need 
another being to which it must be attached in order 
to exist. 

A modification is that which needs another being 
to which it may adhere in order to exist, as color. 
Modification is also called accident ; it is the sub- 
stance appearing to us with such or such determined 



90 METAPHYSICS. 

form. Hence the modification is not something of 
a positive being added to the substance ; but it is the 
substance itself determined in such or such manner. 
The following axiom is clear of itself: " Modification 
supposes substance." It follows from the foregoing 
definitions that modification cannot exist without 
substance, nor substance without modification ; and 
that the modification, materially speaking, or con- 
sidered in a material jjoint of view is perceived before 
the substance. 

Substance is created or not created, and complete 
or not complete. 

A complete substance is a substance sui juris (of its 
own right), that is, one which is not united to an- 
other substance in order to be perfect, and which, 
consequently, is the principle of its own operations, 
if it has any. Peter is a complete substance. A 
complete substance is also called a suppositum. 

A substance is incomplete when it is united to 
another substance in order to be perfect, as the body 
by itself, the soul by itself. 

There is a difference between a substance and a 
suppositum. A suppositum is always a substance, 
but a substance is not always a suppositum. 

When the suppositum is endowed with reason it 
becomes a, person. 

When a person is composed of several substances, 
united in order to constitute it, we have the hypos- 
tasis, or hypostatic union. 

From what has been said, we deduce the following 
axioms : 

I. Actions are personal ; that is, actions ought not 



METAPHYSICS. 91 

to be attributed to each or any substance composing 
a person, but to the union of all, or the person itself. 

II. Actions share the dignity of the person acting. 
Hence the actions of our Lord were of an infinite 
value. 

III. Names belong to the persons or suppositums. 

Article Second. — Infinite and Finite Substances. 

Substance is infinite or finite. 

Infinite substance is that having no limitation. It 
is the same as simple being, or absolute being (ens 
simpliciter). 

Finite substance is that which is limited. 

Some authors divide the infinite into the infinite 
actu, or the actual infinite, that which is the highest 
and most perfect that can be imagined, namely, God 
alone ; and the infinite potentia, or the potential or 
virtual infinite, which can be infinitely increased or 
diminished. But certainly this division cannot be 
accepted ; since the infinite, and a substance which 
can be increased, are two terms involving a contra- 
diction. That which is infinite is so of its own 
nature, and can therefore be neither increased nor 
diminished. The infinite absolutely excludes limita- 
tion ; hence it is immutable. The so-called virtual 
infinite should be called the indefinite. 

We shall see farther on, that the infinite being is 
the same as the necessary being, and the finite being 
the same as the contingent being. 

That we have in our mind the*idea of the infinite 
is certain, for we can define it, and it is in our mind 
distinct from any other idea. This idea, according 



92 METAPHYSICS. 

to Descartes, Mallebranche, Leibnitz and Bossuet, 
in opposition to Locke and the other sensists, is a 
positive idea, hut not an adequate, though a true 
- and clear one. Evidently it has been placed in our 
mind by God himself, since the finite could not give 
the idea of the infinite : no one can give what he has 
not himself. 

The idea of a finite being, considered materially, 
that is, as having a real existence, is also a positive 
idea ; but considered formally, that is, as deprived 
of some reality which it might possess but does not, 
is a negative idea. 

Article Third.- — Material axd Spiritual 
Substances. 

Substance is, again, either material or spiritual. 

A material being is one which is essentially exten- 
sive and inert ; and a spiritual being is one which is 
essentially active and thinking. There is conse- 
quently a fundamental difference between these two 
beings. 

Matter is essentially divisible, since it is extensive ; 
but whether matter is infinitely divisible, and what 
are the elements of matter, have been questions of 
dispute. 

The opinion of Descartes and his followers is that 
matter is infinitely divisible ; for, they say, since 
extension belongs to the essence of matter, as long 
as you have matter you have extension, and conse- 
quently divisibility! In their view, a simple ele- 
ment becoming extensive by aggregation involves a 
contradiction. 



METAPHYSICS. 93 

On the other hand, Leibnitz and his disciples are 
of opinion that the monads, which is the name given 
by them to the elements of matter, are simple beings ; 
an infinite divisibility, in their view, involving a 
contradiction. Any composite being, they teach, is 
formed of composing elements : but with the system 
of Descartes we should have a composite substance 
without composing elements. 

In both these systems we find at least apparent 
contradictions. According to the system of Descar- 
tes, the infinite is contained in the finite ; while, 
according to the system of Leibnitz, a substance, or 
a simple monad, which is essentially unextensive, 
becomes extensive by aggregation. 

It is morally impossible to give a satisfactory so- 
lution of these questions : still, the system of Leib- 
nitz seems, in general, to be more acceptable than 
that of Descartes. 

Spiritual substance is quadruple; namely, God, 
the Angels, the human soul and the soul of the 
beasts. 

Material substance is multiple, as may be seen in 
the study of Natural Philosophy. 

CHAPTER FOURTH. 

Of the Properties qe Being. 

The properties of a being are those parts which 
constitute the being ; they are so called because they 
are its own proper parts (propria). 

I. Some properties are common to all beings, con- 
sidered in themselves .; these are : Unity, truth and 



94 METAPHYSICS. 

goodness. Every being must be one, true and good. 

First, unity. No positive definition can be given 
of the unity commonly called numerical, but by the 
philosophers metaphysical. 

The following negative definition of unity is given 
by the scholastics: One is that which is divided, 
that is distinct, from every other being, but undi- 
vided in itself. 

The metaphysical unity is found in every being ; 
for every being must be undivided. If a being could 
be divided into several parts, each part would be a 
separate being, and there would be several beings 
instead of one. On the other hand, it is clear that 
every being must be distinct from every other. 

This numerical or metaphysical unity may be : 

1st. Substantial Unity, or simplicity, which be- 
longs to substances that cannot be divided, be- 
cause they exclude composition of parts. Such is 
the unity of the soul, or of any of the spirits. 

2nd. Physical Unity, which is composed of parts 
united by some physical bond. Such is the unity of 
the human body. 

3d. Moral unity, which is composed of parts 
united by a moral tie, as the unity of a family. 

Second, truth. A being is true when it agrees 
with its own attributes. The truth of a being is its 
conformity with its own archetype, that is, with the 
idea of that being as it exists in the divine intellect. 
This truth, which is the metaphysical truth, is found 
in all beings, even those which are merely possible. 
* Truth is also either moral or logical, according as 
it refers to beings which belong to the moral or to 
the logical order. 



METAPHYSICS. 95 

Third, goodness. Goodness is the aptitude of a 
being to attain its own ends. It is clear that this 
property is found in all beings, since God is infi- 
nitely wise. 

This definition is of metaphysical or absolute good- 
ness. Moral goodness is a property of reasonable 
and free beings. 

Goodness does not pertain to bad actions ; for a 
bad action, or a sin, is something merely negative. 
A bad action is an action lacking in righteousness ; 
but the lack or absence of righteousness is nothing 
positive, nor is it any being, but the negative of be- 
ing and of perfection. 

II. Some properties are merely relative ; that is, 
they pertain to beings when compared with other 
beings. All beings are in continual relations with 
one another. We may define relation, in general, 
to be a property pertaining to a being when com- 
pared with another being. In a relation, considered 
in general, there are three elements, a subject, a 
term and a foundation. If, for instance, I compare 
the whiteness of paper with that of snow, the paper 
is the subject, the snow is the term to which I refer 
the subject, and whiteness is the foundation or the 
reason for referring the first element to the second. 
The term and the subject are the correlatives. 

These elements are essential, or natural ; or they 
are arbitrary, or accidental. They are essential 
when they flow from the very essence of things, as 
the relations between a cause and its effects. They 
are arbitrary when they are grounded on the mere 
opinions of men. Such are all the symbolical ob- 



96 METAPHYSICS. 

jects, in relation to the moral beings which they sig- 
nify, as the relation between the olive branch and 
peace ; and also all the moral relations, as that ex- 
isting between a king and his subjects. 

Among the relations are classed identity and dis- 
tinction. 

Identity may be taken in several senses, but here 
it is the perseverance of a being in the same state. 
This identity may be physical or moral. Living 
beings have a moral identity, not a metaphysical or 
absolute one. 

The identity of the human soul is not an accidental 
one ; that is, it is not an identity consisting in the 
maintainance of the similitude of modifications, but 
is a substantial identity. 

Individuals endowed with reason retain their per- 
sonal identity so long as they maintain their subsist- 
ence and rationality. 

Distinction is the negative of identity. There is 
a difference between distinction and diversity. What 
is diverse is distinct ; but that which is distinct is 
not always diverse. Heaven and earth are distinct 
and diverse ; Peter and Paul are distinct, but not 
diverse. Distinction excludes identity, and diver- 
sity excludes similitude. 

Two beings entirely alike may exist, for their ex- 
istence involves no contradiction. 



METAPHYSICS. 97 

CHAPTER FIFTH. 

Of Space and Time. 

Space, in general, is extension, in wliicli bodies 
exist, or in which they may exist or he conceived as 
possible. Hence the division of space into real space, 
in which bodies actually exist, and abstract space, in 
which they are conceived as possible. Abstract 
s]3ace is the object of geometry. 

The conception of abstract space is formed in our 
minds by abstraction in the same manner as we form 
all our conceptions of possible beings. For instance, 
when we see many bodies having among themselves 
relations of situation and position, our minds may 
abstract, or remove, every other property pertaining 
to these bodies, even their actual existence, and con- 
sider that sole property by which they may occupy 
various positions with regard to one another, then 
we have the idea of an abstract extension, or of ab- 
stract space. 

Space, conceived abstractly, is eternal, necessary 
and immutable, in the same manner as we conceive 
as eternal, necessary and immutable all possible 
beings. Space is virtually (potentia) infinite, using 
the word "infinite," as we have before explained, 
in the sense of indefinite. It is also immense and 
indefinitely divisible. 

A place is a determined part or point of space. 

Time is the duration of a being, or the permanence 
of its existence. Time is also defined to be the du- 
ration in which contingent beings succeed each 
other, or may continue those successions. Time 
5 



t)3 METAPHYSICS. 

also, we may observe, is, like space, real and ab- 
stract. 

Time is divided, first, into past, present and 
future, and, second, into real and abstract time, all 
of which words are sufficiently clear. 

Eternity, properly so called, is duration without 
a beginning or an end ; and eternity, improperly so 
called, is duration without an end, but with a be- 
ginning : this last is the same as immortality, and 
by the scholastics is called eternity aparte post. As 
succession requires a first point, eternity, properly 
so called, has no succession, for it has no beginning. 
Consequently the idea of time as lasting from all 
eternity involves a contradiction ; hence, the eternal 
being does not exist in time, because this being does 
not admit of succession. We may say, however, 
that the eternal being in its immutable duration 
co-exists with the successive mutations of contingent 
beings. 

There have been many opinions expressed by the 
learned concerning the nature of space and time, 
the two main ones being those of Clarke and Leib- 
nitz. 

Clarke, whose opinion was accepted by Newton, 
taught that what he called absolute or abstract space 
and time are nothing else than the immensity and 
the eternity of God. This opinion is not acceptable 
for the following reasons : 

1 st. We do not conceive abstract space and abstract 
time as things actually infinite, but only virtually 
so, that is, as things always admitting of increase ; 
while, at the same time, we conceive the eternity 



METAPHYSICS. 99 

and the immensity of God as two attributes actually 
infinite, and we cannot conceive them differently. 
Consequently the notions of space and time, as we 
conceive them, are contradictory to the notion of 
the infinite. 

2nd. We do not conceive abstract space and abstract 
time as things really and individually existing, but 
as two abstractions of the mind ; while eternity and 
immensity exist really and individually in God, 
although they cannot be separated from the divine 
substance. 

3d. It is evident that the opinion of Clarke much 
favors pantheism ; for since, as we have seen, space 
and time are not actually infinite, but only virtual- 
ly so, which is the same as indefinite or finite with 
no determined limits, it follows that if space and 
time may be considered as attributes of the divine 
substance, nothing can prevent us from considering 
the other finite beings also as attributes of God. 

Leibnitz teaches that space and time are not beings 
distinct from the other contingent beings , but that 
they are mere relations of those beings, space being 
the relation of situation among bodies, and time the 
relation of succession anion 2j contingent beings. 

o o o 

Consec|uently, if there were no contingent beings 
there Avould be neither space nor time ; and when 
contingent beings began to exist then also began 
the existence of space and time. 

This explanation seems true, and gives full satis- 
faction to the mind. But Leibnitz mingles with 
this part of his doctrine some notions concerning the 
extension of matter, taken from his system of monads, 



100 METAPHYSICS. 

which, do not seeni so satisfactory. Omitting these 
notions, we may accept the explanation given above. 

Epicurus, Democritus, and several among the 
moderns, make space to be a substantial being which 
is infinite and contains all bodies. Descartes does 
not admit of abstract space, but teaches that space 
is a material and substantial being. 

Kant, who denies the objectivity of bodies, applies 
his system to this question. His idealism has been 
indirectly refuted in Logic, where we established the 
truth that the evidence of the senses is an infallible 
motive of certitude. 



SECOND DISSERTATION. 

ON THEODICY. 

This subject is naturally divided into two parts, 
in the first of which we treat of the existence of God, 
and in the second of his attributes. 

PAET FIRST.— THE EXISTENCE OF GOD. 

Some men do not admit the existence of God, and 
these are called Atheists, a name derived from the 
Greek (a Oeog, no God). We may consequently 
call those who believe in the existence of God the- 
ists. This first part is therefore naturally sub- 
divided into two chapters. 



METAPHYSICS. 101 

CHAPTEK FIKST. 

Of Atheism. 

Atheists are either speculative or practical disbe- 
lievers in the existence of God : the former do not 
acknowledge his existence ; the latter know that he 
exists, hut live as if they did not know it. Specula- 
tive atheists are called negative when they simply 
deny the existence of God, and positive when they 
attempt to prove that he does not exist : the positive 
atheists are also called systematic atheists. 

Note. — There is a difference between theism and 
deism, although the two words have substantially 
the same etymology. Theism is the doctrine of 
those who believe Jin God and in his operations ; 
while Deism is the doctrine of those who also believe 
in God, but entirely reject divine revelation. 

The causes of atheism proceed from the intellect 
or from the will ; being in the first case (a) an im- 
perfect knowledge, or (b) an abuse of certain sciences ; 
and in the second (a) corruption, or (b) pride. 

§ 1. Is it prudent to remain indifferent concerning 
the existence of God ? 

Such indifference is certainly very unwise ; for it 
is a question upon which depends our greatest hap- 
piness or our greatest misery. 

The atheists reason in this manner : ( ' I do not 
know who placed me in this world ; nor do I know 
what the world is, or even what I am myself. I do 
not know what my body is, or my senses, or my soul, 
or this part of me which thinks of what I am now 



102 METAPHYSICS. 

saying. I see those frightful spaces of the universe 
which surround me ; and I find myself fixed on a 
speck of this immensity, not knowing why I have 
been placed here rather than elsewhere ; nor why 
the small space of time which I have to live has been 
assigned to me at this moment rather than at any 
other moment of eternity. I see immensities every- 
where ; they engulf me as an atom, or as a shadow 
that lasts but for an instant. All that I know is 
that I shall soon die ; and yet that which I try most 
to forget is this very death which I cannot avoid. 
As I do not know where I came from, so I do 
not know where I am going to ; I know only 
that, leaving this world, I fall forever into nothing- 
ness, or else into the hands of an angry God : and 
not knowing which of these alternatives will be my 
lot, I conclude that it is better for me to pass my life 
without thinking of what shall happen to me ; and 
believe that I have but to follow my inclinations 
without reflection or anxiety concerning what ought 
or ought not to be done in order not to fall into eter- 
nal, damnation, in case that what is said of this be 
true. Perhaps I might find some light to dissipate 
my doubts, but I do not wish to take any trouble 
about the -matter, nor do I care to make one step to 
find this light ; and so, looking with contempt on 
those who trouble themselves with such cares, I pre- 
fer to go on, and wait without fear for that great 
event, allowing myself to be carried on quietly to 
death in the uncertainty of my future condition." 
Such are the horrible sentiments of the Atheist. 
The chief argument of the Atheists is an evident 



METAPHYSICS. 103 

absurdity. They say : If G-cd exists he is infinitely 
good, consequently there is nothing to be feared. 
They forget that God is also infinitely just. 

§2. Are there any evils resulting from the adop- 
tion of the theory of the Atheists ? 

This system is the source of many evils to men, 
whether considered individually or collectively, that 
is, as members of society. 

1st. Atheism is hurtful to men considered as indi- 
viduals ; for it takes away from them all security, all 
comfort in misfortune, and every hope of happiness. 
It takes away all security ; for in all the labors of life, 
what gives us courage is the consideration that God 
will bless our efforts for own welfare and for that of 
those dependent upon us. It takes away all conso- 
lation and hope, and consequently stifles the voice of 
nature to which the pagans themselves gave ear. 
We find no real happiness in this world, because 
here every good is mingled with sorrow and of short 
duration, because many suffer constantly, and be- 
cause the thought of death disturbs our joys. Hence 
Atheism, which takes away the hope of a better 
world, is hurtful to man, considered individually. 

2d. Atheism is also hurtful to men considered as 
members of society, for (a) it leaves authority with- 
out restraint. (Authority cannot be judged, con- 
demned and punished by its own subjects). And 
(b) it leaves the citizen without morals. (Whence 
would come restraint against vice, if Atheism pre- 
vailed ? Without God there would be no other life, 
nor would conscience exist, nor would the laws have 
any sanction). 



104 METAPHYSICS. 

Atheism breaks every bond of union among men. 
Those bonds are the virtues : gratitude, deference, 
obedience, sincerity, justice, &c, and without God 
there would be no virtue. 

§3. Is theism better than atheism? The observ- 
ations made above are sufficient to give an affirma- 
tive answer to this question. 

§4. Is theism safer than atheism? 

A doctrine in which there is nothing to be dreaded, 
if false, and everything to be hoped, if true, is safer 
than one in which there is nothing to be hoped for, 
if true, and much to be dreaded, if false. But such 
is the case in regard to this question ; hence theism 
is safer than atheism. 

§5. Is atheism worse than polytheism? 

That doctrine is the worse which restrains our 
passions the less. Atheism restrains our passions 
less than polytheism ; for polytheism admits the be- 
lief in another life. Consequently, atheism is worse 
than polytheism. 

It is objected to this, that without God, 1st, there 
would be the natural law ; 2nd, that religion has been 
the cause of many wars ; 3d, that many atheists 
have been good men, while many theists have been 
bad men ; 4th, that the atheist is inclined to do evil 
by his nature only, while the polytheist is inclined 
to evil both by his nature and by the example of his 
gods ; and 5th, that it is better to deny God than to 
attribute to him vices which debase him. 

We answer, to the 1st, that without God there 
would be no sanction to the natural law, and with- 
out a sanction no law can have force ; to the 2nd, 



METAPHYSICS. 105 

that religion has been the pretext, but not the cause 
of war (We may here observe that we speak of re- 
ligion as being the aggressive power ; for religion 
has often been obliged to defend herself. The cause 
of these wars was ambition, or a spirit of revenge 
on the part of princes who were censured by the 
popes, or some other cause of similar nature) ; to the 
3d, that neither theists nor atheists were logical in 
their conduct, and that therefore no conclusion can 
be drawn from their conduct, to deduce a general 
conclusion from exceptional facts is a fallacy per 
accidens ; to the 4th, that the poly theists have some 
motives for restraining their passions, for example, 
the belief in another life ; and to the 5 th, that the 
ignorance of the polytheists is not the result of a bad 
will, that consequently their intentions are good, 
and that since the intention constitutes the merit 
or the demerit of our actions, the conduct of the 
atheists is worse than that of the polytheists. 

CHAPTER SECOND. 
Of the Proofs of the Existence of God. 

No truth has been more firmly established than 
that of the existence of Grod. The arguments by 
which this truth is proved are of three kinds, being 
taken respectively from the metaphysical, the phys- 
ical and the moral order ; and consequently the 
present chapter is divided into three articles. 

Article First. — Metaphysical Arguments. 

These arguments are so called because they are 
5* 



106 METAPHYSICS. 

grounded upon the essence of things, and are drawn 
from considerations purely intellectual. 

Some preliminary notions more fully explained in 
Ontology must be summarily repeated in this con- 
nection : 

No being exists without a reason for its existence. 
This reason may come from the nature of the being, 
or from a cause which is extrinsic to it. A being 
which has in its own nature the reason of its exist- 
ence, or which exists by itself out of its own nature, 
is called a necessary being, or a being a se. The 
opposite of a necessary being is called a contingent 
being, that is, a being which has received its exist- 
ence from an extrinsic cause. 

An infinite being is one which admits of no limit ; 
it is also called ens sim/pliciter, because it excludes 
negation in every way. The notion of infinite ne- 
cessarily excludes that of number or series : the idea 
of an infinite number or series is contradictory in 
itself. 

First argument, taken from the notion of a ne- 
cessary being. 

Proposition. — From the existence of a necessary 
being ive conclude that God exists. 

Argument: God exists if there is a necessary be- 
ing ; but such is the case ; therefore God exists. 

Proof: There is a necessary being. For, among 
the beings now existing, either there is a necessary 
being or all beings are contingent. But this latter 
supposition cannot be true ; for, if all existing beings 
are contingent they must have received their exist- 
ence from another being : but it cannot be that all 



METAPHYSICS. 107 

existing beings have received their existence, for, if 
they had, they must have received it from a being 
taken either outside or inside the collection of existing 
beings : but neither of these suppositions can be trne ; 
for, since none but contingent, beings exist, the be- 
ing upon which they depend cannot be taken out- 
side of them ; and it cannot be taken from inside 
their collection, for then it would be both contingent 
and non-contingent ; it would be cause and effect, 
prior and posterior to itself, which is a contradiction : 
there must therefore be a beins; which is not contin- 
gent, that is, a necessary being. 

Conclusion. — The necessary being is infinite. It 
is infinite if it has all the perfections, existing or 
possible, of all existing or possible beings ; but such 
is the case : for all contingent beings come from the 
necessary being ; but perfections are modifications 
of beings ; hence, all perfections existing in contin- 
gent beings come from the necessary being : this 
necessary being must have all possible perfections 
also, for otherwise these perfections would be pos- 
sible and not possible at the same time. Therefore 
the necessary being is the infinite, and the infinite 
is God. 

Second argument, taken from the idea of Gfod. 

Proposition. — From the idea of God ive conclude 
that God exists. 

Argument : From the idea of God we . conclude 
that God exists, if we have really that idea, and if 
that idea is necessarily connected with- the actual 
existence of God. But such is the case ; hence, from 
the idea of God we conclude that God exists. 



108 METAPHYSICS. 

Proof: 1st. We hare the idea of God, that is, of 
a heing infinitely perfect : this idea is clear in our 
mind, and distinct from any other notion. 

2nd. The actual existence of God is necessarily 
connected with the idea of God ; for if not we might 
conceive him as possible only, but we cannot con- 
ceive God as merely possible. "We cannot conceive 
a being without its essence ; the essence of God'is 
to be : we cannot therefore conceive God except as 
actually existing. Hence, the idea which we have 
of God is necessarily connected with the existence of 
God ; and, consequently, from the idea of God we 
conclude that God exists. 

Third argument, taken from the idea of the in- 
finite. 

Proposition. — From the idea of the infinite toe con- 
clude that God exists. 

Argument : The infinite exists, and consequently 
God exists, if we have the idea of the infinite ; but 
such is the case ; hence, from the idea of the infinite 
we conclude that God exists. 

Proof: The idea of the infinite involves the exist- 
ence of the infinite, since this idea can come but from 
the infinite itself. 

1st, The idea of the infinite cannot be given to us 
by a finite being ; for, if so, we should have an effect 
greater than its cause, which involves a contradic- 
tion. 

2nd. JS~o one can give what he has not ; hence, 
the idea of the infinite comes from the infinite itself. 

We have the idea of the infinite ; for, as in the 
case of the idea of God, we perceive it ; it is clear 



METAPHYSICS, 109 

and distinct in our mind. Hence, the idea of the 
infinite involves the existence of the infinite., and 
consequently, the existence of God. 

Article Second.— Physical Argument. 

The physical argument is taken from the aspect 
of the universe, and the "beautiful order found there- 
in. The Atheists pretend that the world was made 
by chance, and Epicurus embodied this system in 
the following manner: From all eternity an im- 
mense vacuum existed, and in this vacuum matter 
was found to have existed from all eternity. This 
matter was not found collected in one mass, but 
divided into its primitive atoms. To these atoms 
Epicurus gives the following properties : They had 
various forms ; they were eternal and necessary ; 
they were indivisible on account of their extreme 
hardness ; they moved in the vacuum in straight 
lines. It happened that some of these atoms devi- 
ated from the straight lines and adhered to other 
atoms, thus forming various bodies, until gradually 
the world resulted from this disorder. 

We may observe that these principles are quite 
arbitrary ; and that, our definitions of the words 
necessary and infinite being accepted, these same 
principles are also absurd and contradictory. Besides, 
the consequences are false ; for, from our definition of 
the necessary being, it follows, that the world has 
been created, and created by G-od ; while, from the 
system of Epicurus, it follows, that the order of har- 
mony, the conservation and reproduction of material 
beings, are merely the result of the deviations of atoms 



110 METAPHYSICS. 

wandering in a vacuum, in which an infinite matter 
is found. Who does not smile at such incoherencies ! 
It is needless to say more of this system. Let us 
come to our argument, and establish the following 

Proposition. — The order of the physical world indi- 
rectly proves the existence of God. 

Argument: This proposition is true provided 
there is order in the physical world, and that this 
order comes from a being of supreme intelligence ; 
but such is the case, and consequently the order of 
the physical world proves the existence of God. 

Proof. — A. Order is found in the physical world. 
The parts which constitute the physical world are 
the planetary and stellar systems, and the two-fold 
kingdom of nature, the inorganic and the organic. 
In the inorganic it will be sufficient to point out the 
atmosphere ; while in the organic we have the vege- 
table and the animal creation. In all these we find 
a beautiful order ; that is, the most suitable dispo- 
sition of means for the end in view. 

B. This order comes from a being of supreme in- 
telligence. This assertion is true, provided (a) the 
author of this order is a being distinct from matter 
and endowed with intelligence ; and provided (b) 
the cause of this order infinitely surpasses the human 
mind in intelligence. As both of these are true, it 
follows that this order comes from a being of supreme 
intelligence. 

(a) That the cause is intelligent and distinct from 
matter appears from this ; Order is a disposition of 
the means necessary to reach an end ; consequently, 
the author of this order must be able to know both 



METAPHYSICS. Ill 

the end and the means necessary to reach it ; it 
must then be an immaterial and intelligent cause, 
since matter is inert, blind and void of intelligence. 

(b) This cause infinitely surpasses the human mind 
in intelligence. All admit that the order found in 
the works of nature is far superior to anything pro- 
duced by the human mind. This order is so perfect 
that the human mind has never been able to dis- 
cover all its perfections ; new wonders are found 
every day, while many more escape the most inge- 
nious researches. Hence it appears that this intel- 
ligent cause immeasurably surpasses the human 
mind, and therefore it must be God. 

This argument destroys the system of Epicurus, 
since it proves that the order of the universe does 
not spring from chance, that is, from a blind cause ; 
it also overturns the system of the Pantheists, who 
pretend that God is not distinct from matter : but 
it does not absolutely prove the existence of God, 
that is, it does not prove that the intelligence that 
formed the universe is infinite, but only that it im- 
measurably surpasses mere human intelligence. 

Note. — From what has been said, we may con- 
clude that matter is contingent and consequently 
that it has been created ; hence, its existence proves 
that of a creator. Matter, we have further seen, is 
inert ; and we may conceive it as existing without 
motion : hence, motion is not a necessary quality of 
matter, and as motion exists, we conclude that there 
has been a prime mover. These observations will 
supply the^ means of answering the objection raised 
against the creation from the axiom ex nihilo nihil 



112 METAPHYSICS. 

fit. If "nihilo" here means a cause, the axiom is 
true ; but if the axiom means that what was merely 
possible may not become actual, it is false. 

Article Third. — Moral Argument; 

Amoral proof is one drawn from some fact that 
belongs to the moral nature of man ; that is, a fact 
based on the propensities or opinions which are com- 
mon to all men. Such proof produces in the mind 
a certitude not less than that resulting from meta- 
physical or physical proofs. Hence, the certitude 
resulting from a moral argument ought not to be 
confounded with what is called moral certitude, a 
term which often signified nothing more than prob- 
ability. 

First argument, taken from the common consent 
of mankind. 

Proposition. — From the unanimous consent of man- 
kind, if follows that God exists. 

Argument : If at all times and among all nations 
men have believed in the existence of God, we may 
conclude that God does exist. But there has always 
and among all nations been such a belief. Hence, 
the unanimous consent of mankind proves the exist- 
ence of God. 

Proof: The fact may be established as follows : 
we may know that all peoples have at all time be- 
lieved in the existence of God, if we find everywhere 
and in all ages prayers, temples, altars, sacrifices 
and religious rites. But this fact is abundantly 
proved for ancient times by all the writers, sacred 
or profane, who deserve our confidence. The fact 



METAPHYSICS. 113 

is as clearly evident for our own times, from the tes- 
timony of numberless travelers and writers. No 
nation, civilized and enlightened, or barbarous and 
savage, has been found where some form of worship 
could not be discovered. 

This consent is universal, uniform, and constant, 
and no one denies that the fact to which it testifies 
is of the greatest importance ; consequently this tes- 
timony has all the conditions required in the treatise 
on certitude to constitute an infallible motive of cer- 
titude. Therefore God exists. 

This proof is complete, and allows us to conclude 
the existence of an infinite being ; because such is 
the notion, although sometimes obscure, which is 
found in the minds of all people concerning God. 

Second argument, taken from the existence of the 
natural law. 

Proposition. — The existence of the natural law 
proves the existence of God. 

Argument : God exists if there is a natural law, 
but there is a natural law, hence He exists. 

Proof: The natural law is that rule, commanding 
' what is right and forbidding what is wrong, which 
is found in the conscience of every man. Since it is 
found in all men, it is the voice of truth, that is, 
the voice of God. But there is no law without a 
legislator ; and since the natural law is implanted 
in the hearts of ail men the legislator must be prior 
to man and superior to him, that is God. 



114 METAPHYSICS. 

PAST SECOND.— THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 

An attribute is a quality declared to "belong to a 
being ; and as perfection is an attribute which it is 
better to have than not to have, it follows that all 
the attributes of God are perfect ; hence, to speak of 
the attributes of G-od is the same as to speak of his 
perfections. 

Perfections are absolute when they exclude any 
limitation, and relative when they admit some lim- 
itation. The first are found in God alone, and the 
others in the creation ; but God necessarily possesses 
all absolute perfections formally, that is, as they are, 
and all relative perfections modo eminenti in an em- 
inent manner. 

Concerning the question as to which is the pri- 
mary attribute of God, we find four opinions. Some 
say that it is his unity, that is, his existence by 
himself. The Thomists contend that God is first 
an eminent and actual intelligence ; while the Scotists 
declare that his primary attribute is his infinity ; 
but in all these opinions we have conceptions of God 
considered in reference to the creation ; these con- 
ceptions must consequently be posterior, logically 
speaking, to the conception of his being, or of his 
existence : the fourth opinion, therefore, according 
to which, logically speaking, the primary attribute 
of God is u to be simply," would seem to be more 
satisfactory. 

The attributes of God are divided into two classes, 
relative and absolute. The relative attributes are 
those which are proper to each of the three persons 



METAPHYSICS. 115 

of the Holy Trinity : the discussion of these belongs 
to theology. The absolute attributes are those 
which belong to the divine essence. 

As we have said, God is a simple substance ; the 
assertion of the contrary would involve a contradic- 
tion. The difficulty then is to explain these attri- 
butes of God. Is the distinction given above real, 
or logical, that is, virtual only ? Is it real ; that is, 
does there exist in God the same distinction of attri- 
butes as there exists in the human soul between the 
will and the intellect ? or, is this distinction virtual 
only, that is, the result of the action or manifesta- 
tion of God's attributes, appearing to us as if there 
was a real distinction in them? 

The Scotists teach that there is a real distinction 
among God's attributes, and the Thomists affirm 
the contrary. The doctrine of the Thomists certain- 
ly offers less difficulty in reasoning on this myste- 
rious question. St. Augustine, before St. Thomas, 
gave the second opinion as his own. "No," says 
he, " there is no real distinction among the attributes 
of God ; but it is the essence of God which is, at the 
same time, most simple and most manifold, being a 
simple multiplicity and a multiple simplicity." It 
must be confessed that these antitheses do not throw 
any light on the subject. 

We shall divide this question concerning the 
attributes of God into thirteen chapters ; treating 
successively of his unity, his eternity, his immuta- 
bility, his liberty, his independence and omnipo- 
tence, his simplicity, his immensity, his intelligence 
and knowledge, his wisdom, his sanctity and truth, 



116 METAPHYSICS. 

his goodness and happiness, his justice, and his 
providence. 

CHAPTEE FIKST. 

Of the Unity of God. 

This attribute of God has been denied by the 
Polytheists and by the Manicheans. The Poly- 
theists admitted a plurality or multiplicity of gods, 
while the Manicheans affirmed that there are two 
principles of all things, one bad, who is the origi- 
nator of all evil, and the other good, who is of course 
the cause of all good. In order to proceed method- 
ically, let us divide the present chapter into three 
articles. 

Article First. — The Unity of God Proved Against 
the Polytheists. 

The forms of Polytheism have been manifold; 
being denominated Demonolatry, or worship of 
demons, Anthropolatry, or worship of men, Herol- 
atry, or worship of heroes, Zoolatry, or worship of 
animals, Idolatry, or worship of idols or statues, and 
Fetichism, or worship of objects having no deter- 
mined form. 

It is impossible to find out exactly when Polythe- 
ism made its first appearance in the world ; but it is 
certain that it has never been general, that, besides 
the philosophers, the generality of the people had 
some idea, though a confused one, of the unity of 
God. It is certain, moreover, that Monotheism was 
prior to it, contrary to the teaching of some writers 



METAPHYSICS. 117 

who pretend that Christianity- is hut a phase of Poly- 
theism. It is clear also that Polytheism did not 
grow more perfect in the course of time, but it 
degenerated and engendered general corruption, 
placing the world on the verge of an abyss, so that, 
according to the opinion of Bossuet, the world would 
have relapsed into chaos again if Jesus Christ had 
not come to save it. It has been asked whether 
Polytheism sprang from the will or from the intel- 
lect. We may accept as the true opinion that 
Polytheism originated mainly from the corruption 
of the will. 

Against the Polytheists we proceed to establish 
the following 

Proposition. — God is one. 

1st. We have shown that God is a necessary be- 
ing, or a being simply, that is, one who has in him- 
self the whole fullness of being, or existence. He 
cannot therefore be multiple ; for if there were any 
being or a plenitude of being extrinsic to him it 
could not be said that he possesses the whole fullness 
of being. 

2nd. The necessary being is infinite ; that is, the 
necessary being excludes any limitation: hence he 
is one, otherwise there would be limitation. 

3d. The unity of harmony which is found in the 
creation shows that its author and preserver is one. 

4th. We may add to the above reasons the con- 
sent of nations ; for it may be clearly demonstrated 
that the Pagans themselves admitted the unity of 



118 metaphysics. 

Article Secoxd. — The Unity of God Proved 
Against the Dualists. 

We find among the Semitic races, especially in 
Egypt and Persia, a belief in the existence of two 
first principles, one the principle of matter, and the 
other the principle of spirit. This Dualism is not 
that which we propose to examine in this article, 
hut rather that which was put forth hr llanes in the 
second and third centuries of the Christian era, and 
revived hy Bayle in the seventeenth century. These 
men taught that all evil 'comes from the had prin- 
ciple and all good from the good principle ; hut their 
doctrine cannot he accepted, for, 

1st. God is one — there cannot he two necessary 
"beings. The necessary heing is infinite ; the infinite 
"being contains the fullness of heing or existence : 
he cannot therefore he multiple ; and hence he is 
one. 

2nd. Of these two "beings one would he infinitely 
perfect and the other infinitely imperfect ; but im- 
perfection is a negation, that is nothing ; hence the 
principle of evil would he infinitely nothing, which 
is an absurdity. 

3d. Laying aside the former considerations, 
neither of these beings would be omnipotent, and 
neither would be happy, unless they made an agree- 
ment with each other concerning all things which 
should be clone, and then we should have fatalism, 
that is, human liberty would be annihilated. 

4th. In conclusion, we will say that this system 
is not necessary in order to explain any difficulties 
in the mechanism of the world. 



metaphysics. 119 

Article Third. — The Origin of Evil Under a 
Being Infinitely Good. 

It is true that it appears difficult to explain the 
origin of evil under a being infinitely good ; still we 
cannot reject the unity of God on account of this, for 
that truth has been established. 

Let us then make a few considerations concerning 
this question of the origin of evil. The evil in the 
world is three-fold. 

1st. The evil which is called metaphysical consists 
in this, that God has granted more or less perfec- 
tions to his creatures. It is plain that there is no 
disorder in this ; it is even necessary as the source of 
order, for this very variety while harmoniously dis- 
posed constitutes the foundation of that beauty and 
order in the moral world which excites our admira- 
tion. It is the principle of society, the source of 
heroism and the origin of all the virtues. 

2nd. Physical evil consists of the pains which 
afflict the human body in many ways. These are the 
consequences of the actual condition of man ; and it 
derogates nothing from the perfections of God, that, 
though infinitely good, he has established this con- 
dition. For it may be demonstrated that the good 
is greater than the evil, even from this physical 
point of view, as is evident from the fact that there 
is no one who does not prefer to live rather than to 
die. Besides, these evils are the source of moral good 
to many, and thus become the occasion of eternal 
happiness : the greatest virtues have their origin in 
the existence of these evils or pains. Moreover, we 



120 METAPHYSICS. 

know that physical pains are often the result of moral 
evil. 

In a Christian sense the evil does not exist, hut as 
punishment ; original sin explains everything ; hut 
in this work we consider the question philosophi- 
cally. 

3d. Moral evil is sin. God was not obliged to 
prevent sin for these reasons : 

(a) Not on account of Ms sanctity or holiness : God 
is holy if he be not sullied with sin and if he hate 
it ; hut such is the case. 

(b) Not on account of Ms justice : God is just if he 
have established man in a condition good in itself, 
and if he do not punish him unjustly ; but such is- 
the case. 

(c) Not on account of Ms goodness : God is good if 
he have granted to man liberty, which is good both in 
itself and in the intention of God ; but such is the 
case. 

(d) Not on account of Ms ivisdom: God is wise if 
he have done nothing but for a good end, and have 
chosen the best means to reach that end ; but such 
is the case. He proposed to reward the virtues of 
men, and gave them the most efficacious means that 
they might not abuse their liberty. 

The objections to our arguments are taken from 
the fact of God's foreseeing the abuse which men 
would make of the liberty he gave them. The prin- 
ciples for refuting these objections are as follows : 
The intention of God was good, the gift was good, the 
foresight of God had no influence on human liberty, 
God helps human weakness, and, finally, all'agree 
hat existence, as it is, is better than non-existence. 



METAPHYSICS. 121 

CHAPTEE SECOND. 

Of the Eternity of God. 

Proposition. — God is eternal. 

Argument : God is eternal if he be necessary, but 
God is necessary ; then he is eternal. 

Proof: We have already proved that God is ne- 
cessary. A necessary being is one whose essence it 
is to be; and, since we cannot conceive a being with- 
out its essence, the necessary being must always 
have been : hence he is eternal. 

If the necessary being were not eternal he would 
have been produced by another being, for he could 
not have produced himself, that is, he Avould be 
contingent ; but we have proved that God is the 
necessary being, he is then eternal. 

Several authors have considered the question 
whether there is succession in the eternity of God. 
We have seen that the necessary being is infinite, 
but infinity and succession in the same being in- 
volve a contradiction. Succession is composed of 
moments added to one another, each of course being 
limited ; but the infinite excludes limitation, while 
succession includes series, a series being a collection 
of finite beings : hence, the infinite and series, or 
succession, are terms involving a contradiction. The 
eternity of God is therefore not successive, but sim- 
ple, like his own being. God is. For him, there 
is neither past nor future, but all is present : his 
essence is to be. 

6 



122 METAPHYSICS. 

CHAPTEK THIRD. 
Of the Immutability of God. 

Proposition. — God is immutable. 

Argument : God is immutable if immutability can 
be ascribed only to contingent beings, but such is 
the case, and hence God is immutable. 

Proof: Mutation is the transition from one condi- 
tion to another, consequently the transition from 
the possible to the real : hence mutation can be 
applied only to contingent beings, and the infinite 
and the mutable are terms involving a contradiction. 

In God everything is infinite ; hence nothing can 
be changed, either in his perfections or his decrees ; 
there can be in him nothing which is contingent. 
God is then immutable. 

In order to solve the objections which are advanced 
against this attribute of God, let it be remembered 
that in God there is neither past nor future. These 
words cannot be applied to God, to whom everything 
is present. 

CHAPTER FOURTH. 

Of the Liberty of God. 

Liberty is the power of choosing. The object of 
liberty is either an act which brings to its author 
some perfection or imperfection, or else an act which 
brings to him neither perfection nor imperfection : 
hence we see that the object of liberty is within the 
limits of what is good. 

Liberty may be considered as freedom either from 



METAPHYSICS. 123 

external force, otherwise called freedom from coac- 
tion ; or as freedom from necessity, otherwise called 
freedom of election. 

The acts may also be either exterior or interior. 
For God, the interior acts are those whose object is 
himself. 

Evidently God is free from coaction ; but, in his 
interior acts, he is not free from necessity. 

The liberty of God has been attacked by the Pan- 
theists, who, admitting only one substance, make 
every phenomenon a necessary modification of God ; 
and also by the Optimists, but these deny God's 
liberty only indirectly. 

We shall divide this chapter into three articles : 
in the first we shall demonstrate the fact of the liberty 
of God ; in the second we shall explain and refute the 
doctrine of the Pantheists ; and in the third that of 
the Optimists. 

Article First. — The Existence of the Liberty of 
God. 

Proposition — God is free in liis exterior acts. 

Argument : God is free if liberty is a perfection, 
and if no cause could have compelled him to create 
from necessity, but such is the case, and therefore 
he is free in his exterior acts. 

Proof : Liberty is a perfection ; for a being who is 
free, is independent in his acts and the supreme 
arbiter of what he does ; and independence is better 
than dependence^ and consequently an absolute per- 
fection ; but God being infinite possesses infinitely 
all absolute perfections ; hence he is free. 



124 METAPHYSICS. 

God possesses infinitely all the perfections which, 
are found in his creatures ; but we are free, and there- 
fore he must be free. 

No cause could have obliged God to create from 
necessity : neither his happiness nor his glory, for in 
these he suffices for himself; nor his internal perfec- 
tions, for if this were so we should conclude that 
God, considered in his essence, is not infinitely per- 
fect, but certainly this would be untrue. 

It appears difficult to reconcile the immutability 
of God with his liberty. Three systems have been 
formed for this purjDose, but they are not satisfactory. 
It is enough for us that both attributes have been 
proved to exist in God: the "difficulties spoken of 
only serve to show the weakness of human reason. 

Article Second.— Pantheism. 

Pantheism is the system of those who admit the 
existence of but one substance, which substance, ac- 
cording to them, is infinite. Hence, the Pantheists 
agree with the Atheists in making matter exist from 
necessity, and consequently in making it eternal and 
infinite. 

The doctrines of Pantheism may be reduced to 
these three heads : First, what exists, exists from 
necessity ; second, what exists forms one substance ; 
and, third, this one substance is infinite. 

The above principles are evidently false : For, in 
the first place, it has been proved that there is but 
one necessary being ; and that we are contingent, 
since we have received our existence. Secondly, 
there is a multiplicity of substances in the world, if, 



METAPHYSICS. 125 

for instance, there exists an essential difference 
between my soul and the bodies around me. Again, 
if there were but one substance, this substance would 
be either material or spiritual, or at the same time 
both spiritual and material ; but certainly all the 
substances in the world are not spiritual only, or 
material only, nor are they at the same time both 
spiritual and material, for this would be a contra- 
diction. Thirdly, as the infinite is simple, that is, 
not composed of parts, it is clear that matter cannot 
be infinite. 

The doctrine of Pantheism is pernicious in its 
consequences, for these reasons: 1st. It takes away 
all obligation and sanction from the moral laws, 
since according to this system there is no superior 
being. We speak thus absolutely, although the 
Pantheist will say that conventions may be held 
and their decisions accepted for the sake of peace : 
we all know that no convention not approved of God 
can ever find the human conscience. 2nd. Panthe- 
ism destroys man's liberty, and consequently takes 
from him all responsibility for his actions ; for if 
matter be necessary so also are its volitions or 
modifications, the actions of men, according to the 
Pantheists, being but modifications of the one neces- 
sary substance. 3d. Pantheism would oblige us 
to admit logically certain consequences which are 
evidently absurd ; as, for instance, that God is a 
stone, a plant, or a beast. 

Pantheism was taught among the ancients, in the 
Eleatic school ; and, indirectly, by some writers of 
the middle ages. But the doctrine which we have 



126 METAPHYSICS. 

explained is modern pantheism., as reduced to a sys- 
tem by Spinosa, a Jew, of Amsterdam, Holland. 

Pantheism has been taught also in Germany, by 
Kant, Fichte, Hegel, &c. All those writers insist 
upon the unity of substance ; there is according to 
them no distinction except a logical one, between the 
ego and the non-ego ("me " and il not me") that is, 
there is but a logical, and not a real, distinction be- 
tween the subjective and the objective. This doc- 
trine of Spinosa and the German philosophers is based 
upon the following definition of substance, which is 
ambiguous ; ' ' Substance is that which is in se (in 
itself) , and which is conceived to exist by itself ; that 
is, it is that of which we may conceive ; without con- 
ceiving of some other being by which it might have 
been formed." Evidently there is here an allusion 
to the modification, which does not exist indepen- 
dently of the substance, and which presupposes sub- 
stance in order that it should exist itself. 

Pantheism is the doctrine of the French Commu- 
nists, called Saint Simonists, Phalansteriens, Four- 
ierists, &c. ; and it is notorious what calamities have 
lately resulted from their doctrine in Europe, and 
especially in France. 

Article Third. — Optimism. 

Optimism is a system originated by Mallebranche 
and Leibnitz, in order to vindicate the providence of 
God and to refute the objections of Bayle and others 
against the goodness of God on account of the evil 
which exists in the world. Both Leibnitz and Mal- 
lebranche admit the existence of evil ; but according 



METAPHYSICS. 127 

to them the evil is necessary for the perfection of the 
universe, and does not detract from this perfection. 
According to Mallebranche, God was free to create, 
and could consequently have refrained from creating. 
He was also free to choose among several worlds 
equally perfect that which he wished to form ; but, 
owing to the perfections of his attributes, he was 
not free to choose a less perfect world, rejecting 
others more perfect. 

According to Leibnitz, God, on account of his 
wisdom and goodness, was not free not to create, nor 
was he free to create any but the most perfect world. 
God could not even choose among several worlds 
unequally perfect, taking one in preference to an- 
other. Still, even when God acts according to what 
is absolutely required by his attributes, he remains 
free. 

Both systems must be rejected, first, because they 
destroy, at least indirectly, the liberty of God, 
notwithstanding the contrary assertion of both phil- 
osophers. They must also be rejected because they 
assume that the ultimate reason for the exterior acts 
of God is the goodness of the object of these acts ; 
while, in fact, this ultimate reason for God's exte- 
rior acts is his own will, for which reason he may 
choose -a less perfect object in preference to a more 
perfect one, if he wills it, provided this choice be not 
in derogation of any of his attributes. 

Thirdly, their system must be rejected because its 
assertion that God was obliged to create the most 
perfect world involves an impossibility : for the most 
perfect world would be one of such perfection that 



128 METAPHYSICS. 

none more perfect could be imagined ; but the per- 
fection of the world could never be such that a more 
perfect one might not be imagined ; for however 
perfect it might become, it would still be finite, that 
is limited ; and what is limited is capable of increase, 
that is, it is imperfect : hence, the most perfect world 
must be infinite in perfection, which is an impossi- 
bility. The systems of Mallebranche and Leibnitz 
must therefore be rejected. 

CHAPTER FIFTH. 
Of the Omnipotence and Independence of God. 

1st. Omnipotence is the power of producing, or of 
bringing into existence, that which is merely possi- 
ble. By what is possible, we mean that which does 
not exist, but the idea of which involves no contra- 
diction. 

Proposition. — God is omnipotent . 

Argument : God is omnipotent if he can do what- 
ever is possible ; but such is the case, and hence he 
is omnipotent. 

Proof : God can do whatever is possible : for either 
he has this infinite power, or else he can do nothing 
or only something ; but the latter supposition cannot 
be correct, since, if it were so, God's power would 
not be so great as we may conceive it to be, and 
consequently not infinite. But he is infinite, and 
hence he can do everything which is possible : he is 
therefore omnipotent. 

Xote. — It is evident that God cannot do what is 
impossible ; for instance, he could not make a square 



METAPHYSICS. 129 

circle, because that involves a contradiction : the 
essence of a circle is roundness, and no being can 
have an essence other than its own ; for, if it could, 
the being would both be and not be at the same 
time. 

It is also plain that God cannot make what is 
infinite ; for, if so, the infinite would have a begin- 
ning, that is a limitation, but the infinite has no 
limitation, no beginning, hence it cannot be pro- 
duced by God. 

2nd. Proposition. — God is infinitely independent. 

Argument : God is infinitely independent if he 
depends on no one for his existence, or for the mode 
of that existence ; but such is the case, and therefore 
he is infinitely independent. 

Proof: Independence consists in this, that the 
being who is independent depends on no one for his 
existence, or for the mode of that existence. Such 
is the case in regard to God. We have demon- 
strated that he exists in himself (a se); hence he 
depends on no one for his existence. The second 
part is but a corollary of the first ; for if God depends 
on no onefor his existence he is equally independent 
as to the mode of that existence, since the mode, or 
modification, necessarily follows the substance. 

CHAPTER SIXTH. 

Of the Simplicity of God. 

This attribute of. God has been denied by the 
Polytheists, the Pantheists, the Materialists and 
the Anthropomorphites. These last were heretics 



130 METAPHYSICS. 

of the fourth, century who, taking the words of 
Scripture in a literal sense, maintained that God 
has eyes, mouth, hands, &c. 

Proposition. — God is Simple. 

Argument : God is simple if he is infinite ; but 
he is infinite, hence he is simple. 

Proof: If God is not simple he is composed of 
parts ; and these parts cannot be infinite, but must 
be finite. But God himself is infinite, and we can- 
not admit that a compound of finite parts, the es- 
sence of which is to be limited, can constitute a being 
which is infinite, or the essence of which is to be 
unlimited. Hence, God is simple ; and hence, also, 
he is not corporeal. This latter conclusion is against 
the Anthropomorphites. 

CHAPTEE SEVENTH. 
Of the Immensity of God. 

We call that immense which cannot be measured. 
The immensity of God is that attribute by virtue of 
which his presence cannot be limited, or by virtue 
of which he is present to everything that exists : 
hence, immensity means the same as omnipresence ; 
and, since God is an intelligence, he is omnipresent 
not only by his knowledge and operations, but also 
in his Substance. 

Proposition. — God is Immense. 

Argument : God is immense if he is infinite ; 
but he is infinite, hence he is immense. 

Proof: We have shown that God is infinite, that 
is, that he is without any limitation : hence, accord- 



-METAPHYSICS. 131 

ing to the definition, he is immense. He is there- 
fore substantially present everywhere. 

Note. — This substantial immensity of God is not 
of course a corporeal presence, but a spiritual one, 
since G-od is infinitely simple ; for the same reason, 
although God is whole in each part of space, still 
his substance is not multiple. Finally, we may say 
correctly that God is everywhere and also that he is 
nowhere : in saying that he is nowhere, we mean 
that he does not occupy a limited point of space, 
or a space of certain distance or dimensions, as 
creatures do. Here again we meet with a difficulty 
in explaining how God can be simple and immense 
at the same time ; but we have shown that he 
possesses both these attributes, and that they do not 
involve any contradiction. 

CHAPTER EIGHTH. 

Of the Knowledge of God. 

Men before knowing must conceive, judge and 
reason ; but such is not the case in regard to the 
knowledge of God. He knows, or rather sees, 
everything. All philosophers admit, first, that 
God alone knows himself perfectly ; second, that 
everything past is present to him, for otherwise his 
immutability would be destroyed ; third, that every- 
thing present, even the most secret things are 
known to him ; fourth, that he knows everything 
which is possible and that he realizes those same 
things ; and, fifth, that he knows all future things 
which are necessary, that is, which flow necessarily 
from the laws established by him. 



132 METAPHYSICS. 

In regard to those future things which are called 
contingent, that is, those things which may happen, 
but which are dependent on the free choice of men, 
Cicero and many other pagan writers, and after- 
wards the Socinians, as well as certain modern 
theorists, have maintained that God has only a 
contingent knowledge. 

But it is certain that God knows all future things, 
even those which are conditional and contingent ; 
and this may he proved in the following manner : 

1st. God is immutable ; hence he knows every- 
thing, for otherwise he might acquire knowledge, 
and consequently change. 

2nd. God is infinite. But if God did not know 
everything we might conceive a being more perfect 
than God, and this would destroy his infinity. 

3d. God is eternal. Eternity is the permanence 
of existence, or being. Eternity is one and simple, 
and we have proved that it cannot be successive ; 
consequently, such words as ""prevision," "'pre- 
science/' and "conjecture," are inaccurate when 
applied to the eternal being, that is, to God. God 
is, and, consequently, knows ; and neither in his 
being nor in his knowing can there be any limita- 
tion, any priority or posteriority. 

4th. All mankind have ever been convinced of 
this truth. 

The scholastics have asked in what way it is that 
God sees all things, and what is the character of 
his knowledge. All admit that it is more perfect 
to know a thing directly than indirectly, or to see 
a thing in itself, that is, in its essence, rather than 



METAPHYSICS. 133 

in a being distinct from the thing. Hence it follows 
that God sees himself, and all possible things, as 
well as all future necessary things, in their own 
essence. 

St. Thomas says that God also sees future free 
and contingent things in their essence, that is, that 
he sees them in his eternal and immutable decrees ; 
for nothing, even a free action, happens except by a 
decree of God, in such a way that in our free actions 
God is an efficient cause. But Molina and his dis- 
ciples contend that with such a system it is impos- 
sible to defend human liberty ; and they say that 
God sees the future as contingent on the free deter- 
minations of his creatures. We can accept either 
system. 

In order to answer objections to the foreknowledge 
of God, we have but to remember the words of St. 
Jerome : " The actions of men foreseen by God do 
not happen because God foresees them, but God 
foresees them because they are going to happen." 

CHAPTER NINTH. 

Of the Wisdom of God. 

Wisdom is that attribute according to which a 
being proposes to himself a good end and takes the 
most proper means to reach that end ; but God has 
this attribute, for, first, he is infinitely perfect, 
second, the order existing in the world proclaims 
his wisdom, and, third, we have shown that God 
possesses in an eminent degree all the perfections 
found in his creatures. 



134 METAPHYSICS. 

CHAPTEE TENTH. 

Or the Sanctity and Veracity op God. 

Sanctity consists in the love of what is good and 
the hatred of what is evil : it is evident that such 
an attribute must he found in a being who is infi- 
nitely perfect. 

Yeracity consists in this, that a being can neither 
deceive nor be deceived : God being holy cannot 
deceive, and having a knowledge which is infinite, 
he cannot be deceived. 

CHAPTEE ELEVENTH. 

Oe the Goodness and Happiness of God. 

Goodness, or benignity, is that attribute by which 
a being is inclined to do good to others gratuitously. 
Evidently such an attribute is a perfection, and con- 
sequently it is an attribute of God. This all men 
in all ages have believed: God has always been 
called Deus optimus maximus. u God very good 
and very great." To the goodness of God we must 
refer his mercy, which is rather an attribute in a 
theological sense., but which is also infinite. 

Happiness consists in the enjoyment of the good 
and the absence of the evil : but God being inde- 
pendent cannot be subject to evil, and being infi- 
nitely perfect he must possess and of course enjoy 
all good. Hence God is infinitely good and infi- 
nitely happy. 



METAPHYSICS. 135 

CHAPTER TWELFTH. 

Of the Justice of God. 

Justice is the attribute according to which, we 
give to others what belongs to them. God of course 
possesses this attribute, for if he did not act thus, 
he would not be equitable, and consequently not in- 
finitely perfect. We might' here, if necessary, cite 
the testimony of men ; but all agree on this point. 

CHAPTER THIRTEENTH. 

Oe the Providence of God. 

. We divide this last Chapter on the Attributes of 
God into two Articles. 

Article First. — The Existence of Providence. 

Providence is the care which God extends over 
his creatures ; or, it is the action by which he directs 
his creatures, either the reasonable or the unreason- 
able, to the end which is proper, to each individu- 
ally, and to all in general. 

The Epicureans, the Stoics, who held the doctrine 
of fatalism, and some modern philosophers contend- 
ing, that God's providence would destroy man's 
liberty, and that God is too great and too high to 
take such care of us, deny the existence of provi- 
dence. Against them we establish this 

Proposition. — God 's providence exists and extends 
to all things. 

Argument : The existence of providence must be 
accepted if it be required by those attributes of God 



136 METAPHYSICS. 

which are believed by all, and which are necessary 
in order to explain the order of the world ; but such 
is the case, and hence providence does exist, and 
must extend to all things. 

Proof: 1st. All admit that it is good, that it is 
a perfection, to take care of what we have produced ; 
hence, God, who is infinitely perfect, must have this 
perfection. 

Providence is required by the wisdom and good- 
ness of God. God's wisdom requires that he should 
do what is necessary in order that his creatures may 
reach the end he has designed for them ; and we are 
so ignorant, so weak, and so wickedly disposed,, that 
without providence we could not reach this end. 

The goodness of God requires that he should do 
what is necessary in order that we may obtain hap- 
piness ; but we have just seen that without God's 
providence we could not reach our end, hence we 
could not be happy, and God would not be good : 
but since God is good providence must exist. 

2nd. All people, in all ages, and in all countries, 
have believed in the existence of providence, as 
might easily be shown by the testimony of Christian 
and pagan writers ; and this testimony, so universal, 
so uniform, so constant, and concerning such an im- 
portant question, is a criterion of certitude : we may 
therefore again conclude that providence exists. 

3d. The constancy and uniformity of the effects, 
or rather of the order perpetuated in the world, is 
after all the most striking proof of the care which 
God takes of his creatures : and if this argument is 
so clear, and so generally confessed by every one, in 



METAPHYSICS. 137 

regard to the physical world, a fortiori it is likewise 
conclusive in regard to the moral world. 

To these proofs we may add the following consid- 
eration : Existence is something contingent to us, 
since it does not belong to our essence ; consequently, 
existence must be renewed at every instant of our 
life. Then, in order that we may live, it is neces- 
sary that God perpetuate, that is, renew at every 
instant, the act of his will by which he created us. 
Providence is therefore a continued creation ; and, 
so far as God's will is concerned, it is a necessity. 
But with God, to will and to act are the same ; hence 
the action of God upon us during our life is con- 
stant, and this is what we mean by his providence. 

In order to answer the objections to this proposi- 
tion, we have but to observe that the preservation 
of his creatures does not injure the majesty of God 
any more than their creation ; and that such care 
cannot cause trouble or grief to God who is infinitely 
happy and immutable. 

Article Second. — Consequences of the Existence of 
Providence in Regard to the Free Actions of 

- Men. 

From the definition given above, it follows that 
God directs everything in the world towards its own 
end ; and, consequently, that this action must have 
some influence over the free actions of men. This 
influence may be natural or supernatural. It is 
natural when the actions are considered without 
reference to future life, and supernatural when these 
actions are considered with reference to future life. 



138 METAPHYSICS. 

This supernatural influence is God's grace, a sub- 
ject belonging to theology. 

We have here to examine only the natural influ- 
ence of God over the free actions of man. We shall 
first consider whether this influence exists, and if so 
what is its nature. 

I. Does this influence of God exist ? 

The existence of this influence has been denied 
by several modern philosophers. But that the 
influence does exist is certain, for (a) God is the 
primary cause, and this attribute requires that 
everything which is a perfection in the creature 
should proceed from God ; but evidently the good 
use of liberty is a perfection, nay, even the greatest 
perfection in man, hence this good use proceeds from 
God. Good use here signifies the free and right 
determination of men, but under the influence of 
God, since this way of acting, which is a perfection, 
must proceed from him. 

(b) We may here again bring forward the 'consent 
of mankind. We all pray to God, that he may 
guide us, correct us, help us, inspire us, &c. 

Evidently, this influence takes place only for the 
good use of liberty. In regard to its wrong use, 
God cannot have an immediate, but only a mediate 
influence on man's actions, in the sense that he has 
granted liberty, of which a bad use is made against 
his suggestions : his sanctity forbids that he should 
act immediately in that case. 

II. What is the nature of this influence? 

The Molinists pretend that this influence is posi- 
tive and direct, but not on our will, which it neither 



METAPHYSICS. 139 

moves nor determines^ but simply helps, and with 
which it acts in concurrence for the performance of 
actions, so long as our will remains within the 
limits of what is good. As this assistance consists 
in affording a concourse of circumstances the most 
suitable for the determination, the followers of this 
system have been called Congruists. 

The Thomists maintain that the above system too 
much restrains the actions of God, who is the pri- 
mary cause of everything which is a perfection in 
his creatures ; and they contend that the influence 
of providence is direct even upon the will, but how- 
ever that Grod_, whose knowledge is infinite, keeps 
human liberty always safe. 

It seems difficult to conceive how man's liberty is 
preserved, according to the system of the Thomists ; 
and equally difficult to understand how the supreme 
dominion of Grod is respected, according to the sys- 
tem of the Molinists. 

This question, like many others, occasioned by 
the difficulty of explaining the attributes of Grod, 
became the subject matter of many books, which 
now, as Bouvier says, sleep in the dust, and the 
question is not solved, and remains insoluble. 

There are other opinions, and especially that of 
St. Augustine, but they are rather theological than 
philosophical, and consequently we shall omit them, 
and here finish this treatise on Theodicy, which is 
the first part of Pneumatology, or spiritual meta- 
physics. 



140 METAPHYSICS. 



THIRD DISSERTATION. 

ON PSYCHOLOGY. 

The word Psychology is derived from the Greek 
tpvxv' toyo$, and signifies a discourse upon the soul. 
We may define this branch of pneumatology to be 
the science which has for its object the general 
lnowledge of the human soul. 

Psychology is divided into two parts : the first 
treating of the human soul more according to expe- 
rience than reason ; and the second treating of it 
more according to reason than experience. The first 
is called experimental psychology, and the second 
rational psychology. We shall treat of these two 
parts in succession. 

PART FIRST.— EXPEEIMENTAL 
PSYCHOLOGY. 

Experimental Psychology may be defined to be 
the science which treats of the faculties of the human 
soul by the method of experience. According to 
this definition we shall naturally divide the subject 
of experimental psychology into as many parts as 
there are faculties of the human soul. 

We find in the soul three faculties, or general at- 
tributes : namely, activity, which is the fundamental 
attribute, and the sensibility and the intellect, which 
are the faculties that excite the soul to action. 

Since activity is not put in motion in the soul 
until it is first excited by the sensibility and the in- 



METAPHYSICS. 141 

tellect, we shall treat first of the sensibility, next 
of the intellect and afterwards of activity. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

Of Sensibility. 

The Sensibility of the soul may be considered 
either in general or particular. 

Sensibility, in general, is the faculty by which 
the human soul experiences emotions which are ordi- 
narily pleasant or unpleasant. A pleasant emotion 
is called pleasure, and an unpleasant one pain. 

The elements of sensibility are two. As soon as 
the soul perceives a sensation it instinctively turns 
to the object causing the sensation ; we have there- 
fore two elements, the sensation perceived and the 
reactive motion of the soul:- in the first case the soul 
is passive, and in the second it is active, but this 
activity is instinctive and necessary. 

This sensible emotion is merely passive and sub- 
jective, and is thus distinguished from the intellec- 
tual perception, which is a modification of the soul 
merely passive, but also objective ; because the in- 
tellectual perception represents an object as distinct 
from the modification itself, 

The reactive motion of the soul is called by the 
moralists motus primo primus, and its ordinary ap- 
pellation is appetite. This reaction is attractive 
when the emotion is agreeable, and repulsive when 
it is disagreeable. 

The source from which these attractive and re- 
pulsive emotions, or all the appetites of our soul, 
proceed, is the love of ourselves. 



142 METAPHYSICS. 

Sensibility, in particular, is exterior and physical 
when the emotion is produced by the action of the 
organs of sense, and interior when this emotion is 
produced without such action. 

(A) Physical sensibility is the power of experien- 
cing sensation. By sensation we understand the 
emotion which the soul experiences on account of 
some action of the organs of sense. Three elements, 
then, are found in physical sensibility r the organic 
impression which precedes and causes the sensation ; 
the sensation itself; and the appetite, or the re- 
action after the sensation. 

(a) The organic impression is the impression 
made on one of the organs of sense by an external 
body, and transmitted to the brain by the nerves. 

The senses are five in number : taste, touch, smell, 
hearing and sight. No sensation is experienced 
before the impression made on the organ of sense 
has reached the brain. The brain is an organ con- 
sisting of a soft, whitish, nerve-like substance, situ- 
ated in the skull. That part in the upper front 
part of the head is the direct and immediate organ, 
not only of physical sensibility, but also of interior 
sensibility, of the intellect} and even of the will ; 
so that if that part of the brain is removed or para- 
lyzed the man loses his power of feeling, of under- 
standing, and even of controlling the acts of his 
will. 

The brain is divided into two parts, or lobes, one 
on the right side and the other on the left, and each 
part is subdivided into many smaller ones. Upon 
these divisions the system of the phrenologists is 
built. 



METAPHYSICS. 143 

The nerves are either sensitive or motive. The 
sensitive nerves are those that transmit the impres- 
sions made on the organs of sense to the brain ; and 
the motive nerves, or motors, are those that serve, • 
as we might say, as the tools of the will. How 
these impressions are conveyed to the brain, and 
how the desires of the will are carried back again, 
are questions to which no answer has been given. 

(b) Sensation. — From what has been said it is easy 
to see the difference between sensation and the organic 
impression, which causes sensation. Sensations are 
either pleasant or unpleasant ; and our power of 
knowing by means of the nerves the place of the 
impression enables us to determine what part of the 
body feels pleasure or pain. 

There are some sensations which we may call 
indifferent. Although in morals no human act is 
indifferent in regard to salvation, yet we may accept 
the opinion of a large number of authors who con- 
sider many of our sensations as indifferent, that is, 
as affording neither pain nor pleasure, or, at most, 
very little of either pleasure or pain. 

(c) Appetite.- — Appetite is the reactive motion of 
the soul after it has experienced a sensation, whether 
agreeable or disagreeable. It is now customary to 
call the appetite resulting from an unpleasant or 
repulsive sensation a repugnance. We can now 
readily understand the difference between sensation 
and appetite. 

It is not by sensation only that appetite is excited 
in the soul : the remembrance of a sensation is suffi- 
cient to produce appetite. 



144 METAPHYSICS. 

Appetites are periodic, as that of hunger, &c; 
and accidental, as that for a certain kind of food, &c. 

It is obvious that the end to be obtained by appe- 
tite is the preservation of the body. 

(B) Interior sensibility is the power of experien- 
cing sentiments. A sentiment is the emotion produced 
in the soul by an intellectual notion. A sentiment 
differs from a sensation in two respects : first, a 
sentiment is produced by an intellectual notion., 
while a sensation is produced by an impression on 
the organ of one of the senses; and, second, the 
nature of the resulting emotions of pleasure or pain 
are different. 

The reactive emotion arising from a sentiment is 
called passion. 

Interior sensibility considered in relation to its 
object is three-fold in character : 1st, in relation to 
the personal affections, 2nd, in relation to social de- 
sires, and 3d, in relation to those sentiments which 
involve a certain conception of pure reason. 

(a) Personal affections. These are the disposi- 
tions, good or bad, with which we regard our fellow 
men ; and which determine us to wish them good or 
evil ; they are accordingly either benevolent or ma- 
levolent. 

The benevolent affections are either particular or 
general, and the others universal. The particu- 
lar benevolent affections are those of the family, 
friendship, gratitude, commiseration, &c. The gen- 
eral benevolent affections are charity, love of country, 
&c. Among the malevolent affections we may men- 
tion rivalry, envy, &c. 



METAPHYSICS. 145 

The principal distinctions between the benevolent 
and the malevolent affections are : first, a benevo- 
lent affection is always accompanied with an agree- 
able emotion ; second, a benevolent disposition is 
natural to man ; and, third, in regard to the object, 
benevolence is more extensive than malevolence. 

(b) Social desires. These are emotions of the soul 
by which we are inclined to seek for certain advan- 
tages that are found only in society, as reputation, 
power, &c. These desires may be reduced to five : 
1st, the desire for social companionship, which is 
natural to all men ; 2nd, the desire of knowing ; 3d, 
the desire of acquiring esteem and consideration ; 
4th, the desire of superiority, and 5th, the desire of 
property. These words need no explanation. 

(c) Sentiments involving some conception of pure 
reason. There exist within us certain sentiments 
which originate in the soul by the influence of the 
conceptions of pure reason ; as, for example, by the 
conceptions of the ideas of truth, of beauty, of the 
infinite, &c. 

The chief sentiments of this kind are : the senti- 
ment of truth ; the sentiment of beauty, or the 
aesthetic sentiment ; the sentiment of goodness, or 
the moral sentiment ; the religious sentiment ; and 
the sentiment of the infinite. There is such an 
affinity. between the objects of these sentiments and 
our intelligence that the soul cannot perceive them 
without experiencing some agreeable emotion, and 
this emotion is called the love of truth, of beauty, of 
goodness, &c. 
1 



146 METAPHYSICS. 

CHAPTER- SECOND. 
Of the Intellect. 

We nave already, in Logic and in the Introduc- 
tion, examined most of the notions concerning the 
intellect, and we shall now only briefly recapitulate 
them. 

The intellect is the thinking power. The facul- 
ties of the intellect may be divided into two classes, 
the perceptive faculties by which the mind perceives, 
and the reflexive faculties, by which the mind makes 
use of these perceptions. This Chapter is therefore 
divided into two Articles, to which we shall add a 
third on the nature and origin of ideas. 

Article First. — The Perceptive Faculties. 

There are two kinds of perception, the perception 
of contingent things, otherwise called experimental 
perception or experience ; and the perception of neces- 
sary things, otherwise called rational perception or 
pure reason, or simply reason. 

(A) The experimental perceptive faculties are: 
Consciousness ; memory, to which may be added 
what is called the association of ideas ; and the per- 
ception of the senses. 

It is well to observe here that there is an essential 
difference between sensation and the perception of 
the senses. As we have said, sensation is a phe- 
nomenon purely subjective. For instance, the 
sensation of smell is altogether an affection of the 
soul, and represents nothing distinct from this sen- 



METAPHYSICS. 147 

sation ; for if there were a representation of something 
accompanying the sensation it would not belong 
to the sensation itself, but to the perception or the 
imagination. The perception of the senses, on the 
contrary, is a phenomenon both subjective and ob- 
jective, which represents something which is outside 
the soul. The confusion of these two notions was the 
origin of sensism. 

The errors generally attributed to the perception 
of the senses come from three sources : 1st, dreams 
and delirium, 2nd, affirmation of more than the senses 
perceive, and 3d, weakness or unsound condition of 
some of the organs of sense. To avoid mistakes from 
these sources, we should affirm nothing more than 
we really perceive, and if possible use more than 
one sense to observe the same phenomenon. Be- 
sides, we should renew our observations under dif- 
ferent circumstances. 

(B) The rational perceptions are, first, ideas, or 
rational conceptions, the principal of which are 
those of being (idea entis), of unity, of infinity, of 
substance, of cause, of truth, of beauty, and of good- 
ness, concerning all of which we have already 
spoken sufficiently; and, second, the necessary 
truths, or the principles of pure reason, which we 
have explained in the Dissertation on the motives 
of certitude. 

Article Second. — The Eeflexive Faculties. 

The reflexive faculties are those by which the soul 
exercises its activity upon the perceptions. They 
are, as we have explained in Part First : Attention, 



148 METAPHYSICS. 

abstraction, judgment, reasoning, imagination, and 
the expression and transmission of thought by lan- 
guage. 

The imagination is that faculty by which the soul 

O Jo 

represents to itself an object under a sensible form, 
without the present or actual exercise of the percep- 
tion of the senses. The imagination may be creative, 
as well as reproductive ; for we may by imagination 
represent to ourselves certain intellectual notions 
under sensible forms. 

The imagination is affected by the vicissitudes of 
the body and the influence of physical agents more 
than any other intellectual faculty : it is modified by 
the influence of age, temperament, sickness, manner 
of living and diversity of climate. 

When the imagination is well directed it affords 
much aid towards the happiness and moral improve- 
ment of mankind ; but when badly directed, especially 
when sustained by the reading of novels and bad 
books, its influence is most pernicious. 

The expression and transmission of our ideas by 
language is a subject which must be treated more 
fully. 

(a) General Notions. 

Language, in general, is any sensible sign by 
which men may communicate to one another their 
thoughts, feelings and affections : it is either natural 
or acquired. 

Natural language is that which men use and 
understand without any previous instruction ; such 
as gestures, looks, shouts, &c. This kind of Ian- 



METAPIIYSICS. 149 

guage, which is also called gesticulation, is very 
expressive in certain circumstances, but generally is 
too vague, uncertain and incomplete. 

Acquired language is that which can neither be 
expressed nor understood without previous instruc- 
tion and knowledge of the native tongue. This 
kind of language is either spoken or written. Spoken 
language, being uttered by the tongue and other 
organs of speech, is language properly so called, or 
the tongue, as we say the English tongue, the French 
tongue, &c. 

Language is natural to men, in the sense that 
they have suitable organs for its use ; but it is also 
conventional, in the sense that the meaning given 
to the sounds issuing from the organs of speech is 
fixed almost altogether by the agreement of men. 

It is clear that spoken language is far more useful 
than that which we have called natural language, 
or gesture. 

Written language is a collection of fixed and per- 
manent figures, by the use of which men give 
expression to their ideas. It is of three kinds, 
ideographic, or picture writing (as the figures in 
arithmetic, algebra, geometry and chemistry); 
alphabetic ; and hieroglyphic, which is a mixture of 
the other two.. 

(b) Language Corpsidered in Relation to Thought. 

Language is not the producing cause of our ideas, 
but it is necessary in order that the human intellect 
should attain the degree of perfection of which it is 
capable. In regard to abstract and purely intel- 



150 METAPHYSICS. 

lectual ideas, language is necessary to develop and 
preserve them ; for it is impossible without language 
-to meditate upon things which do not belong to the 
sensible order, as, for instance, God and his attri- 
butes, &c. 

In order that the language be well composed, it 
is necessary that it be full, clear and harmonious. 
The rules to be followed in its use are given in the 
text-books on grammar. 

(c) The Origin of Language. 

The enquiry on this subject is two-fold : we have 
first to consider the question of fact, and secondly 
that of possibility. 

First. — The Question of Fact. 

I. It is certain from Genesis that God gave to our 
first parents a supernatural knowledge of articulate 
or spoken language. 

II. The most ancient traditions of all nations 
agree in admitting .the existence of what they call 
the golden age, during which God conversed with 
men and instructed them. 

III. All history is silent concerning an invention 
of language. 

IV. The study of philosophy has shown conclu- 
sively that all languages have had a common origin, 
or that there was a primitive language which fur- 
nished the roots of all other tongues ; and it is surely 
more simple and reasonable to explain this fact by 
the supernatural gift of language to man in the be- 
ginning, than by the invention of a first language 



METAPHYSICS. 151 

which must have been imperfect and incomplete, 
and which consequently could not have been the 
original of all languages. 

Second.' — The Question of Possibility. 

Is it possible that our first parents could of them- 
selves have invented language ? 

I. All the materialists and sensists affirm that 
our first parents could have done this. Some Chris- 
tian philosophers hold the same opinion, and say : 
First, that men can naturally express what they 
feel by some external signs, and consequently that, 
if they can think before speaking, they can manifest 
their thoughts by spoken language ; but, they 
farther assert, men can think before speaking, and 
hence could have invented language. Secondly, 
they say, that by attention men can have ideas of 
individual things, and afterwards express these 
ideas in words ; then pass from this point to abstrac- 
tion, generalization, &c, and so gradually form 
language. 

II. De Bonald is the principal defender of the 
opinion that it is impossible that men should have 
invented language ; and most of the Catholic phil- 
osophers side with him. They say, first, that 
without language it is imposible to acquire reflexive 
ideas of immaterial things ; and this is proved by 
daily experience and by the mental state of the deaf 
and dumb who have not been taught an artificial 
language, as well as by the state of mind of certain 
unfortunate persons who have lived in the wilder- 
ness without human society from their infancy. 



152 METAPHYSICS. 

Secondly, as is shown in the case of children, abstract 
and general ideas, even of material things, cannot be 
acquired, except gradually and with the knowledge 
of the language: these ideas require reflexion, and 
reflexion requires words. Thirdly, in order to in- 
vent language it would first be necessary to know 
its law and structure ; but these cannot be known 
without reflexion, and the same difficulty occurs as 
before. Fourthly, language could not be invented 
by one man, since he could not be understood by the 
rest of men, nor could he obtain their consent to use 
the language formed by him ; nor could it be in- 
vented by a number of men, for this would suppose 
an agreement, and no agreement is possible without 
language. Fifthly, they conclude language can- 
not have been invented gradually, since it forms a 
whole of which all the parts exist at the same time. 
Neither of these opinions is sufficiently conclusive. 
Either, however, may be accepted without opposing 
the Catholic doctrine. 

Article Third. — The Nature and Origin op our 
Ideas. 

1st. The Nature of our Ideas. 

We have already spoken of this subject in Logic; 
but there we considered ideas especially in regard to 
the objects which they represent. We have now to 
examine the question subjectively, and enquire 
whether our ideas of things, corporeal or incorporeal, 
are only modifications of the mind representing ob- 
jects to itself; or whether they are images distinct 



METAPHYSICS. 153 

from these modifications and also from the objects 
represented. According to the first hypothesis, 
there are hut two things to he considered in connec- 
tion with the idea, namely, the subject and the 
object, while, according to the second hypothe- 
sis, there is, besides the subject and the object, 
an image which is a medium between the two. 
Philosophers are divided in opinion on this question. 
Arnauld, Thomas Keed and Scotists advocate the 
first hypothesis ; while Aristotle, Democritus, Mal- 
lebranche, Locke and the Materialists defend the 
second. Some of these latter consider the medium 
to be a material image, which is absurd. 

It seems probable that the first hypothesis is the 
correct one ; for the other is entirely gratuitous, and 
besides does not solve the difficulty, which is : How 
does the soul, a spiritual substance, see corporeal 
things ? This difficulty reappears on the introduc- 
tion of the medium. 

Id. The Origin of our Ideas. 

Ideas are pure, or rational, when their objects are 
necessary things, and empiric when they represent 
contingent things. But as empiric ideas come from 
experience, we need not here enquire of the origin 
of this sort of ideas, but only of those which are 
pure, or rational ; besides, ideas ought not to be 
considered as abstract, but as concrete, for undoubt- 
edly abstract ideas come from abstraction. 

The question then is : What is the origin, or the 
source of concrete rational ideas, such as the idea of 
existence, of unity, of truth, of substance, &c. 



154 METAPHYSICS. 

There have been three opinions entertained by 
philosophers concerning the origin of ideas : that of 
the Sensists, that of those who teach the doctrine of 
innate ideas and that concerning the intuition of 
God, entis siinpliciter . 

(a) The System of the Sensists. 

This is the system of those who derive all our 
ideas, even rational ideas, from the senses. Their 
axiom is : There is nothing in the intellect which 
was not first in the senses. All the Sensists agree 
that at the time of its creation the soul is like a sheet 
of blank paper, void of all ideas. 

There is a difference between the Materialists and 
the Sensists ; the former contend that the soul is a 
material substance, the latter do not. Among the 
Sensists we find the names of Bacon, Locke, Condil- 
lac, Laromiguiere. 

This system ought to be rejected, if it is true that 
rational ideas cannot come from the senses ; but it 
is true that these ideas cannot come from this source, 
either directly by the perception of the senses or 
indirectly by reflexion : for the senses perceive only 
bodies and their phenomena ; and reflexion, acting 
upon ideas of contingent things, can derive nothing 
from them but what they contain, that is, what is 
contingent and mutable. Consequently, reflexion 
cannot derive from ideas of contingent things the 
ideas of truth, infinity, justice, &c, the objects of 
which are necessary and immutable things. This 
conclusion is strictly logical, and established upon 
the principle of contradiction. 



METAPHYSICS. 155 

(b) The Doctrine of Innate Ideas. 

This' is the doctrine of those who say that the 
mind is possessed of ideas which it did not acquire 
by its own power, but which were given to it by 
God, probably at the moment of its creation. Those 
who hold this doctrine say also that these ideas are 
not actually present to the mind at the moment of 
its creation, but only habitually present, and, as it 
were, remain slumbering in the soul, even as certain 
notions are stored up in the memory without being 
actually thought of until they are called forth by 
an effort of the mind. In like manner, they say, 
when reason becomes active these ideas become 
actual, or actively present, and the attention of the 
soul is directed towards them. 

The defenders of the doctrine of innate ideas claim 
that Descartes and Leibnitz favor their system. 
Descartes says that "some ideas are born with us, 
and that the germs of truth are deposited in our 
souls and gradually come to light by the activity of 
reason." Leibnitz speaks in the same sense, and 
compares these germs to the veins in marble which 
form the figure of some object : the object needs only 
the hand of the artist to bring it forth. 

It is evident that we cannot pronounce this sys- 
tem altogether false. The objections to it are : 
First, that if these ideas were in the mind we should 
have some consciousness of their presence ; but no 
one can say positively that we have this conscious- 
ness. Second, this doctrine explains nothing if it 
is meant by it that we have in the mind certain 



156 METAPHYSICS. 

dispositions only, or mere faculties, according to the 
explanation of Descartes and Leibnitz ; if, however, 
it is meant by the doctrine, that at the moment of 
creation there are in the soul virtual notions, the 
supposition is gratuitous. Accordingly we may 
make another supposition, which is that, instead of 
those ideas, which are improperly called innate, the 
soul receives notions, at every moment, by the in- 
tuition of God ; and this is the third system. 

(c) The Doctrine of the Intuition of God. 

This is the doctrine of those who maintain that 
rational ideas come into the mind by the intuitive 
perception of the simple being, or of God. Accord- 
ing to this doctrine, which is the true one, God is 
present to our intellect and is seen by it ; and from 
this perception the idea of the simple being, that is 
the idea of God, is present to our mind : and as the 
simple being is also infinite, necessary, eternal, &c, 
the intuition of this being contains in itself and pro- 
duces in our mind the ideas of infinity, necessity, 
eternity, &c, in a word, all the rational ideas, 
which, after all, are nothing else than the idea of 
the simple being considered in itself. 

This doctrine has been held by St. Augustine, 
St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, Bossuet and many 
others. 

We must observe that this intuition is not the 
beatific vision, which we can enjoy only in heaven ; 
but is an intuition by which we may see God ob- 
scurely, and as it were, to use the Apostle's expres- 
sion, in an enigma. 



METAPHYSICS. 157 

This doctrine satisfactorily explains the origin of 
ideas ; still it is only a hypothesis. 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

Of Activity. 

Activity is the power or faculty of acting : it is 
both interior and exterior. Interior activity is the 
soul's activity, considered independently of its 
action on the body ; while exterior activity, on the 
contrary, is the soul's activity, considered with 
reference to the movements of the body: exterior 
activity has therefore been called the motrix faculty. 

Interior activity is twofold, free and spontaneous ; 
the latter must not be confounded with the soul's 
passivity. 

Spontaneous activity is exercised in two ways, 
from instinct and from habit. Instinct differs from 
habit in this, that instinct proceeds from nature 
while habit is the result of a frequent repetition of 
the same acts. Instinct is found in animals as well 
as in men, and in children as well as in adults. 
Habit has been denned as the disposition to act 
acquired from a frequent repetition of the same acts. 
The soul and the body have each their own habits. 
It is evident that actions proceeding from mere 
habit are not free in themselves, though they may 
be so indirectly, that is, in their cause. 

Free activity, or the liberty of the soul, will now 
be treated at large, forming the chief part of this 
chapter. The other subjects belong directly to 
theology. 



158 METAPHYSICS. 

The Freedom of the Human Soul. 

"We first give a definition of the will : The icill 
is that faculty by which the soul chooses the good 
proposed to it by the intellect and avoids evil. 
Hence we conclude that nothing is willed unless it 
first be known. 

The will is either necessary or free. In the first 
case, the one who wills cannot refrain from willing, 
and this is will properly so called ; in the second 
case, one may refrain from willing that which is 
proposed by the intellect and choose something else, 
and this is called freedom. Freedom, therefore, is 
the power either to will or to refrain from willing ; 
or, more simply, it is the power of choosing. 

Among the philosophers who have denied the 
freedom of the will, we find, first, the Stoics, who 
were strict fatalists ; second, the Pantheists, who 
cannot admit freedom without being in contradic- 
tion with themselves ; third, the Manicheans, who 
pretended that we do good or evil according as the 
good or the evil principle inspires us ; fourth, the 
Mahometans, who are fatalists ; fifth, several modern 
religious systems which teach that we are predestined 
to do good by grace, and to do evil by concupiscence, 
thus confounding the notions of the voluntary 
and the free, and of course destroying freedom ; 
sixth, the followers of Cousin and Gall, who indirect- 
ly teach fatalism ; and, seventh, the Materialists, 
whose system, like that of the Pantheists, destroys 
human liberty. 

Note. — Euler and some other philosophers have 



METAPHYSICS. 159 

contended that freedom is essential to spiritual sub- 
stances. We feel constrained to deny this, and to 
say that G-od might have created us without liberty, 
at least without the liberty of doing wrong. 

We have now to discuss the question as to whether 
we have the liberty of choosing, and will proceed to 
prove the 

Proposition.— The human mind is truly free. 

Argument : That ought to be admitted as true 
which is proved to be true by the testimony of con- 
sciousness, by the consent of mankind, by the absurd 
consequences of fatalism and by reason ; but such is 
the case with the above proposition, and hence the 
human soul is free. 

Proof: First. Consciousness. We have seen that 
consciousness is an infallible motive of judging of 
the present state of the soul. Now, we feel sure 
that in many of our actions we are free : we perceive 
that there is an essential difference between the ac- 
tions which are performed with deliberation and 
those which are done without deliberation. The 
remorse that follows our bad actions helps us to 
make this distinction more evident. We may there- 
fore conclude that the freedom of the will is proved 
by our own consciousness. 

Second. The consent of mankind is a clear and 
powerful proof in this case. We find everywhere, 
and in all ages, laws, treaties, rewards, punish- 
ments, &c. Among themselves men naturally use 
entreaties., threats, exhortations, &c. Even the 
fatalists do not deny these facts, although they pre- 
tend to believe that this general persuasion proceeis 



160 METAPHYSICS. 

from necessity. But we cannot admit that God, in 
his wisdom and love of truth, would permit all men 
to remain in such a state of delusion ; and we there- 
fore hold this consent of mankind as conclusive in 
favor of the freedom of the human soul. 

Third. If the doctrine of fatalism were admitted, 
we should be hut machines, deprived of reason. It 
would he absurd to speak of reasoning, deliberation, 
prudence, wisdom, &c, or of a distinction between 
virtue and vice or good and evil. There would be no 
merit in being a poet, an orator, or a philosopher, 
since necessity would compel certain persons to fill 
these positions. Xo one is willing to admit the ex- 
istence of these consequences, which, however, are 
logically true if we are not free. 

Fourth. Eeason. We might here use an argu- 
mentum ad liominem. "Would those philosophers 
who deny the existence of human liberty refrain 
from asking for punishment for any one who should 
strike or rob them? And yet, if they were logical, 
they would not consider those persons guilty who 
do these things. The illogical conduct of the fatal- 
ists themselves then shows that we are free. 

We conclude : 

1st. That the existence of our freedom is as clear 
as that of our thought. 

2nd. That the denial of our freedom leads to the 
denial of certitude itself. 

3d. That the existence of human freedom must 
be considered a primary truth. 

It is in the doctrine of the moderate fatalists that 
we find objections raised against the existence of 



METAPHYSICS. 161 

human freedom. By moderate fatalists we mean 
those philosophers who considering the strength of 
our physical nature, blinded more or less as it is by 
ignorance, habit or prejudice, exaggerate its influ- 
ence over the determination of the will. 

That this influence exists, and is in some cases 
very strong and very pressing, is of course true ; but 
it can never have such power over our determination 
as to make us act from necessity. We may always 
ascertain that we have been free, even in those ac- 
tions in which our temper, our habits, &c, have 
had most influence over us. 

PART SECOND.— RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

Of the Nature of the Human Soul, or of its 
Spirituality. 

Those philosophers who admit the spirituality of 
the human soul are called Spiritualists, and those 
who deny it are called Materialists. Besides the 
school of Epicurus, we may rank among the Mate- 
rialists, Locke, La Mettrie, Voltaire, Cabanis, Hel- 
vetius, d'Holbach and Diderot. 

Among the ancients many admitted the spiritu- 
ality of the soul, as Cicero and Aristotle. 

Proposition. — The soul is a simple substance, and 
absolutely distinct from matter. 

Argument: Two substances cannot be identical 
when they have opposite properties ; but such is the 
case in regard to the soul and matter. 



162 METAPHYSICS. 

Proof: In order to prove trie above proposition 
we will establish the fact that the soul is endowed 
with three properties which matter cannot have : the 
power of thinking, that of judging, and a free will, 
or activity. 

I. The soul has the power of thinking, a power 
which cannot be found in any material substance, 
that is, in a substance which has extension and is 
capable of division ; for if a material substance could 
have the power of thought, (1) the whole thought 
must be located in the whole substance, or (2) in 
each part of the substance, or (3) in one part only. 

The first hypothesis cannot be accepted ; for if it 
were true we should have to admit that thought may 
be divided into as many parts as there are in the 
substance, and consequently there would be no part 
which would be conscious of the whole thought or 
perceive its entire object. 

The second hypothesis is equally absurd ; for if it 
were true, the thought would be multiple, instead of 
divisible, but we feel that our thought is one. 

The third hypothesis is also inadmissible, because 
the same difficulties come back. This part of the 
matter would itself be matter, and consequently di- 
visible, and of course the thought must again be 
either divisible or multiple, and this is against the 
general conviction and feeling of our consciousness 
that the power of thinking is simple. 

II. The soul has the power of judging. In order 
to compare there must be a comparer who examines 
the two notions to be compared ; this comparer 
therefore must have the attribute of unity, but unity 



METAPHYSICS. 163 

cannot be found where there is divisibility, that is, 
in matter. Hence this power belongs to a simple 
substance. 

III. The human soul is active. We have proved 
that we are free ; to be free is, first, to be active ; 
but matter has no activity, being inert by nature : 
hence the soul must be an immaterial substance. 

We might add other observations to the above : 
First, that taken from the identity of the thinking 
principle within us. We are conscious of this iden- 
tity. We feel that we are now the same beings that 
we have ever been ; and yet our bodies have been 
changed many times, being constantly renewed. 

Second, that taken from the consciousness which 
we have at the same time of several sensations of a 
different character : I see, hear, smell, taste and 
touch at the same time, and am conscious that it is 
the same principle that perceives these various sen- 
sations. If, according to Epicurus, this principle 
were nothing else than the organs of the different 
senses, I could be conscious of but one sensation at 
the same time. 

Third, that drawn from the consent of mankind 
may be added to the above, and we conclude that 
the immateriality of the soul is proved. 

In order to answer the objections made against 
this proposition, let us observe that from the mutual 
influence of the soul and body over each other we 
cannot conclude that the two substances are identi- 
cal, for these reasons : 

(a) There is no contradiction in the action of a 
spiritual substance on a material one, (b) As Grod, 



164 METAPHYSICS. 

who is a spiritual substance, acts upon material 
creatures, so may the soul act upon the body, (c) 
Many examples show these substances to be different ; 
as very often a powerful mind is found in a weak 
and feeble body, (d) The body is to the soul what 
a musical instrument is to a musician : the musician 
tunes his instrument by degrees, and so the soul acts 
on the body during all the periods of our existence. 
From what has been said we may conclude, first, 
that the soul is a substance endowed with activity, 
sensibility, intellect and freedom ; and, second, that 
it is a substance which is a unit in every man, sim- 
ple and always identical with itself. 

CHAPTER SECOND. 

Or the Union of the Soul with the Body. 

From the last chapter it follows that the human 
soul and the human body are of different natures ; but 
between them there is the closest unio.n, the effects 
of which we experience at every instant. All admit 
this union, but in regard to the manner of explain- 
ing it several systems have been invented. 

First system. This is called the system of phys- 
ical influence, according to which the soul has a 
real influence over the body, as well as the body 
over the soul. This influence is called physical, 
not that it is material, but because the soul acts on 
the body as really and directly as one physical ob- 
ject would act upon another. This system was the 
only one received before the time of Mallebranche 
and Leibnitz, and even now it is generally accepted. 



METAPHYSICS. 165 

The second system,- that of a plastic or operating 
mediator, is taught by those who believe that there 
is between the soul and the body a middle substance, 
by the aid of which the soul and the body mutually 
act upon each other. According to the philosophers 
who teach this doctrine, this mediator is an active 
and incorporeal substance, but is deprived of sensi- 
bility and intelligence. 

The third system, that of occasional causes, is the 
one taught by Mallebranche. According to this 
system there is no real action of the soul upon the 
body, or of the body upon the soul : but the opera- 
tions of the mind are only occasions, and these being 
present God himself acts upon the body ; in like 
manner, the modifications of the body are occasions, 
which. being also present, God modifies the mind, 
that is, excites sensations in it. 

The fourth system, that of a pre-established har- 
mony, is the system of Leibnitz. This philosopher 
teaches that there is no direct action of the soul 
upon the body, or of the body upon the soul ; nor 
does God act directly upon the body on account of 
the operations of the mind, nor upon the mind on 
account of the modifications of the body ; but He so 
disposes, or prepares, both body and soul at the 
time of their creation that the whole series of voli- 
tions of the mind answers, in the most perfect har- 
mony, to the whole series of the motions of the 
body. 

As the second system complicates rather than 
explains the difficulty, we must reject it. 

The fourth system does not differ from the third 



166 METAPHYSICS. 

in regard to the present difficulty, which is to de- 
termine whether there is a mutual influence of the 
soul and the body on each other. Both systems 
deny that there is any such influence, and in this 
respect they do not differ, although in other respects 
they differ greatly. In each, however, especially in 
that of Leibnitz, we do not see how human freedom 
would be safe. 

There remains the first system, shall we admit 
the existence of a real mutual influence, a true 
causality, between the soul and the body ; or, accord- 
ing to the third system, a mere occasionally ? That 
there is a real influence we propose to prove by the 
following 

Proposition. — The soul has a direct influence upon 
the body, and the body upon the soul. 

Argument : If the existence of this mutual influ- 
ence is not shown to be impossible, and if it is even 
proved by many facts that the influence does exist, 
then the proposition must be accepted as true ; but 
such is the case, and hence the soul has a direct 
influence, &c. 

Proof: 1st. It has never been shown that the 
existence of this influence is impossible. When we 
say that the soul can act directly upon the body, we 
do not mean that it acts materially, for it is a spir- 
itual substance ; but we mean that the soul has a 
natural power of moving the body. That the exist- 
ence of this power of spirit over matter is not impossi- 
ble is evident from the fact that G-ocl, who is a pure 
spirit, does move material substances. 

That the influence of the body upon the soul is a 



METAPHYSICS. 167 

passive one is evident from the fact that the body, 
being matter, is inert of itself. The body is like an 
instrument in the hands of a workman ; it acts, or 
has influence, upon his will in proportion to its 
degree of fitness and perfection. Besides, it has not 
been shown that the forces of attraction and repul- 
sion, existing among the molecules of matter accord- 
ing to the arrangement made by God, do not exercise 
some action or influence upon the soul. 

2nd. Many facts and circumstances prove the 
mutual influence of the body and the soul. • These 
facts are : 

(a) The testimony of consciousness. Whenever I 
move my body I am conscious, not only of my will 
to move my body, but even of a certain effort of the 
soul to move it, and I clearly perceive that the move- 
ment of my body responds to the effort of my soul. 

(b) The universal persuasion of mankind. All 
men are convinced that the human will is the mov- 
ing cause of bodily action, and also that the body 
reacts upon the soul. This testimony, as we have 
proved, is a sufficient argument to establish certitude. 

(c) The unity of human personality. Personality, 
in man, is a union between the soul and the body, 
so complete that they form one individual who 
attributes to himself all the actions of the soul and 
the body, who can say with equal correctness, /think 
and I walk. It is clear that we could not thus ex- 
press ourselves if we did not know and feel that our 
actions are indeed our own, and not the result of 
the actions of Gfod in consequence of the volitions of 
our mind or the movements of our body. 



168 METAPHYSICS. 

(d) The power icliich the mind has of directly per- 
ceiving corporeal objects. This lias been established 
in Logic, in treating of the evidence of the senses. 
The existence of this power shows that the senses 
have a direct influence upon the soul. The first sys- 
tem may therefore be now considered as fully proved 
to be the true one. 

Notes. — (1) Philosophers have examined the ques- 
tion concerning the origin of the soul. It is clear, 
and also generally admitted, that souls are created 
immediately by God, without the co-operation of 
parents ; and, consequently, the soul does not exist 
before the conception of the body, for this pre-exist- 
ence, which is contrary to the teaching of theology, 
seems entirely opposed to reason and to the wisdom 
of God. 

(2) In regard to the consequences of the union of 
the body with the soul, there are two kinds of phe- 
nomena ; the first ones are the result of the influence 
of the body upon the mind, as has been noticed in 
Experimental Psychology, in treating of sensation, 
memory, &c, when both soul and body are in a 
normal condition, and in treating of delirium, &c, 
when they are in an abnormal condition ; and the 
others are the result of the influence of the mind 
upon the body, as it has been said in treating of the 
changes of the voice, countenance, &c, when we 
wish to show the feelings of the soul, in other words, 
when the influence of the soul is exercised upon the 
body. 



METAPHYSICS. 169 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

Or the Destiny of the Soul. 

It has been shown that the soul and the body- 
are two substances, entirely distinct and different. 
The dissolution of the body does not involve that of 
the soul, since the soul is not divisible, that is, is 
not composed of parts. The dissolution of the body 
does not necessitate the annihilation of the soul ; 
for if such were the case it would be because the 
soul could not exercise her faculties without the 
body, but this is not so, for there are in the soul 
many faculties which by their nature have no con- 
nection with the body : such are the faculties of 
thinking, judging, reasoning, &c. Hence we may 
conclude that the soul may outlive the body. This 
property of the soul is its immortality. 

Since the soul may outlive the body, there must 
be another life ; at least, the above remarks will 
justify us in concluding that the existence of an- 
other life is possible. Does this life then exist? 
This question properly belongs to Ethics, and we 
shall only consider it briefly in this place. 

The existence of another life is rendered neces- 
sary, 1st, by two attributes of G-od, His justice and 
His wisdom. 2nd. It is shown by the desire born 
with us to enjoy a felicity not to be found here, and 
which must be found somewhere. 3d. It is proved 
by the natural inclination of men to seek for repu- 
tation, glory and immortality. 4th. It is proved 
by the common consent of mankind, who have 
always in their treatment of the dead shown their 
8 



170 METAPHYSICS. 

conviction of the existence of another life. It can- 
not be objected to this that the testimony of a good 
conscience, or the hope of reward, are a sufficient 
sanction to the natural law ; for experience shows 
that a time comes for some men when these impres- 
sions are of no avail. 5th. It is proved by the 
consequences which would be the result of the con- 
trary belief. 

Note. — The eternal duration of the other life is 
not in contradiction to reason. 

CHAPTER FOURTH. 

Of the Souls of Animals. 

Besides God, the angels and the human soul, 
there is the inferior soul of animals. By this soul 
we mean the principle by which the animal has its 
life. Let us examine, first, what are the faculties 
of this soul, and, second, what is its nature and des- 
tination. 

Article First. — -The Faculties of the Souls of 
Animals, 

We find in those animals that have the most 
perfect organization these faculties, sensibility, in- 
tellect and activity. 

(a) Sensibility. Animals have (1) a physical 
sensibility which is superior in acuteness to that of 
man, as that of sight in the eagle. They have (2) 
physical appetites as men have. (3) In some of 
them we find desires and passions, as the inclina- 
tion to live in society, emulation, ostentation, envy 



METAPHYSICS. 3*71 

and avariciousness. (4) We find in some animals 
affections, that is sentiments either good or had. 

(h) Intellect. The degree of intellect is not the 
same in the different classes of animals. The mam- 
mals have the greatest amount of intellect. They 
are found to possess the following faculties : (1) By 
the organs of sense they perceive certain qualities 
of many bodies placed before them ; and this per- 
ception produces a conviction which excludes any 
doubt, as in the case of oats placed before a horse. 
Hence (2) they have consciousness of their own sen- 
sations and operations. (3) They are capable of 
being attentive, as a hunting dog scenting game. 

(4) They have memory. A horse will after years 
recognize a road through which lie has once passed. 

(5) Some animals have imagination ; and this is the 
only way of explaining their dreams. (6) Many 
animals have the power of expressing themselves 
exteriorly, or of communicating their sentiments. 
(7) It would not be unreasonable to admit in them 
something more than attention, in fact a sort of 
calculation on their part, in order to explain some 
extraordinary phenomena. 

(c) Activ'ty. Some of the actions of animals are 
spontaneous and others voluntary ; some proceed 
from instinct, some from choice, and others again 
from acquired habits. 

Instinct in animals takes the place of reason ; 
certain actions of theirs, as we have said, proceed 
from choice, as, for instance, a dog will abstain from 
food for fear of a stick with which he is threatened. 

The difference between men and the inferior an- 



172 METAPHYSICS. 

imals is (1) that men are endowed with reason, 
which belongs to the nature of the human soul ; 
consequently, by their nature men are superior. It 
is by reason that men distinguish what is good, true, 
beautiful, &c, and it is certain that the lower ani- 
mals cannot make these distinctions. (2) The lower 
animals are incapable of morality : having no moral 
liberty, their actions are not characterized by moral 
good or malice. 

Article Secoxd. — The Nature and Destiny of the 
Souls of Animals. 
It is evident that there is in all animals some im- 
material substance. We must believe this (1) since 
they exhibit activity, sensibility, and phenomena 
indicating an inferior intellect ; and (2) since these 
phenomena allow us to conclude in favor of the ex- 
istence of a substance which is active, sensible and 
has an inferior intellect ; and (3) since such sub- 
stance ought to be immaterial. 

(1) We have seen in the first Article that animals 
show signs of activity, etc. 

(2) We may conclude from the existence of these 
signs or phenomena, what we logically concluded 
concerning the human soul, namely, the existence 
of a substance which is active, sensitive and intel- 
ligent. 

(3) This substance must be essentially immate- 
rial, since these faculties are essentially different 
from the properties found in matter. 

We may therefore reject the doctrine of Descartes, 
who says that beasts are mere machines, and also 



METAPHYSICS. 173 

the doctrine of some modern dreamers, called phi- 
losophers, who pretend that men are not superior to 
beasts. 

The soul of the inferior animal cannot of course 
be dissolved by the dissolution of its body, since it 
is an immaterial substance ; but as there is no rea- 
son for admitting the existence of another life for 
such souls, we may consider as reasonable the opin- 
ion of those who think that such substances are 
annihilated as soon as their services are no longer 
needed. 



PART III 
ETHICS; OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 



ETHICS; 

OR, 

MORAL PHILOSOPHY 



THE words Ethics and Morals have the same 
meaning : the first comes from the Greek aeoc, 
and the second from the Latin mores. 

Ethics is the practical science which directs human 
actions toward honesty. 

Human actions are those which we perform as 
human beings, that is, with the knowledge of •the 
intellect and the consent of the will. Actions per- 
formed without this knowledge or consent are called 
the actions of man {actus hominis). 

We have already said, in Ontology, that there 
exists in the world a two-fold order, the physical 
and the moral. 

Beings deprived of their liberty necessarily follow 
the order assigned them by their Creator ; so that 
if there is disorder, the disorder cannot be attributed 
to them as the cause thereof: consequently they 
deserve neither praise nor blame. 

Beings endowed with liberty are responsible for 
their actions; according to their own wish, they 
follow or refuse to follow the order assigned them : 
and this is the first principle of human actions. 



178 ethics; 

Human actions may be considered both in general 
and in particular ; hence the division of this Part 
into two dissertations. 



FIRST DISSERTATION. 

ON HUMAN ACTIONS IN GENEEAL. 

Human actions are considered in general when 
they are examined abstractly, that is, the special 
state of man being laid aside. 

We have hrstto examine whether there are actions 
which are good and others which are bad, also what 
is the source of each and how we may make a dis- 
tinction between them. Hence the division of this 
dissertation into three chapters ; in the first of which 
we shall treat of the difference between good and 
bad actions, in the second of the principles of these 
actions, and in the third of the rules marking dis- 
tinctions between them. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

Of the Difference Between Good and Bad Actions. 

It would be useless to give rules of conduct if there 
were no difference between good and evil. We 
must consequently first determine whether there is 
such a difference, and if so whether there is any 
natural obligation of doing good and avoiding evil. 
In order to proceed methodically we shall divide this 
chanter into five articles. In the first we shall ex- 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 179 

amine whether there is any difference between good 
and evil ; and in the second, whether there is an 
obligation to do good and avoid evil, that is, whether 
there is a natural law : in the third we shall estab- 
lish the fact of the promulgation of that law ; in 
the fourth we shall prove that the law is immutable ; 
and in the fifth we shall show what is its sanction. 

Article First. — The Difference Between Moral 
Good and Moral Evil. 

This difference has been denied by Epicurus and 
his disciples, by Hobbes and Spinosa, and by 
the modern deists, as Helvetius, La Mettrie and 
d'Holbach. Their principles are, first, that man 
has received no useless faculties from nature, and 
consequently that what is possible to him is also law- 
ful for him ; and, second, that, in order to obtain 
security for themselves, men made an agreement to 
abstain from actions which might be injurious to the 
general welfare, from which, they say, resulted the 
distinction between good and evil. 

But we affirm that there is an essential difference 
between good and evil, as there is an essential differ- 
ence between truth and falsehood ; and, to prove 
this, we will establish the following 

Proposition. — Moral good and moral evil are es- 
sentially different. 

I. We prove this proposition first by its own evi- 
dence. What the mind clearly perceives as existing 
does really exist. But we clearly perceive the 
difference spoken of in the proposition ; it therefore 
does exist. For instance, the mind clearly perceives 



180 ethics; 

that it is right to honor our parents and wrong to in- 
sult them. The knowledge of this difference being 
a primary truth, its existence cannot be directly de- 
monstrated. 

II. In the second place, we prove this truth by 
the unanimous consent of mankind. That this con- 
sent exists we mar know by daily experience, by the 
annals of all nations and by the language of every 
people. We may moreover prove it by the manner 
of acting of those whose advantage it would be to 
deny the existence of this difference. There is not 
a wicked person who would not like to call his bad 
actions good, if he could do so ; and the very fact 
that he tries to do it shows that he admits that there 
is a difference between good and evil. The remorse 
which he feels is the best evidence of the truth of the 
proposition. It may further be proved by the man- 
ner of acting of those who deny theoretically the 
existence of the difference ; for these same deists, 
like all men, praise virtue and condemn vice. Since 
then this general consent exists, since it concerns a 
matter of great importance, and since it is in oppo- 
sition to our passions, it must be an infallible motive 
of certitude. As we have said in Logic., such a 
consent could not come from education, prejudice or 
agreement ; it must therefore come from nature, 
and is consequently the expression of truth. 

III. Thirdly, we prove this proposition by noting 
the absurd consequences of the opposite doctrine. 
If this difference did not exist, then good and evil 
would be the same ; but this is in contradiction to the 
common sense of men and their practices in daily 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. • 181 

life. If this difference is not essential, but the re- 
sult of an agreement, it would follow that to-morrow 
men might agree that it is right to insult our parents 
and wrong to honor them, which is evidently ab- 
surd. Hence we conclude that there is an essential 
difference between good and evil, that this difference 
is based upon the essence of things and upon the 
first principles of morals, and that neither God nor 
man could alter them. 

The principles of morals are of course the same 
for all men. However, in regard to the application 
of these principles we find a great diversity of 
opinion ; and, in regard to their remoter conse- 
quences, even the most learned men do not agree. All 
peoples, for instance, know that it is right, and even 
obligatory on us, to honor our parents ; yet nations 
are found where men think it an act of kindness to 
kill their parents when they become very old. The 
love of parents for their children has also been 
strangely abused by those who, through fear of 
future want or misery, think it allowable to kill 
their own offspring. Objections to our proposition 
may. be answered by the aid of these remarks. 

Article Second. — The Obligation of Doing Good 

and Avoiding Evil, or the Existence oe the 

Natural Law. 

The word law is probably derived from ligare, to 
bind. A law is a precept which is common to all, 
just, stable, given by a superior, sufficiently pro- 
mulgated and sanctioned. 

Law is a precept, and not an advice ; common to all 



182 ethics; 

and consequently different from a mandate, which 
is made for certain persons ; just, for no one can 
command that which is unjust ; stable, because it is 
not a transitory act, permanence being essential to 
it ; sufficiently promulgated, for it must be made 
known, and this can be done only by promulgation ; 
given by a superior, a legitimate superior only having 
the power to command and to exact obedience ; 
sufficiently sanctioned ; for otherwise the superior 
could not realize his end. 

There is no superior unless there are subjects. 

The power to command supposes the obligation of 
obedience. 

The obligation of obedience to lav/ is not deduced 
from human reason, considered in itself, but from 
the supreme dominion of God. The obligation of 
obedience to a law cannot be deduced from the 
human reason considered absolutely ; because, in 
order to impose an obligation, two wills are necessary, 
the one of a superior having a right to command, 
and the other of an inferior who is bound to obey : 
but the human will, considered abstractly from God, 
is not that of a superior, all men being naturally 
equal ; hence the human will cannot create an 
obligation. The obligation must therefore come 
from the authority of God ; and when a man com- 
mands he does so as holding the place of God : omnis 
auctoritas a Deo, all authority proceeds from God. 

Consequently, according to the Atheists there could 
be no obligation of obedience. 

From all eternity, God sees the supreme order of 
the essence and relations of things. This order 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 183 

constitutes the law which, is called moral, when 
considered in reference to free and intelligent beings ; 
and the disturbance of this same order constitutes 
moral evil. 

The supreme reason existing in God, determining 
in a fixed manner what may be done and what may 
not bs done, is called the eternal law. The eternal 
law is therefore the Avill of God commanding the 
maintenance and forbidding the disturbance of the 
natural order of things. 

The natural law is a participation of the eternal 
law by rational creatures. We may define it to be 
a precept by which God commands us to fulfill the 
duties which arise from the nature of things ; the 
necessity of which our reason may know, either by 
itself, or by the aid of another being. 

Proposition. — There exists a natural law. 

I. We might first give as an evidence of this truth 
several passages of the Holy Scripture, quoted or 
found even in the writings of pagans, as that of 
Psalm xxxiii — 15, Diverte a malo et fac bonum, 
avoid evil and do good. 

II. We have seen that there exists in the world a 
supreme order, but it is impossible to admit that 
God does not take care to have that order respected 
and observed by his free creatures : to admit that 
God looks with indifference on all our actions would 
be to deny his wisdom, his sanctity, etc. 

III. If we except the Epicureans, we find that 
the legislators and the peoples of all ages have be- 
lieved that God regards the actions of men, in order 
to reward the good and punish the wicked ; and we 



IS! ethics; 

know that such a consent is an infallible motive of 
certitude. 

Article Third. — The Promulgation of the Natural 
Law. 

I. There is no one having the use of reason who 
does not perceive within himself the presence of a 
light by the aid of which he can discern good from 
evil, and judge surely that some of his actions are 
right and others wrong. This light, found in the 
minds of all men. must come from God. the author 
of nature, and must therefore be the means of show- 
ing us what is his will. Thus the natural law is 
made manifest to us. and this manifestation is its 
promulgation, and creates for us an obligation of 
obedience. Xo form is required for such promulga- 
tion : it is sufficient for us that the will oV God has 
been made known to us . 

In the same manner the first precepts of morals 
are made evident to our souls. However, this light, 
which is merely rational, is exceedingly feeble in 
some men. and in others it is almost obscured, espe- 
cially concerning several consequences deduced from 
first principles. In order to help our natural weak- 
ness God has further enlightened our minds by 
revelation, by the authority of the Church and by 
tradition. 

To conclude, we may say that conscience, even 
when aided by education, could not discover many 
things which by deduction belong to the natural 
law : it is therefore no "wonder that many philos- 
ophers, not enlightened by revelation, have given 
forth so manv absurd and even monstrous syst 



OH, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 185 

II. It lias been a question whether, in the present 
state of things, there can be an invincible ignorance 
of the natural law. By invincible ignorance is un- 
derstood such an ignorance as cannot be removed by 
the ordinary help of nature and grace. The con- 
trary is called vincible ignorance. Some rigid doc- 
tors, chiefly of the University of Louvain, have 
contended that there can be no invincible ignorance 
even of the most remote consequences of the viola- 
tion of the natural law ; because, they contend, these 
consequences are essentially bad, and no one can be 
invincibly ignorant of what is essentially wrong, 

This opinion is generally rejected. We know 
that this invincible ignorance exists,, since we see 
the most learned' doctors, as St. Thomas and St. 
Bonaventure, giving contradictory solutions to ques- 
tions resting on the natural law. But concerning 
the primary precepts of the natural law and the 
proximate conclusions deduced from them, there is 
of course no invincible ignorance in any man with 
the use of his reason. 

III. The judgment of the mind concerning the 
morality of an action performed or about to be per- 
formed by it is called the conscience. Hence in 
Ethics we do not consider the conscience merely as 
a faculty, but also as an action. 

As this subject belongs to theology we shall here 
content ourselves with a few general remarks. 

Conscience is either true or false, certain or 
doubtful. 

A true conscience is one which declares lawful or 



186 ethics; 

unlawful that which really is so ; a false one being, 
of course, the contrary. 

A certain conscience is one 'which judges pru- 
dently, and without any fear of probable error, that 
some action is good or bad. Hence we may see that 
a certain conscience may not be a true one ; such a 
conscience, when in error, is said to be invincibly 
erroneous. 

A doubtful conscience is one which abstains from 
judging, because it perceives on both sides opposing 
reasons. 

1st. It is plain that a true, or at least a certain, 
conscience must be the rule of all our actions. 

2nd. It is never allowable for us to act against 
our conscience, even if it should 'afterwards appear 
that our conscience was is error ; for to act against 
our conscience is to be willing to commit sin. 

Article Fourth. — The Immutability of the Natural 
Law. 

The immutability of the natural law consists in 
this, that what is declared good by the natural law 
can never become bad, and vice versa. 

Proposition.- — The natural law is immutable. 

This is proved, first, by the intrinsic goodness of 
certain actions, and the intrinsic badness of others. 

Certain actions, as the honor due to God, are per- 
ceived by us to be so intrinsically good, and others 
are perceived to be so intrinsically bad, that never, 
in any hypothesis, can they be otherwise. Hence 
the law which commands us to observe this necessary 
order is immutable. 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 187 

In the second place, the moral axioms, or the first 
principles of the natural law, are necessary truths, 
just as the mathematical axioms are necessary truths. 
The principle ' ' We must give to every one what 
belongs to him," is as necessarily true and immuta- 
ble as the axiom " The whole is equal to the sum 
of its parts." Hence the natural law is immutable, 
and can suffer neither dispensation nor derogation. 

Some facts of Holy Scripture have been quoted 
against the truth of this proposition ; as the com- 
mand of God to Abraham to kill his son, and to the 
Israelites to take the vessels of the Egyptians. In 
the first there was no violation of the natural law, 
for this law forbids us to inflict death on our fellow- 
men by private authority ; but God, being the su- 
preme master of our lives, may, in virtue of his 
divine authority, command any one for a just cause 
to take away the life of another. In the case of the 
Egyptians, the Hebrews merely took back what was 
their own. In neither case therefore was there any 
dispensation or abrogation of the natural law. 

Article Fifth. — The Sanction of the Natural Law. 

By the sanction of the natural law, we understand 
the reward bestowed on those who observe the law, 
and the punishment inflicted on those who violate 
it. In regard to this sanction we proceed to prove 
the following propositions :* 

First Proposition. — God has established a sanction 
for the natural law. 

God being infinitely wise and powerful, has taken 
the proper means to secure the observation of the 



18S ethics; 

laws which lie has established. But, considering 
the natural disposition of men, it is evident that a 
sanction is necessary for the enforcement of the 
natural law ; for if left to his own inclinations man 
will not obey unless he forces himself, and he will 
not force himself unless he is compelled to do so : 
for this compulsion duty is not always a sufficient 
motive ; rewards and punishments must he provided. 
Hence God must have established a sanction for the 
natural law. 

Second Proposition. — The natural law lias some 
sanction even in this world, but this sanction is incom- 
plete and even void if separated from the sanction of 
another life. 

1st. The natural law has some sanction even in 
this world, that is, some reward is bestowed on those 
who observe the law, and some punishment is in- 
flicted on those who violate it ; for experience shows 
that virtue makes a man happy, so far as it is pos- 
sible to be happy in this world, and, on the contrary, 
that vice makes him unhappy. 

2nd. This sanction, in the present life, is incom- 
plete ; because it is not in strict proportion to the 
merit of virtue or the demerit of vice ; and because, 
as we all know, there are many virtuous actions that 
have no reward in this world, and many vicious ones 
that receive no punishment. 

3d. Moreover this sanction, in the present life, is 
almost void if separated from the sanction of the 
future life. Virtue makes one happy because it 
brings peace of conscience, and vice renders one un- 
happy because it is followed by remorse of conscience ; 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 189 

"but if we remove the certitude of another life this 
peace and this remorse would have no real founda- 
tion. 

All admit, when they speak seriously, that the 
desire of enjoying a good name among men, the 
intrinsic beauty of virtue, and the deformity of vice, 
are not sufficient motives for securing the observance 
of the natural law. 

We may conclude, from these considerations, that 
there is another life ; and that that life will be eter- 
nally happy for the good, for Grod can never cease 
to love them ; and eternally unhappy for the wicked, 
this eternity of punishment not being repugnant to 
the justice, wisdom or goodness of God. This last 
conclusion, concerning the eternal duration of re- 
wards and punishments, has always been believed by 
the generality of mankind. 

Note.' — It is worthy of inquiry whether one who 
observes the law on account of its sanction, that is, 
on account of the hope of reward or the fear of pun- 
ishment, performs a good moral action. 

We must distinguish: 1st. He who abstains from 
evil on account of mere hope or fear, but retains the 
desire to do evil if the sanction were removed, does 
not perform a good action, because his will is evil. 
2nd. He who observes the law, on account of the 
hope of reward or the fear of punishment, but also 
with the desire of thus doing his duty, performs a 
good action, for he does good on account oT the duty 
resting upon him. 3d. He who observes the law 
on account of the hope of reward or the fear of pun- 



190 



ethics; 



ishment, without considering the question of right 
or duty, does not indeed perform a bad action ; but 
his action is less perfect than that of the man who 
acts on account of duty. 

CHAPTEK SECOND. 
Of the Principles of Good and Bad Actions. 

These principles are the sources of goodness and 
wickedness ; they are, the intellect, liberty and the 
will. 

1st. It is certain that in order that an action be 
good or bad, it is necessary ihe intellect should know 
it to be such before it is performed. An act done 
without the knowledge of the intellect is not a human 
action. 

2nd. It is also certain that liberty in the actor is 
necessary for the morality of a human action. If 
the actor is not free, the act cannot be considered 
his own. An act done through necessity must be 
charged, not to the agent, but to the cause which 
determined him to act. 

3d. Again, it is certain that the will only is the 
cause and the foundation of sin ; as it is also the 
cause and the foundation of virtue. The will, 
understood in this sense, is consequently human 
liberty in exercise. 

The will considered in the act, is either simple or 
free. Its operation is called volition.* Volition is 
itself either simple or free. It is simple when there 
is knowledge of the intellect and consent of the will ; 

* This word means here what the authors express by voluntarium. 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 191 

it is free when besides these two there is also delib- 
eration. Hence what is free is voluntary, but what 
is voluntary is not necessarily free. For instance, 
we seek our happiness voluntarily, but not freely. 
It is free volition only which is the principle of our 
actions. 

Volition is direct when something is positively 
and in itself .intended by the agent ; and indirect 
when something is willed, not in itself, but in the 
cause of which it is the effect. For instance, if one 
burst a shell for mere amusement, and thus accident- 
ally kill a man, he does not will the death of the man 
directly but indirectly. 

Volition is perfect if it does not suppose any re- 
pugnance of the will, otherwise it is imperfect. An 
example of imperfect volition is that of a merchant 
at sea who throws his goods overboard for fear of 
shipwreck. 

The causes which may diminish or destroy the 
freedom of the will are : force, fear, error, ignorance 
and passion. 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

Rules for Distinguishing G-ood from Bad Actions. 

It is clear that we must avoid everything which 
is bad, but that we are not obliged to do everything 
which is good, as this latter would be impossible. 
Hence, the precept to avoid evil is negative and uni- 
versal, whereas the command to do good is affirmative 
and particular. The first obliges always and in all 
cases ; while the second obliges always, but not in 
all cases. The questions which belong to this chapter 



192 



ethics; 



are all theological, and are fully examined in the 
treatise on "Human Actions." 



SECOND DISSERTATION. 

ON HUMAN ACTIONS IN PAKTICULAK. 

Alan, as a moral agent, may he considered in three 
points of view, in his relations with God, with 
himself and with his fellow-men. Hence the three 
varieties of His special duties. 

Duty means the same as obligation. It is a moral 
restriction of the natural powers of a person. This 
is called a moral restriction, because duty imposes 
not a physical, but a moral restraint. 

This restriction is the result of the power which 
one being has either of doing something without 
hindrance from another being, or of exacting some- 
thing from that other being : this last power is 
called right. Hence right is the cause or origin of 
duty ; they are correlative, and one cannot exist, or 
be conceived, without the other. 

Eight is then the lawful authority of one being to 
do something, or to exact something of another 
being. From this definition, it is easy to' conceive 
how duty results from right: First, if a being has 
lawful authority to act in a certain manner, all other 
beings are bound not to impede his action : and^ 
second, if a being has lawful authority to exact an 
action from another being, that other being is bound 
to perform the required action. 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 193 

The duties of men are of three kinds, according 
to the division given above : duties towards God, 
towards themselves, and towards one another. There 
can be no other kind of duties, as, for 'instance, 
towards beings without reason ; for such beings can 
have no right, and hence there can be no obligation 
in regard to. them. 

CHAPTER FIRST. 

Of the Duties of Men towards God. 

The duties of men towards God, taken altogether, 
are called worship. Concerning this we have two 
questions to examine, 1st, Is man bound to worship 
God? and, 2nd^ Did God supernaturally reveal to 
man the manner in which He must be worshiped? 

This second question, which is theological, is fully 
discussed in the treatise u On Religion/' in the- 
ology. Here we have to examine only the first 
question, which we shall do by establishing the ne- 
cessity of religious worship, and by giving the 
causes which induce .men either to neglect or to 
corrupt that worship. . 

*A.rticle First. — -The Necessity of Religious 
Worship. 

"Worship is both interior and exterior. Interior 
worship is the sum of all our duties towards God, 
in so much as they consist in certain interior acts of 
the mind, as to love, to submit our will to the will 
of God, etc. Exterior worship is the outward man- 
ifestation of our interior worship ; and is itself either 
9 



194 ethics; 

private or public. Private worship is that paid to 
God by men in their own name ; and public wor- 
ship is that rendered to God by men as members of 
society. 

Concerning the necessity of religious worship, as 
thus explained, we establish the following proposi- 
tions : 

First Proposition. — Man is hound to give interior 
tvorsliij) to God. 

Man is bound to act towards God in accordance 
with the attributes of God and man's own condi- 
tion ; and both of these require an interior worship 
of man towards God. 

1st. The attributes of God. God is infinitely 
perfect, and must therefore be loved by his creatures ; 
he has supreme dominion over all things, and must* 
therefore be adored : but love and adoration are both 
acts of interior worship. 

2nd.. The condition of man. Man having been 
created by God, is obliged in return to give to him, 
as to his last end, all his actions and even his being 
itself; having been the object of the divine favor, he is 
obliged to return thanks to God ; and being in need 
of divine assistance, he is obliged to ask the help of 
God : but the direction of our actions towards Goa, 
thanksgiving for favors and petitions for help, are 
all acts of interior worship. Hence the proposition. 

Interior worship consists, first, in loving, for love 
being the noblest faculty of the soul is also the first ; 
and second, in obeying, for obedience is the proof of 
our love. Besides these duties, adoration, offering 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 195 

one's self to God, thanksgiving and prayer are so 
many acts of interior worship. 

Second Proposition. — Man is obliged to render to 
God an exterior worship. 

This proposition may he proved, first, by the ne- 
cessity there is for this worship, in order that we 
may he assured of the reality of our interior worship ; 
for man cannot feel deeply without showing what 
he feels hy some exterior signs. Hence, where there 
is no exterior worship there may be doubt whether 
there is any interior. 

It may be proved, in the second place, by the 
necessity of exterior worship for the preservation of 
the interior. Experience shows that the sense of 
religion is not long retained in our mind unless it 
is stirred and warmed, as it were, by exterior signs. 

Thirdly, exterior worship is necessary, because it 
is the tribute paid by our body to God, as interior 
worship is the tribute of the soul. Both owe wor- 
ship to God, who is the author of both soul and 
body. 

Third Proposition. — Man is bound to give public 
ivorship to God. 

This proposition is ^proved by these two consider- 
ations : 1st. Public worship is necessary for the 
preservation of both interior and exterior worship ; 
experience shows the truth of this, especially in the 
case of ignorant and uncultivated persons. 2nd. 
Public worship is the tribute due to God by the 
moral body called society ; and, besides, society, as 
a body, having need of. assistance, must seek it from 
God. 



196 ethics; 

Fourth Proposition. — The necessity of interior, 
exterior and public worship is proved by the unani- 
mous consent of mankind. 

This is a fact which no one can deny ; and this 
unanimous consent is an infallible motive of certi- 
tude. Cicero says: "Each state has its own reli- 
gion;" and Plutarch: " Xo one has ever seen a 
place without worship." 

Note. — The principal signs that constitute as it 
were the essence of exterior and public worship are : 
vocal prayer, singing, certain reverential motions 
and postures of the body, sacrifice and burning of 
incense. 

When man frequently fulfills his duties to God 
he acquires an ease and pleasure in worship which 
soon becomes a habit. This habit is called piety, 
or a religious disposition. 

Piety is therefore the virtue which inclines men 
to give to God the veneration and worship, both 
interior and exterior, which is his due. There is, 
however, a difference between piety and a disposition 
to fulfill our religious duties. This religious dispo- 
sition is the state of mind of one who is unwilling 
to omit to render to God the worship which is due 
to him ; while piety disposes one not only to render 
to God the worship which is due to him, but also to 
do this with fervor and great reverence. 

Piety is both interior and exterior : the first is a 
habitual intercourse existing interior]}* between God 
and the soul ; the second consists in exterior prac- 
tices of devotion. Piety is true and solid only when 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 197 

it is both interior and exterior. Solid piety is the 
most sure foundation of morality. 

Article Second. — The Causes which Induce Men 
either to Neglect or to Corrupt the Worship of 
God. 

I. The causes that lead men to neglect divine 
worship are of two kinds : those that lead them to * 
deny even in theory the necessity of divine worship, 
and those that induce them to omit this worship in 
practice. Of the first kind are atheism, and a false 
opinion of providence, as in the case of those who 
deny that G-od wants any worship, or that he cares 
for it. Of the second are indifference in matters of 
religion, very common as we all know, and the 
slavery of the passions ; this slavery is very much 
opposed to the worship of God, as it is a true 
idolatry.. Very many of these idolators are found 
in the world. 

II. The causes that alter and corrupt divine wor- 
ship are : idolatry, superstition, and lack of solid 
interior piety, that is, lip-worship instead of heart- 
worship. These causes corrupt not only divine 
worship, hut also public morals. This is especially 
the case with idolatry : the pagan world furnishes 
a most shameful example of the fact. 

CHAPTER SECOND. 

Op the Duties of Man towards Himself. 

These duties may be reduced to two : the obliga- 
tion of preserving the life of the body, and that of 
cultivating: the faculties of the mind. 



198 ethics; 

Article First. — The Obligation of Preserving the 
Life of the Body. 
To preserve his life man must avoid suicide, and 
not otherwise expose himself without sufficient cause 
to the danger of losing his life or his health. 

I. Suicide. 

Suicide is the act of a man who willingly and 
knowingly kills himself. We will first proceed to 
show that suicide is unlawful, and, secondly, that the 
arguments which are brought forward to justify it 
are futile. 

First Proposition. — Suicide is unlawful. 

That is unlawful which is contrary to the destiny 
intended for man upon earth, and which is opposed 
to the glory of God, to the good of society and to 
the natural propensities of men ; but such is suicide. 

1st. Suicide is contrary to the destiny intended 
for man upon earth. The present life is a time of 
probation : this follows from the fact of human lib- 
erty, and that of the existence of another life. For, 
since man can do either good or evil, and con- 
sequently gain merit or demerit, and since he is 
destined for another life which will be eternally 
happy or eternally miserable, it is evident that the 
present life is a time of probation. That it is not 
lawful for a man, by his own authority, to diminish 
the time of this probation imposed by God, is also 
clear ; because it must be unlawful for a creature to 
oppose the end designed by his creator, and because 
it is essential to the nature of probation that its 
duration be not left to the choice of him who is in 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 199 

the state of probation, but rather of Him who has 
established the probation. 

But by suicide a man diminishes the time of his 
probation, since he voluntarily deserts the station 
in which he has been placed by God. Hence suicide 
is, in the first place, contrary to the destiny intended 
by his Creator for man upon earth. 

2nd. Suicide is opposed to the glory of God, since 
man by continuing to practice virtue glorifies God, 
whereas if he commits suicide he voluntarily refuses 
to serve God and thus opposes himself to the promo- 
tion of God's glory. 

Suicide is also opposed to the good of society ; for 
if suicide were declared lawful there is no doubt that 
many would persuade themselves that it would be 
better for them to die, and thus numbers of useful 
members would be cut off from society. 

Suicide, finally, is opposed to the natural propen- 
sities of men : it is opposed to common sense, for all 
men admire and esteem those who are patient' and 
resigned in the sufferings of this life ; it is opposed 
to our instinctive love of life, and this love being 
acknowledged by all men must be the voice of nature, 
which it is unlawful for us to disobey. 

Observation. — Suicide is a most cruel act to one's 
self, since it hurls him headlong into the midst of 
the greatest calamities. He who is guilty of this 
crime dies in the actual commission of a bad action, 
and consequently puts it out of his power to make 
any atonement for the wrong which he does. His 
fate is the most deplorable that can befall a human 
Tbeina;. 



200 ethics; 

Second Proposition. — The arguments in favor of 
suicide are futile. 

This proposition is a corollary of the first : if sui- 
cide be unlawful, then all arguments in its favor must 
be vain. We shall, however, completely expose the 
fallacy of all these arguments. Some declare that 
suicide is lawful, because, they say, life is a gift 
which we can renounce ; others pretend to believe it 
an act of courage; others, again, affirm that it is a 
right of nature ; and others, finally, would persuade 
us that it is an act quite indifferent in its character. 

First reason : That life is a gift of God which we 
may renounce whenever it is useless to us and to 
others, and, a fortiori, whenever it becomes an intol- 
erable burden. 

Life is not a mere gift, granted without any con- 
dition and to be renounced whenever we please. By 
the very fact of our existence we are bound to serve 
God, not as we will, but as He wills ; and, conse- 
quently, as long as He keeps us in this life, we must 
serve Him, and we are never allowed to change, by 
our own will, that way of serving him, by passing 
into another life. Hence we cannot lawfully re- 
nounce the gift of our own existence. 

Nor is life ever useless to man. Whatever be his 
condition he can always make himself more and 
more worthy of that future beatitude for which this 
present life is a preparation. 

Nor even when life seems to be an intolerable bur- 
den is it allowed to man to take it away. Whatever 
be the sufferings which make life seem intolerable, 
they can never constitute a motive for committing 



OR; MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 201 

suicide ; on the "contrary, trie greater the trials of 
this life the better are they to enable us to reach the 
end for which we have been destined, and indeed 
life, in order to be a probation, must be burdensome. 

Besides, it is not true that life is ever entirely 
intolerable ; for the trials of life are never so great 
that man may not bear them, provided he has firm 
confidence in Grocl. The examples of many good 
persons have amply proved this in their sufferings. 
If therefore one who does not believe in the existence 
of Providence finds himself unable to bear the ills 
of this life, he cannot bring forward his unbelief as 
a lawful cause for committing suicide. 

Second reason : That suicide is lawful and praise- 
worthy because it is an act of courage. 

Such was the assertion of the Stoics ; but it is not 
true, for the man who kills himself because he can- 
not bear his trials does not perform a courageous act, 
but a cowardly one, as even the pagans themselves 
acknowledged. 

Third reason : That suicide is a natural right, as 
J. J. Eousseau and other deists have pretended. 

This is false, since men cannot have received from 
nature a right which is in opposition to the design 
which their Creator had in view, namely, as we have 
seen, that this life should be a time of probation. 
Suicide is opposed to this design of G-od, and hence 
cannot be a natural right. 

Fourth reason : That suicide is an act indifferent 
in its character, as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and the 
Encyclopedists have affirmed, since, says Montes- 
9* 



202 ethics; 

quieu, suicide does not disturb the order established 
by divine Providence. 

We have shown, in our answer to the third rea- 
son and elsewhere, that suicide does disturb the 
order established by Providence, since it is opposed 
to the end designed by Grod ; hence it is not an indif- 
ferent act. 

From the answers given above, we may conclude, 
first, that it is not lawful to kill one's self in order 
to avoid a more cruel death, and, secondly, that it 
is not lawful to commit suicide even in order to 
avoid the danger of committing sin, for to him that 
confides in G-od the occasion of sin is never insur- 
mountable. 

II. Danger of Losing Life or Health. 

1st. It is clear that we are not permitted to expose 
our life when there is not a good reason for so doing, 
which reason must be of equal gravity with the 
danger incurred. Consequently, it is not lawful to 
expose our life for mere amusement. 

2nd. It is clear, on the other hand, that it is lawful 
for us to expose ourselves to a probable or a certain 
danger of death, provided there is a reasonable cause 
for so doing, the gravity of the cause being in pro- 
portion to that of the danger. We may expose our 
life in order to obtain a greater good, as for the wel- 
fare of the State, or to preserve the life of another. 

3d. It is further clear that such exposure of life 
is not only lawful but even praiseworthy. 

4th. And, finally., it is clear that sometimes it is 
not only lawful and praiseworthy, but even obliga- 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 203 

tory for us to expose ourselves to certain danger of 
death. This is always the case in reference to our 
duties ; for instance, a soldier must keep his post at 
any risk, and a priest must attend his sick parish- 
ioners, even when they are dying of pestilence. 

Observation. — Although certain trades and occu- 
pations are unhealthy, or otherwise endanger life, 
yet on account of their general utility it is lawful to 
follow them, even though this utility he of mere 
temporary importance. 

What we have said concerning the danger of losing 
life may also he applied to the danger of losing our 
health. 

Article Second. — The Obligation of Cultivating 
the Faculties of the Mind. 

Proposition. — We are all obliged to cultivate and 
perfect the natural faculties and aptitudes of our mind. 

God gave us those faculties and aptitudes only 
that we might use them for promoting His glory 
and the good of ourselves and our fellow men. In 
order to promote the glory of Grod, we must culti- 
vate the seeds of virtue which have been implanted 
in our heart ; and in order to do good to ourselves 
and our fellow men, we must cultivate those apti- 
tudes which we have received for following some 
occupation useful to mankind. 

The faculties which we must cultivate are the 
intellect, the sensibility and the will. 

(a) Culture of the Intellect. ■ 
The intellect is cultivated by the acquisition of 



204: ethics; 

knowledge; and this knowledge may be necessary, 
useful or hurtful. 

1st. Necessary knowledge. Every one should 
acquire that knowledge which is necessary to enable 
him to attain his end, in other words, that knowledge 
which concerns the general duties of men. These 
duties are nowhere so clearly pointed out as in the 
Christian doctrine. Every one should also apply 
himself to the study of those things which concern 
his special duties in life. 

2nd. Useful knowledge. By useful knowledge is 
meant, not that which is necessary to enable us to 
discharge the duties of life, but that which may 
enable us to discharge these duties in a more perfect 
manner. But the acquisition of that knowledge 
which is only useful should never interfere with the 
acquisition of that which is necessary. A knowledge 
of the liberal arts and the sciences constitutes what 
may be called useful knowledge. 

3d. Useless or hurtful knowledge. It is not 
lawful to waste our time in the acquisition of useless 
knowledge ; and the acquisition of hurtful know- 
ledge, such as may be had from the reading of 
bad books, is positively forbidden : for by such 
knowledge the intellect is weakened and corrupted, 
and we are prevented from attaining the end for 
which we have been placed in this world. * 

Note. — -In order to acquire sound knowledge, we 
should, 1st, be careful not to study too many things 
at the same time ; 2nd, with the assistance of some 
experienced person, Ave should choose the best books, 
and read them with the most serious attention ; and, 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 205 

3d, we should take particular notice of everything 
important which we come across in reading. 

It has been made a question whether the study of 
the arts and sciences is hurtful to morals ; and also 
whether it is profitable for people in general to 
engage in the study of the sciences and the liberal 
arts. 

First question. — J. J. Rousseau, in a discourse 
delivered at Dijon, tries to show that the study of 
the arts and sciences corrupts good morals ; and, 
consequently, of course, that this study does not im- 
prove the morals. Against these assertions, we 
establish the following 

Proposition, — The culture of the arts and sciences 
does not of itself corrupt the morals ; on the contrary, 
this study exerts a powerful influence in favor of good 
morals. 

1st. That these studies do not corrupt the morals 
is evident from the fact that the arts and sciences are 
good in respect to their object, which object is the 
development of a series of truths from certain prin- 
ciples, or the expression of the beautiful in the physi- 
cal and the moral order, or some other equally good 
and proper end ; and the object being always thus 
proper and good, the study which has this object in 
view cannot be corrupting to the morals. 

Experience also shows the falsity of Rousseau's 
assertion ; for how many learned men are there whose 
hone*sty and purity of morals are as remarkable as 
their attainments in science. 

Even Rousseau's own confession refutes him ; for 
he has said in another discourse that he put forth 
the above paradox for the sake of vanity. 



206 ethics; 

2nd. The culture of the arts and sciences even im- 
proves the morals. History shows that the ferocity 
of men has always been in proportion to their igno- 
rance. 

We have shown that of itself this culture does 
not corrupt morals : it may, however, do so inci- 
dentally ; and hence we sometimes see learned men 
whose conduct instead of being virtuous is exceed- 
ingly vicious. These men abuse their knowledge, 
and the more learned they are the greater is the 
abuse of which they are guilty, according to the 
maxim : corruptio optimi pessima, (the worst cor- 
ruption is that of the wise) . But from this abuse of 
knowledge certainly nothing can be proved against 
knowledge itself, or against the culture of the arts 
and sciences. 

It is objected against this proposition that the 
Egyptians, Greeks and Komans became wicked as 
they became more learned. 

Intellectual culture had nothing to do with this, 
for the arts and sciences flourished in those countries 
long before the people became corrupt. Many ex- 
amples may be given, on the other hand, of nations 
that became great and illustrious in consequence of 
the spread of knowledge among them ; as the Franks 
under Charlemagne, the Italians under Leo X., &c. 

It is said also that many ancient nations remained 
invincible so long as they remained ignorant ; as the 
Persians, the Eomans, &c. The inference that 
science caused the weakness of those nations is false ; 
for it has not been proved that the study of science 
lessens the warlike spirit. And even supposing 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 207 

that such culture had weakened the courage of those 
peoples, Ave should still have to examine whether 
they were less happy after this warlike spirit declined 
than they had been while their heroism rendered 
them invincible : for, as the most courageous people 
are often the slaves of the lowest vices, it is certain 
that a warlike spirit alone is not sufficient to cause 
the other virtues to flourish in a nation. 

Second question. — Whether it is profitable for 
people in general to engage in the study of the 
sciences and the liberal arts. 

That it is profitable for all people to know how 
to read and write, and be acquainted with the 
common branches of knowledge, is something which 
we all know by experience. Beading especially 
is very useful to help them in the acquisition of 
the religious knowledge which is indispensable to 
them. But it may perhaps remain a question 
whether it is always profitable to children in humble 
circumstances to be instructed in those arts and 
sciences which will be of no service to them in the 
sphere of life in which they have been placed by 
Providence ; for such studies generally serve only to 
disgust them with their condition, without enabling: 
them to rise above it, unless indeed they are pos- 
sessed of great natural talent. 

(b) Culture of the Sensibility. 

The various propensities of the sensibility may be 
reduced to two : love and hatred. The first was 
called by the ancients the concupiscible appetite, or 
the appetite of desire ; and the second the irascible 
appetite, or the appetite of anger. 



208 ethics; 

1st. Love should be directed towards the supreme 
good; and diverted from all bad or dangerous objects. 
The supreme good is God, and all created good 
must be loved for his sake, and in proportion to the 
degree of its perfection, or its approach to the su- 
preme good. 

Love should be diverted from every bad and dan- 
gerous object, that is, from everything which could 
prevent man from attaining his end. Among these 
dangerous objects are, bad books, most theatrical 
exhibitions, public balls, masks, etc. 

2nd. Hatred must be overcome by the repression 
of the irascible appetite, so that it may not become 
a habit, which would be so much opposed to our own 
happiness and to the good of others. In order to 
correct this natural disposition to anger, which is. 
the source of hatred, we should always think well 
of our neighbor's intentions and abstain from show- 
ing any external marks of ill-humor. 

(c) Culture of the Will. 

The will is the first and constitutive faculty of 
human morality. Its culture is of even more im- 
portance that of all the other faculties, since they 
serve only for the perfecting of the will. The cul- 
ture and good, use of the will consists in avoiding 
evil and doing good ; and, consequently, this culture 
is the final object of the whole science of Ethics. 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 209 

CHAPTER THIRD. 

Of the Duties of Men towards One Another. 

The first question that presents itself in this con- 
nection is whether man was created for society, or 
not. When this has been answered we will con- 
sider the duties of men in their relations with 
society. 

Society is the union of many persons for the pur- 
pose of attaining certain ends by their united efforts. 
Since society is threefold, domestic, civil and uni- 
versal, we shall consider the different duties of men 
in reference to this threefold society. 

Preliminary Article. — Destiny of man for the 
state of society, and consequences resulting from 
this state. 

(A) Destiny of man for the state of society. 

We here propose to give our chief attention to 
the refutation of Rousseau, who pretended to believe 
that man was not destined for the state of society, 
and that the state of society is actually hurtful to 
him, since it is the source of all the calamities and 
all the vices in the world. 

Proposition. — -Man toas born to live in society with 
Ms fellow men. 

Argument : Man was born for that state which is 
required by his propensities and his necessities ; but 
his propensities and necessities demand that he 
should live in society with his fellows, and hence 
he was born for that society. 

Proof: 1st. His propensities require the state of 



210 ethi.cs; 

society ; for all men have a certain inclination to 
live in society, an inclination which we call the de- 
sire of society : now this propensity is natural to 
man, since it is found in every man and is inherent 
in the human mind itself. That this propensity is 
universal is evident from the fact that men have 
always lived in society. In the beginning, as soon 
as mankind became too numerous for the family 
form of government, they established among them- 
selves a sort of public polity, by which the supreme 
authority was placed . in the h ands of one or more 
persons. From this fact, which is well established 
by history and tradition, we conclude that man was 
created to live in civil and political, as well as in 
domestic society. This propensity is inherent in 
the human mind ; for experience shows that nothing 
is more tedious to man than solitude. Consequent- 
ly, the propensities of man jDrove that he was born 
to live in society. 

2nd. Man's necessities require the state of society. 
Domestic society is necessary for the development of 
man's intelligence and morality. A few examples 
of persons who have lived in the forests like wild 
beasts prove the truth of this assertion. 

Civil society is necessary to man for the complete 
development of his faculties. To fully develop his 
aptitude for the cultivation of the arts and sciences, 
man must have imitation and emulation, which are 
to be found only in civil society. The wants of man 
therefore render society necessary to man, and con- 
sequently prove that he was born for society. 

Principles to be observed in answering objections : 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 211 

(a) The abuses sometimes found in society, as the 
tyranny of rulers and the slavery of those subject 
to them, do not prove that the state of society is in- 
jurious to man ; because, first, these abuses are not 
essentially connected with society, since they are not 
found everywhere ; and,, secondly, the abuses of 
tyranny and servitude would be greater and more 
frequent in the savage state than they are in the 
state of civilized society. 

(b) Sickness and other infirmities, which are 
sometimes said to be more frequent in a state of so- 
ciety than in a savage state, do not show that the 
state of society is hurtful to man ; because, first, 
temperate and sober men, no matter where they live, 
are always in good health ; and, secondly, although 
the dwellers in the wilderness are often stronger, 
they are not happier than those in civilized society, 
for happiness is found only in the development of 
all the powers of the body and the mind, especially 
those of the latter, which are but feebly developed 
in a savage state. 

(B) Consequences resulting from the state of so- 
ciety. — Inequality of condition in life, and right of 
property. 

Men cannot live in society with one another 
unless there be some inequality of condition among 
them, and unless the right to acquire and OAvn 
property be recognized. 

(a) Inequality of condition. 

Here again we have to refute Eousseau, who taught 
that this inequality is an evil and contrary to natural 
right. Tliis doctrine has been accepted and taught 



212 ethic s ; 

by St. Simon and Lis disciples who have labored to 
do away with every privilege of origin, condition, 
sex and nationality. To refute this system we 
propose the following 

Proposition. — Inequality of condition among men 
is not opposed to natural right. 

Argument : That which necessarily results from 
man's nature, and from his destiny to live in society. 
c mnot be contrary to natural right ; but such is the. 
case with inequality of condition among men, hence 
this inequality is not opposed to natural right. 

Proof: First, this inequality results from man's 
nature, since that nature subjects children to parents, 
the younger to the older, the weaker to the stronger, 
the ignorant to the learned, &c.,and thus establishes 
unequal conditions among men : secondly, it results 
from the destiny of men to live in society ; for no 
civil society can exist unless there be rulers and 
magistrates, the executors and defenders of the 
laws, which the citizens are bound to respect, and 
consequently unless there be among the citizens the 
inequality resulting from the necessary exercise of 
authority. 

(b) The right of property. 

We have already given the definition of right. 
The right of property, or property, is the lawful 
power of doing something or of requiring something 
to be done for our own benefit, and of preventing 
others from using that right. The things that form 
the object of property are either movable or immova- 
ble : that is, capable of being moved from place to 
place without serious injury, or incapable of such 
movement. 



OK, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 213 

The right of property has been lately attacked 
by the Communists, whose system has been reduced 
to the following words : u La propriete c'est le vol," 
our property is whatever we wish to take. Against 
this false doctrine we establish the following 

Proposition. — The right of property is a lawful 
right. 

Argument: That is lawful which necessarily re- 
sults from our activity, which has been acknowl- 
edged as lawful by all men, and which is necessary 
for the existence and well-bein^; of society. 

Proof: 1st. This right naturally flows from our 
activity ; for when a man by his own activity and 
industry has improved some portion of matter 
which was not before occupied by another, he has, 
by that very fact, attached to the matter something 
which is his own, and which cannot be taken from 
him without depriving him of what is his, and con- 
sequently without injuring him. Hence the right 
necessarily results from our activity. 

2nd. The lawfulness of the right of property has 
been acknowledged by all men. History shows this. 

3d. Without this right domestic society is not 
possible. This society would be destroyed if pa- 
rents could not feed, educate and provide for the 
livelihood of their children ; but it is plain that 
they could not perform these duties if they had not 
the right of property, and consequently could not 
make donations, wills, &c. 

4th. Civil society also is impossible without this 
right ; for the industrious will cease to exert them- 
selves as soon as they find that they have to divide 



214 ethics; 

the fruits of their toil with the lazy. Hence the 
truth of the proposition. 

Corollary. — We may conclude that the right of 
property does not originate in civil authority, al- 
though this authority may direct and regulate it : 
civil authority should protect, but never destroy 
this right. 

It is objected to the proposition that the soil is 
necessary for the exercise of human labor ; and, 
consequently, that being thus necessary for the gen- 
erality of mankind it«cannot become the property of 
any particular man ; and hence that no one can have 
any exclusive right to property. 

The minor of this argument is false : for as soon 
as any one by his own labor has improved anything 
which was not before occupied, he has the right, as 
we have shown, to retain that thing as his own ; 
otherwise he would be deprived of the fruits of his 
own labor. Nor can it be said that it is lawful to 
take property thus improved on account of the right 
which every one has to make use of some part of 
the earth : for we cannot admit that there can exist 
any right in opposition to another prior and well 
established right. Hence some part of the soil may 
become the exclusive property of one person. 



OR j MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 215 

DUTIES OF MEN IN THEIK KELATIONS 
WITH SOCIETY. 

Article First. — The Duties of Men in Eelation to 
Domestic Society. 

Domestic society is the union of husband and wife, 
together with their children, besides servants and 
other immediate dependents, all forming one family. 
Domestic society is therefore threefold, conjugal, 
parental and herile. 

(a) Conjugal society is that established between 
husband and wife by marriage. The first end of 
marriage is the birth of children, that the number 
of those who love and honor God may be thus in- 
creased. The second end of marriage is that each 
one may find in the society of a consort help and 
support in order to bear more easily the burdens of 
life. Two other ends, less perfect but not unlawful, 
may be added to these : marriage is contracted to 
enable each one to avoid more easily the sins of im- 
purity ; and also sometimes in order to have heirs 
to names, properties and dignities. 

The choice of a partner for life should be attended 
with the greatest care : first, by asking light from 
God ; secondly, by seeking the advice of parents ; 
thirdly, by endeavoring to choose a person remarka- 
ble for piety and virtue ; fourthly, by observing, as 
far as possible, a similarity of age, condition, for- 
tune, &c; and, fifthly, by being honest and truthful 
towards one another before the marriage is contracted. 

The duties of married persons arc : mutual love, 



216 ethics; 

conjugal fidelity, mutual obedience, and mutual 
help. 

(b) Parental society is that existing between pa : 
rents and children, especially in reference to the 
education of the latter. 

The duties of parents toward their children con- 
sist, first, in providing them food, raiment and 
shelter ; second, in teaching them the elements of 
the Christian doctrine and giving them habits of 
piety and morality ; third, in giving them an edu- 
cation suitable to their condition and talents ; and, 
fourth, in providing them with the means of making 
their own livelihood. 

The duties of children towards their parents con- 
sist in honor, respect, love, obedience and assistance. 

(c) Her lie society is that existing between em- 
ployer and employed, for their mutual advantage. 

The duties of employers consist in treating those 
in their employ with humanity, kindness and justice ; 
in keeping the contracts or agreements made with 
them ; in watching over their moral conduct ; and 
in giving them opportunities of attending to their 
religious duties. 

The duties of servants to their masters consist in 
reverence, obedience and fidelity. 

Article Segond.— The Duties of Men in Relation 
to Civil Society. 

We shall first make some general remarks con- 
cerning civil society, and then speak of the duties 
of men as members of this soeietv. 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 21 7 

I. Civil Society Considered in Itself. 

(A) Nature and forms of civil society. 

Civil society is an association of men living together 
under the same supreme power, in order to derive 
from it certain temporal advantages. By these last 
words civil is distinguished from spiritual society. 

Civil society is threefold in form : monarchy, 
aristocracy and democracy ; according as the supreme 
power resides in one man, in several citizens or in 
the whole people. 

Monarchy (pdvog dpxn) is the form of civil society 
in which the supreme power resides in one man, 
who is called king, emperor, &c. The monarchy is 
either elective or hereditary. 

Aristocracy (apiang^ Kp&rog") is the form of civil so- 
ciety in which the supreme power is in the hands of 
an order of citizens of high rank : when the number 
of those thus holding the supreme power is but few, 
we have what is called an oligarchy (o?ayog ipxn), 
but this word is generally used in a bad sense. 

Democracy (<%o? icp&rog") is the form of civil society 
in which the supreme power is placed in the whole 
body of the citizens, certain classes, however, are 
often excepted. 

Some forms are called mixed governments, as the 
limited monarchy, called also a constitutional gov- 
ernment. 

Every form of civil society has its own advan- 
tages, but also, on account of the passions of men, 
its disadvantages ; and it may be said that no one 
form is equally suitable for all peoples. 

10 



218 ethics; 

(B) The supreme power in civil society. 

By the supreme power in civil society is meant 
the power which governs that society without any 
subordination to another power residing in the same 
society. 

The necessity of such a power is evident ; but we 
must examine several questions in reference to it : 
(a ) What are the characteristics and attributes of 
the supreme power in civil society, " (b) what is the 
origin or foundation of this power, (c) by what 
means it is acquired, and (d) what are the causes 
for which it may be taken away. 

(a) Characteristics and attributes of the supre.me 
power. 

This power must first be independent of any other 
authoritv residing in the same state, for otherwise 
it would not be supreme ; and, second, it must be 
one, for otherwise there would be a perpetual strug- 
gle, and consequently civil war. anarchy and ruin. 

The attributes proceed from the duties and rights 
which pertain to this society. They are of three 
kinds, legislative, judicial and executive: these 
attributes of framing laws, of pronouncing judg- 
ment, and of carrving laws and sentences into effect 
are incidental to the supreme power. 

(b) Origin or foundation of the supreme power. 
Whence originates this power of making laws and 

punishing those who do not obey them? Some say 
that it originates in the will of the people, who 
confer upon the magistrate the authority necessary 
for the exercise of his office. Others contend that 
this supreme power in civil society derives its au- 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 219 

thority from the will of God, who, having destined 
man for this society, has for this reason established 
supreme power, and attached to it the right to com- 
pel obedience. This latter opinion is the one enter- 
tained by the Christian philosophers ; and, to prove 
it to be correct, we establish with them the followin g 
Proposition. — The supreme authority in civil society 
comes ultimately from God, and not from the people. 

(1) This authority does not come from the people : 
for, as we have before said, to create an obligation 
two wills are necessary, one of a superior and the 
other of an inferior ; but the will of the people is 
not that of a superior, since all men are by nature 
equal ; consequently, neither the will of one man 
nor that of several, considered abstractly from the 
will of God, can impose any obligation upon another 
man. Men may choose one man, or several men, to 
exercise the supreme authority ; but they cannot 
confer any authority, since they have none. 

(2) The supreme authority comes from God. 
Since God wills that all men should live in civil 
society, he must have established a supreme author- 
ity, for without this authority civil society cannot 
exist. God therefore wills that a supreme author- 
ity exist among men ; hence he creates it, and it 
conies from him and not from the j)eople. 

(c) Means by which the supreme power is acquired. 

This question is twofold : How was supreme power 
acquired in the beginning ; and how is it acquired 
now, when society is formed and consolidated ? 

1st. Four opinions have been entertained concern- 
ing the manner in which supreme power was ac- 



220 ethics; 

quired in the beginning : The first of these is that 
authority was acquired by election ; the second 
opinion is that the supreme authority in civil society 
is but an extension of the paternal authority ; ac- 
cording to the third opinion, men wanting protection 
acknowledged themselves dependent on others more 
powerful than they were ; the fourth opinion is that 
G-od intervened directly and thus established su- 
preme authority. 

The fourth opinion is brought forward gratu- 
itously, and we reject it in like manner. The 
second and the third opinion, unless they be con- 
sidered substantially the same as the first, may also 
be rejected ; for acknowledgment of superiority and 
paternity does not of itself constitute supreme au- 
thority, or even the right to exercise this authority, 
unless an election take place, that is, unless the peo- 
ple choose their rulers ; and this is the first opinion, 
which is the true one. 

2nd. How may supreme authority be now acquired, 
that is when society is already formed? 

Four means are considered lawful for such an ac- 
quisition : election, succession, victory in a just war, 
and prescription; The first three of these need no 
explanation. In regard to prescription it is held 
that a ruler who is at first a usurper may after a 
time and under certain circumstances exercise a 
lawful authority. The lawfulness of such authority 
is grounded on reason and the consent of the people. 

Reason teaches that one who has for many years 
exercised supreme ppwer, even though originally a 
usurper, ought not to be deprived of this power at 



OK, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 221 

the imminent risk of greater calamities. In such 
cases God will confer supreme authority, because 
the welfare of the people is the supreme law. 

The consent of the people also shows the lawful- 
ness of prescription : it is recognized everywhere 
now, and we find examples of it in almost every 
country. 

(d) Causes for which supreme power may he taken 
from a ruler. 

These are : first, abdication ; second, expiration 
of the term of election or appointment ; third, 
expulsion after defeat in an unjust war ; fourth, 
revocation on the part of the, appointing power ; 
fifth, removal for causes provided for in the con- 
stitution, as was the case in some parts of G-ermany 
during the middle ages in regard to princes who 
forfeited their power on becoming heretics. Con- 
cerning these five causes there is no controversy. 

But it has been made a question whether insur- 
rection against constituted authority be a law- 
ful cause for taking away supreme power from a 
ruler. Three opinions have been given in answer 
to this question. The first is that of J. J. Rous- 
seau, who pretends that a people may revolt against 
their rulers and expel them for any cause whatever. 
Rousseau logically deduces this opinion from his 
system concerning the origin of power, but the con- 
sequence is as false as the premises. The second 
opinion is that of Suarez, Bellarmin and others, 
who say that in case of tyranny it is lawful to re- 
volt against a ruler and expel him. A third opinion 
is held by Bossuet and others, who teach that it is 



222 ethics; 

never lawful to revolt against a ruler, however 
tyrannical his government may be. These two 
opinions may he defended ; still it must he confessed 
that the opinion of Bellarinin, though more plausi- 
ble in theory, is rather dangerous in practice, being 
fraught with fearful consequences. 

II. Duties of Men Considered as Members of Civil 
Society. 

(A) Duties of all citizens to their country : First, 
they must obey the laws ; second, they should exert 
their talents for the good of their country, by fol- 
lowing some occupation useful to society ; third, 
they must contribute from their wealth to the sup- 
port of the government (by taxes, &c); and, fourth, 
when necessary, they must even sacrifice their life 
for their country. 

(B) Duties of magistrates : First, they are bound 
in all their actions to aim at the good of civil society ; 
second, they should strictly follow the dictates of 
justice, by bestowing offices and honors on the most 
deserving, hj inflicting punishments in proportion 
to crimes and not tolerating any conduct opposed to 
the public welfare, and by refraining from wronging 
the people by granting injurious monopolies and 
from wronging foreign nations by unjust treaties or 
alliances. To these should be added two other 
duties : those placed in supreme power should be- 
come thoroughly acquainted with the science of 
government in all its departments, and above all 
they should always show a good example in all 
things. 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 223 

(C) Duties of citizens towards their chief magis- 
trates. These" duties are respect and obedience to 
their authority ; for, as we have seen, this authority 
comes from Grod. 

Artigle Third. — Duties of Men Towards One 
Another. 

These duties may be reduced to two: to do unto 
others as we would have them to do unto us, and 
not to do unto others what we would not have them 
do unto us. The first are positive duties and the 
others negative. 

I. Positive Duties. 

These may be named in the following order: 
First, we must love our fellow men, since we are all 
the children of God ; and, second, we must do good 
to them, for idle charity is unavailing. The good 
works which we must perform for other persons are 
both spiritual and temporal. 

A certain order should be observed in our charity. 
According to St. Bernard, the rule of charity is that 
those in most need should receive first. In other 
cases we should prefer those who are near to us in 
blood, friendship or religion. " True charity begins 
at home." 

II. Negative Duties — Duels. 

Negative duties are those that prescribe something 
to be avoided. We must avoid everything which 
may injure our neighbor, either in soul or in body. 

We injure the souls of our fellow men by scandal ; 
and we injure their bodies, first, by homicide, or by 



224 ethics; 

mutilating, wounding or striking them (out evi- 
dently there is no injustice in injuring, or even kill- 
ing, an unjust assailant); second, by stealing from 
them or otherwise injuring their property ; and, 
third, by injuring their good name. 

Duels. — A duel is a private combat between two 
persons, according to a previous agreement, the 
place, time and arms, being also agreed upon. 
Against this unholy practice we establish the fol- 
lowing 

Proposition. — Duelling is opposed to natural right. 

Natural right forbids us to kill another, or to ex- 
pose our own life, without sufficient reason. But 
he who fights a duel endangers his own life and that 
of his adversary without sufficient reason. The reason 
given must be, for instance, to prove one's innocence, 
to avenge an injury, to preserve one's honor, or to 
show that one is coura°;eous ; but none of these rea- 
sons is a sufficient cause for eno-airino; in a duel : for, 
first, the innocent one may be killed, and thus it 
may be made to appear that he is guilty ; secondly, 
no one has a right by his private authority to 
avenge himself; thirdly, honor cannot be acquired 
by a duel, it is rather a mark of heroism, and con- 
sequently of honor, to bear injuries with patience ; 
and, fourthly, true courage is shown by practicing 
patience, and by reserving the sacrifice of one's life 
for the acquisition of something preferable to life 
itself, as the safety of our family or our country. 

Observation. — Duelling, which is forbidden by 
the natural law when undertaken by private author- 
itv, may become lawful when performed under the 



OR, MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 225 

direction of the magistrate for the good of the state, 
as when David went forth from the army of Saul to 
challenge Grolliath to mortal combat. 

The Church forbids duelling under pain of sepa- 
ration from her communion. 

To answer objections,, let us observe that there are 
two kinds of honor, true and fictitious : true honor 
is that founded on virtue, and fictitious honor is 
that based upon the opinions of men. We must 
defend true honor, even at the risk of life ; for virtue 
is preferable to life itself : but fictitious honor ought 
not to be preserved at the risk of life, for human 
glory is no virtue. True honor never requires a 
duel for its preservation ; on the contrary it requires 
that duelling should be avoided. 

Sonle persons object that no one is obliged to 
suffer the loss of his reputation . This is false : if 
fame among men cannot be preserved without vio- 
lating natural right and divine law, let it perish. 

They add also that sometimes, especially among 
soldiers, a duel cannot be avoided without serious 
inconvenience, and consequently that in such a case 
it is allowed. Again the consequent is false: no 
inconvenience can render that lawful which is wrong 
in itself and forbidden by the natural law. 

They still add that he who refuses to engage in a 
duel lowers himself in his own estimation. This 
objection is not a serious one : such a man should 
modify his opinion of himself, for it is a false one ; 
his error cannot make duelling lawful. 

The above exposition of our duties is deemed 
sufficiently developed for a course of philosophy. 
10* 



226 ETHICS. 

Let us close by saying that it is not enough for us to 
know our duties, we must practice them ; otherwise, 
our knowledge, being without good works, would 
•only make us worse in the sight of God. With the 
help of God, let us endeavor to bring forth fruit by 
the practice of good works, so that being more wise 
we may be more virtuous. 



CONTENTS. 



Preface 3 

INTRODUCTORY. 

I. 

Definitions of Words ? 

A being — Existence — Possibility — Attributes — Essence and nature of a 
thing — Genus — Species — Individuals — Science — Art — Knowledge — Faith. 

II. 

Definitions of Philosophy • • 10 

III. 
Divisions of Philosophy. 12 

IV. 
Argument 13 



PART FIRST.— LOGIC. 
Definition — Division 17 



> 230 CONTENTS. 

FIRST DISSERTATION.— ON IDEAS. 

Chapter Ferst. 

Of Ideas considered as existing in the mind 10 

I I. — Division of Ideas 19 

§ II. — Properties of Ideas 20 

§ III. — Operations of the mind in regard to Ideas 21 

Chapter Second. 
Of Ideas considered out of the mind , 22 



SECOND DISSERTATION.— ON JUDGMENT. 

Chapter First. 
Of Judgment considered as existing in the mind 23 

Chapter Second. 

Of Judgment considered as existing out of the mind 24 

§ I. — Conversion of Propositions 27 

\ II. — Opposition of Propositions 28 



THIRD DISSERTATION.— ON REASONING:. 
Chapter First. 

Of the SyllogiSni and its rules 30 

Chapter Secoxd. 

Of the different sorts of Syllogisms 34 

Chapter Third. 

Of the forms of argument other than the Syllogism 37 

Chapter Fourth. 
Of Sophisms 39 



CONTENTS. 231 

Chapter Fifth. 
Of the sources of Sophisms 43 



FOURTH DISSERTATION.— ON METHOD. 

First Division, the Method of Invention 45 

Second Division, the Method of Demonstration, or Dialectics 48 



FIFTH DISSERTATION— ON CERTITUDE. 

Chapteb First. 

Preliminary notions — Definitions 50 

Chapter Second. 

Of the Criterion of Certitude 52 

Chapter Third. 

Of the Existence of Certitude 55 

Chapter Fourth. 

Of the Motives of Certitude 60 

1st Motive — The Certitude of pure reason 60 

2nd Motive — Consciousness 62 

3d Motive — The evidence of the senses 63 

4th Motive — The consent of mankind in things of the 

moral order 65 

5th Motive — The testimony of men 67 

§ I . — Authority of such testimony concerning natural 

facts 69 

§ II. — Authority of the same testimony concerning 

supernatural facts , 72 

6th Motive— Memory 73 

7th Motive — Induction or analogy 74 

Appendix— Probability 76 



232 CONTENTS. 

PART SECOND— METAPHYSICS. 

FIRST DISSERTATION.— ON ONTOLOGY. 

Chapter First. 
Of the notion, essence, possibility of a being in general 82 

Chapter Second. 
Of the causes and the effects of beings 85 

Chapter Third. 

Of the different species of being 89 

Article First. — Substance and modification 89, 

Article Second. — Infinite and finite substances 91 

Article Third. — Material and spiritual substances 92 

Chapter Fourth. 

Of the properties of being 93 

Chapter Fifth. 

Of space and time 97 



SECOND DISSERTATION.— ON THEODICY. 

part first.— the existexce of god. 

Chapter First. 

Of Atheism 101 

§ 1st. — Is it prudent to remain indifferent concerning the 

existence of God? 101 

§ 2nd. — Are there any evils resulting from the adoption 

of the theory of the Atheists? 103 

I 3d.— Is Theism better than Atheism ? 104 

§ 4th. — Is Theism safer than Atheism? 104 

§ 5th. — Is Atheism worse than Polytheism? 104 



CONTENTS. 233 

Chapter Second. 

Of the proofs of the existence of God 105 

Article First.- — Metaphysical argument 105 

Article Second. — Physical argument 109 

Article Third. — Moral argument 112 



part second.— the attributes of god. 
Chaptek First. 

Of the unity of God 116 

Article First. — The unity of God proved against the 

Polytheists 116 

Article Second — The unity of God against the Dualists 118 
Article Third. — The origin of evil under a being infi- 
nitely good 119 

Chapter Second. 
Of the eternity of God 121 

CnAPTER Third. 
Of the immutability of God 122 

Chapter Fourth. 

Of the liberty of God 122 

Article First. — The existence of the liberty of God 123 

Article Second. — Pantheism 124 

Article Third. — Optimism 126 

Chapter Fifth. 
Of the omnipotence and independence of God 128 

Chapter Sixth. 

Of the simplicity of God 129 

Chapter Seventh. 
Of the immensity of God ..,.,. 130 



234 CONTENTS. 

Chapter Eighth. 

Of the knowledge of God 131 

Chapter. Ninth. 

Of the wisdom of God 133 

Chapter Tenth. 

Of the sanctity and veracity of God 134 

Chapter Eleventh. 

Of the goodness and happiness of God 134 

Chapter Twelfth. 

Of the justice of God 135 

Chapter Thirteenth. 

Of the providence of God 135 

Article First. — The existence of providence 135 

Article Second. — Consequences of the existence of prov- 
idence in regard to the free actions of men 137 



THIRD DISSERTATION.— ON PSYCHOLOGY. 

part first— experimental psychology. 
Chapter First. 

Of sensibility 141 

(A) Physical sensibility 142 

(a) Organic impressions 143 

(b) Sensations 143 

(c) Appetite 143 

(B) Interior sensibility 144 

(a) Personal affections 144 

(b) Social desires 145 

(c) Sentiments involving some conception of pure 
reason 145 



CONTENTS. 235 

Chapter Second. 

Of the intellect 146 

Article First. — The perceptive faculties 146 

(A) Experimental perceptions 146 

(B) Rational perceptions, or pure reason 147 

Article Second. — The reflective faculties — Language... 148 

(a) General notions 148 

(b) Language considered in relation to thought 149 

(c) Origin of language 150 

1st. The question of fact 150 

2nd. The question of possibility 151 

Article Third. — The nature and origin of our ideas . . • 152 

1st. The nature of our ideas 152 

2nd. The origin of our ideas 153 

(a) System of the Sensists 154 

(b) The doctrine of innate ideas ^155 

(c) The doctrine of the intuition of God 156 

Chapter Third. 

Of activity 157 

The freedom of the human soul 158 

part second.— rational psychology. 

Chapter First. 

Of the nature of the human soul, or of its spirituality 161 

Chapter Second. 

Of the union of the soul with the body 164 

Chapter Third. 

Of the destiny of the soul 169 

Chapter Fourth. 

Of the souls of animals 170 

Article First.— The faculties of the souls of animals. . . . 170 
Article Second. — The nature and destiny of the souls of 
animals 172 



236 CONTENTS. 

PART THIRD.— ETHICS ; OR, MORAL 
PHILOSOPHY. 

FIRST DISSERTATION.— ON HUMAN ACTIONS IN 
GENERAL. 

Chapter First. 

Of the difference between good and bad actions 178 

Art cle First. — The difference between moral good and 
moral evil 179 

Article Second — The obligations of doing good and 

avoiding evil, or the existence of the natural law 181 

Article Third. — The promulgation of this natural law. . 184 
Article Fourth. — The immutability of the natural law. . 186 
Article Fifth. — The sanction of the natural lav/. 187 

Chapter Second. 

Of the principles of good and bad actions 190 

Chapter Third. 

Rules for distinguishing good from bad actions 191 



SECOND DISSERTATION.— ON HUMAN ACTIONS IN 
PARTICULAR. 

Chapter First. 

Of the duties of men towards God < 193 

Article First.— The necessity of religious worship 193 

Article Second.— The causes which induce men either to 
neglect or to corrupt the worship of God 197 

Chapter Second. 

Of the duties of man towards himself ■ 197 

Article First.— The obligation of preserving the life of 
the body • • • • 1£ ^ 



CONTENTS. 237 

Article Second. — The obligation of cultivating the facul- 
ties of the mind 203 

(a) The culture of the intellect 203 

(b) The culture of the sensibility 207 

(c) The culture of the will. 208 

Chapter Third. 

Duties of man towards his fellow men 203 

(A) Destiny of man for the state of society ..... 209 

(B) Consequences resulting from the state of society: 
Inequality of conditions in life — right of property 211 

DUTIES OF MEN IX THEIR RELATIONS WITH SOCIETY. 

Article First. — Duties of men in relation to domestic 
society 215 

(a) Conjugal society * 215 

(b) Parental society 216 

(c) Herile society £16 

Article Second. — The duties of men in relation to civil 

society 216 

I. Civil society considered in itself 217 

(A) Nature of civil society and its various forms 217 

(B) The supreme power in civil society 218 

(a) Characteristics and attributes of the supreme 
power 218 

(b) Origin and foundation of the supreme power 218 

(c) Means by which it is acquired 219 

(d) Causes for which supreme power may be taken 
from a ruler 221 

II. Duties of men considered as members of civil so- 

ciety 222 

Article Third. — Duties of men towards one another. . . . 223 

I. Positive duties , 223 

II. Negative duties — Duels 223 



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